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ABSTRACT
The dissertation is composed by three chapters. In Chapter 2 (coauthored with
Matthew Wiswall) I develop new results for the identification and estimation of the
technology of children’s skill formation when children’s skills are unobserved. In
Chapter 3 I shed light on the importance of dynamic equilibrium interdependencies
between children’s social interactions and parental investments decisions in explaining
developmental differences between different social environments. In Chapter 4 (coau-
thored with Giuseppe Sorrenti) I study the effect of family income and maternal hours
worked on both cognitive and behavioral child development.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The dissertation is divided in three chapters. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew
Wiswall, we develop a new estimator for the process of children’s skill formation. The
wide dispersion of measured human capital in children and its strong correlation with
later life outcomes has prompted a renewed interest in understanding the determi-
nants of skill formation among children (for a recent review, see Heckman and Mosso,
2014b). However, the empirical challenges in estimating the skill formation process,
principally the technology of child development, is hampered by the likely imperfect
measures of children’s skills we have available. While measurement issues exist in
many areas of empirical research, they may be particularly salient in research about
child development. There exists a number of different measures of children’s skills,
and each measure can be arbitrarily located and scaled and provide widely differing
levels of informativeness about the underlying latent skills of the child. 1 In the
presence of these measurement issues, identification of the underlying latent process
of skill development is particularly challenging, but nonetheless essential because ig-
noring the measurement issues through ad hoc simplifying assumptions could severely
bias our inferences.
In this paper, we develop a new method to estimate the skill formation process
in children when skills are not observed directly but instead measured with error.
Rather than assuming skills are measured perfectly by a particular measure, we ac-
commodate the variety of skills measures used in practice and allow latent skills to be
1For a recent analysis of how measurement issues can be particularly salient, see Bond and Lang
(2013b,a) who analyze the black-white test score gap.
1
measured with error using a system of arbitrarily located and scaled skill measures.
In our framework, we treat the parameters of the measurement model as “nuisance”
parameters and use transformations of moments of the measurement data to elim-
inate them, analogous to the transformations used to eliminate fixed effects with
panel data. We show non-parametric identification of the primitive parameters of the
production technology, without assuming any particular values for the measurement
process parameters or “re-normalizing” latent skills each period.
The heart of our identification analysis is a characterization of the classes of pro-
duction technologies which can be identified given different assumptions about the
measurement process. We introduce the concept of production technologies that have
a known location and scale, technologies which are implicitly restricted so that the
location and scale is already known. These known location and scale (KLS) tech-
nologies include the CES production technologies considered in a number of previous
papers (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010; Cunha and Heckman, 2008;
Pavan, 2015). Starting with this class of technologies, we show that standard measure-
ment error assumptions non-parametrically identify the primitive production function
parameters, up to a normalization on the initial conditions only. Importantly, identifi-
cation is obtained without restrictions on the later skill measures as imposed in some
previous papers, which can bias the production function estimates (see Agostinelli
and Wiswall (2016b) for a discussion).
Our identification analysis builds on previous work but offers a distinct approach
to the empirical challenges. Previous approaches apply the techniques developed
for cross-sectional latent factor models (Anderson and Rubin, 1956; Jo¨reskog and
Goldberger, 1975; Goldberger, 1972; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1975; Chamberlain,
1977a,b; Carneiro et al., 2003) to the dynamic latent factor models describing the
development of children’s skills. In an influential paper applying latent factor model-
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ing to child development, Cunha et al. (2010) identify the skill production technology
by first “re-normalizing” the latent skill distribution at each period, treating the
skills in each period as separate latent factors. While latent skills, which lack a
meaningful location and scale, require some normalization (say at the initial period),
repeated re-normalization every period is an unnecessary over-identifying restriction
if the production function estimated already has a known location and scale, as is
the case for the technology estimated by Cunha et al. (2010). We show that non-
parametric identification of this class of KLS production functions is possible without
these re-normalization restrictions, and our identification approach avoids imposing
restrictions these restrictions because they can bias the estimation (Agostinelli and
Wiswall (2016b)).
In an important extension of our baseline results, we develop additional restric-
tions on the measurement process which are sufficient for identification of more gen-
eral production technologies, including those exhibiting Hicks neutral total factor
productivity (TFP) dynamics and non-constant returns to scale. Using standard as-
sumptions, these more general technologies cannot be identified because the location
and scale of the technology cannot be separately identified from the location and
scale of the measures. These more general aspects of the skill development formation
process are nonetheless potentially important as restricting the technology can reduce
the permissible skill dynamics and productivity of investments, substantially chang-
ing our inferences about the child development process and our evaluation of policy.
Our paper provides the first identification results for these more general models. Our
analysis makes clear the key identification tradeoff researchers face: identification
of restricted KLS technologies is possible with standard measurement assumptions,
but identification of more general technologies requires stronger assumptions. We
evaluate the empirical relevance of these additional assumptions, and provide guid-
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ance to researchers to evaluate whether the measures available to them satisfy these
assumptions.
In the second part of our paper, we estimate a flexible parametric version of
our model using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
We examine the development of cognitive skills in children from age 5 to age 14,
and estimate a model of cognitive skill development allowing for complementarties
between parental investment and children’s skills; endogenous parental investment
responding to the stock of children’s skills, maternal skills, and family income; Hicks
neutral dynamics in TFP; non-constant returns to scale; and unobserved shocks to
the investment process and skill production. Following Cunha et al. (2010), our
empirical framework treats not only the child’s cognitive skills as measured with
error, but investment and maternal skills as well.
Constructively derived from our identification analysis, we form a method of mo-
ments estimator. Our estimator is not only relatively simple and tractable but also
robust because it does not impose parametric distributional assumptions on the distri-
bution of latent skills and measurement errors, as is commonly imposed in previous
estimators. We jointly estimate the technology of skill formation, the process of
parental investments in children, and the adult distribution of completed schooling
and earnings, allowing the production technology and investment process to freely
vary as the child ages. Our estimates of high TFP and increasing returns to scale
at early ages indicate that investments are particularly productive early in the de-
velopment period. We also find that the marginal productivity of early investments
is substantially higher for children with lower existing skills, suggesting the optimal
targeting of interventions to disadvantaged children.
Our estimates of the dynamic process of investment and skill development allow us
to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects of some simple policy interventions.
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We show that even a modest transfer of family income to families at age 5 would
substantially increase children’s skills and completed schooling, with the effects larger
for low income families. When we compare these estimates to those using models
which restrict the technology or ignore measurement error, we estimate policy effects
which are substantially smaller, indicating that the generalities we allow are important
quantitatively to answering key policy questions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we develop the model
of skill development and the measurement process. The next sections analyze the
identification of this model, first under weak assumptions about the measurement
process, and then under stronger assumptions about measurement which allows the
identification of more general technology specifications, including those with TFP
dynamics and non-constant returns to scale. The remainder of the paper develops
our estimator and discusses our estimation results.
In Chapter 3, I study the effects of social interactions on the dynamics of chil-
dren’s skills. This paper analyzes the effect of social interactions on skill formation
in children. In particular, I build and estimate a model of child development, where
children grow up in different environments, which are defined by: peers’ composi-
tion, neighborhood quality and school quality. The dynamics of skills is governed
by a technology of skill formation, which depends upon parental investments, the
current child’s skills and the environment-specific inputs. In this framework, I shed
light on the importance of the dynamic effects of children’s endogenous social inter-
actions and the parental investment decisions in explaining developmental differences
between different environments. A growing consensus in the literature emphasizes the
importance of neighborhoods in shaping children’s opportunities later in life (Chetty
and Hendren, 2016a,b; Chetty et al., 2016a,b). However, despite extensive research,
the mechanisms behind these results remain unexplained. This paper reconciles the
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previous findings of childhood exposure to neighborhood with the role of children’s
social interactions in child development.
This project advances the current literature of child development by building and
estimating a dynamic equilibrium model of children’s skill formation with two inno-
vative empirically grounded features. First, within different environments, children
endogenously select their peer groups based on their preferences for their peers’ char-
acteristics. Social interactions can exhibit the tendency of children to become friends
with others who share similar characteristics: a phenomenon called homophily bias.
Second, parental investments respond to changes in peer groups. Decisions regarding
parental investments depend upon a child’s current peers, as well as on expectations
about future peer groups. Equilibrium effects arise from the socially determined
aspects of parental investments. In this framework, parental investments not only
directly affect a child’s skills, but also affect the development of the child’s peers
through social interactions. Consequently, the individual return on investing in chil-
dren is affected by the equilibrium parental engagement within each environment.
Skills are formed dynamically through a technology of skill formation, which de-
fines the complementarities between parental investments and the other inputs of
child development in producing a child’s skills: the current endowment of skills, the
skills of peers, the school quality and the neighborhood quality. In this framework,
there are two main channels through which peers affect parental behavior. First,
contemporaneous changes in current peers and parental investments are related to
the static complementarity between the two inputs. Second, permanent changes in
peer composition affect parental behavior through the dynamic complementarity in
skill formation. In other words, a permanent change in peer composition affect the
return of parental investments through the dynamic aspect of skill formation.
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The model is estimated using data on U.S. adolescents from the National Longi-
tudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). Add Health provides information
about friendships within each school, which is key for analyzing the formation of peer
groups. Moreover, information about child achievements and parental investments
are available.
The identification of the model comes with two main challenges: (i) unobserved
heterogeneity in how peer groups are endogenously formed; and (ii) children’s skills
and parental investments are unobserved. Ignoring these issues by using correlational
relationships would cause the model’s estimates and subsequent quantitative analysis
to be biased.
The first challenge presents itself from the fact that peer groups may be formed
based on additional unobserved heterogeneity, which can cause correlation between
peer groups’ realization and the residual unexplained variation in skill formation. To
address this concern, I implement a standard instrumental variable (IV) approach in
the literature. This identification strategy exploits random variations in cohort com-
position within school / across cohorts. The idea behind this identification strategy
is simple: random changes in cohort compositions affect the opportunities for friend-
ships between children. These shifts in the formation of peer groups affect the return
of parental investments and the subsequent parental decisions. 2
In addressing the second challenge, Cunha et al. (2010) illustrate that even the
classical measurement error in measuring a child’s skills can cause important biases
in estimating the technology of children’s skill formation. Following the approach
in Cunha et al. (2010) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a), I implement a dynamic
2For previous use of similar source of identifying variation, see Hoxby (2000); Hanushek et al.
(2003); Ammermueller and Pischke (2009); Lavy and Schlosser (2011); Lavy et al. (2012); Bifulco
et al. (2011); Burke and Sass (2013); Card and Giuliano (2016); Carrell et al. (2016); Olivetti et al.
(2016); Patacchini and Zenou (2016)
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latent factor model, which allows me to identify the joint distribution of latent skills
and investments by exploiting multiple measurements in the data.
I estimate the model via simulated method of moments (SMM). I find that parental
investments and peers are substitute inputs in producing children’s skills. At the
same time, I find a strong dynamic complementarity between parental investments
and future expected peers. As a result of these two findings, a permanent change in
peer composition has two opposing effects on parental investments. On one hand,
“better” peers generate contemporaneous substitution effects in investment decisions
due to the high substitutability in the production function. On the other hand, higher
expected future skills for peers produce an “income” effect through the dynamic
complementarity of skill formation. Parents have the incentive to invest more in their
children because a higher-skilled child benefits more from higher-skilled peers in the
future.
Furthermore, my estimates suggest that the formation of peer groups displays an
extensive degree of homophily bias. I show evidence of homophily bias with respect
to a child’s race and level of latent skills. A child who is in the lower quartile of the
skill distribution and belongs to a minority group is four times more likely to befriend
a same-race child than a different-race child. In addition, the same child is two times
more likely to befriend a same-skill and same-race child than a same-race child in the
upper quartile of skill distribution.
I first use the estimated model to analyze the extent to which growing up in
different environments accounts for the variation in children’s outcomes. I find sizable
effects for children moving to better environments. The effects are in proportion to
the exposure time. The earlier children are moved, the higher the effect. A child
who is moved at age 12 to an environment where children have 1 percentile higher
skills at age 16 exhibits, on average, an improvement in her skills rank at age 16 by
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0.63 percentiles. The average effect is 0.48 percentiles if the child is moved at age
15. As model validation, I show that my findings track (out-of-sample) the quasi-
experimental findings of childhood exposure effects of neighborhoods for the U.S.
from Chetty and Hendren (2016a). In addition, my model allows me to decompose
these effects. I find that peers account for more than half of the exposure effects.
The relative importance of peers for the exposure effects underlines the role of
policies that change peers’ composition and promote socioeconomic integration in en-
vironments, as a way to improve outcomes for disadvantaged children. I find that by
moving the most disadvantaged children (in the lower quartile of skill distribution)
from a low-income environment to a high-income environment generates important
dynamic equilibrium effects, with heterogeneous treatment effects for both the moved
and receiving children. I first consider a large-scale policy, i.e. a policy that moves
a sizable fraction of disadvantaged children into a higher-income environment (ap-
proximately 5% of the population of the receiving cohort). I find that the policy
increases the skills of the moved population of 16-year-old children, on average, by
approximately 0.40 standard deviations. On average, I do not find any adverse ef-
fect for receiving children. On the contrary, when the fraction of moved population
increases to 30%, I find that the policy generates winners and losers. First, I find
that the policy increases the skills of the moved population of 16-year-old children on
average by 0.22 standard deviations. In contrast, there is an adverse effect for receiv-
ing children, with the skills of 16-year-old children decreasing, on average, by 0.15
standard deviations. Additionally, I find that children who remained in the sending
environment benefit from the outflow of the most disadvantaged companions, with
an average increase in skills at age 16 of 0.17 standard deviations.
I find that large-scale changes in peers’ composition generate important equilib-
rium feedback effects, and as a result amplify the policy effects. Ignoring equilibrium
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effects would lead to large biases in counterfactual policy predictions for children’s
final skills. In the case of the larger policy, I find that the policy predictions for the
children’s skills in the receiving environment would be approximately seven times
smaller. Part of the bias is due to the dynamic-equilibrium feedback effects on
parental investments. In fact, in the absence of dynamic-equilibrium feedback ef-
fects, the static complementarity between parents and peers dominates the dynamic
effects of the policy.
I find that policy effects for receiving and remaining children reduce in magnitude
as the fraction of moved children decreases. An increase of inflow of the most disad-
vantaged children from the low-income environment to the high-income environment
increases the probability of the receiving children becoming friends with the new com-
panions. For the same reason, an increase of the outflow of the moved population
benefits children who remain in the sending environment. For children who were
moved, the opposite is true. The higher the outflow of disadvantaged companions,
the higher the chances that the moved children remain friends with each other in the
new environment.
My structural model allows me to analyze the distributional policy effects. I find
that large-scale changes in peers’ composition exhibit heterogeneous treatment effects
as a result of the endogenous formation of new peer groups. Children with lower skills
(in the first quartile of the skills distribution in each subpopulation): (i) benefit the
most in leaving disadvantaged social environments; (ii) benefit the most amongst the
children who remained in the sending environment; (iii) are the ones who are more
adversely affected in receiving the new peers. Furthermore, I find stronger policy
effects for minorities, with detrimental effects in black and Hispanic children living
in the receiving environment. This is explained by the fact that most of the moved
children are minorities, and as a result, the minority children from the receiving
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environment are more likely to interact with the new companions because of the race
effects in the endogenous formation of peer groups. In line with this result, previous
empirical studies pointed out that peer effects seem to be stronger intra-race and for
minorities (see Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Imberman et al., 2012)
The paper will be presented as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the related liter-
ature. In Section 3.3, I present the data used for the empirical work and preliminary
empirical results. In Section 3.4 and 3.5, I present the model. In Section 3.6, I de-
scribe the identification strategy. Section 3.7 contains a discussion of the structural
estimation and results. Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 discuss the quantitative analysis
and the model validation. Section 3.10 concludes.
In Chapter 4, coauthored with Giuseppe Sorrenti, we study the effect of family
income and maternal hours worked on child development. Poverty represents one of
the major threats to child development. In 2015, about 15 million children in the
United States (21 percent of all children) were living in families with incomes below
the federal poverty threshold (National Center for Children in Poverty, 2015). What
effect does growing up in a disadvantaged family have on a child’s achievements, and
how can living conditions be improved to promote child development?
Support programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Food Stamp
Program, and the Child Tax Credit attempt to reduce family poverty and especially
that experienced by children. Many of these programs (e.g. the EITC) provide cash
transfers on the condition that the recipient works (conditional cash transfers). Such
conditions might shape child development by introducing a trade-off between the
income effect, due to a surge in family income, and the substitution effect, due possibly
to parental labor supply responses and a decrease in time parents spend with their
child.
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The arising trade-off poses an important question: is the change in family income
more important than time spent with parents in shaping child development? In this
study we answer this question by appraising the contemporaneous effect of changes in
family income and maternal labor supply on cognitive and behavioral development of
children. We implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach exploiting changes
in the EITC benefits over time and shocks in the local labor demand as instruments
for family income and maternal labor supply. In this sense, we bridge the gap be-
tween the literature dealing with the estimate of the effect of family income on child
development and the literature on the effect of maternal labor supply and child-with-
parents time. Moreover, we provide important insights on what policies can foster
maternal employment and child development contemporaneously.
Family income is an important predictor of a child’s success and future oppor-
tunities. Figure 4.1 shows the wide dispersion in children’s achievements by family
income. Both cognitive (Panel A) and behavioral (Panel B) development measures
exhibit a steep income gradient, with high-achieving children placed in the top deciles
of the after-tax family income distribution. The impact of family income on child de-
velopment has been widely debated by economists. Previous studies such as Duncan
et al. (2011), Levy and Duncan (1999), and Blau (1999) have found a positive relation
between family economic conditions during childhood and child achievements. More
recently, works such as Løken et al. (2012) and Dahl and Lochner (2012b) employ
instrumental variable techniques to confirm this positive effect in Norway and in the
U.S., respectively.
In addition to studies regarding the income effect, a vast body of economic litera-
ture associates maternal labor supply during childhood with possible negative effects
on child development and future opportunities (Baum, 2003; Ruhm, 2004; Bernal,
2008; Carneiro and Rodriguez, 2009; Bernal and Keane, 2011; Hsin and Felfe, 2014;
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Carneiro et al., 2015; Del Bono et al., 2016; Fort et al., 2017). As examples, according
to Bernal and Keane (2011) each year of child care (versus maternal time input) be-
fore age 6 decreases test scores by 2.1 percent (0.11 standard deviations). Similarly,
Carneiro et al. (2015) estimate that the probability of dropping out of high school
decreases by 2 percent and wages increase by 5 percent at age 30 with the more time
mothers spend with their children in the first months of life.
This paper reconciles these strands of the literature. For most families, an increase
in income is due to an increase in maternal labor supply. In this case, a surge
in monetary resources is associated with a potential decline in the time the mother
spends with her offspring. To understand the possible trade-off between family income
and maternal labor supply, we build upon the empirical model in Dahl and Lochner
(2012b) by considering not only the role of family income but also the role of maternal
hours worked in shaping child development. 3 The work by Dahl and Lochner
(2012b) exploits quasi-experimental variation in the EITC to analyze the causal effect
of family income on child achievement. However, the EITC is designed to incentivize
individuals (including mothers) to work. 4 Mothers, and especially single mothers,
are usually the main target group of these welfare programs and are most responsive
to incentives (Meyer, 2002; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Blundell et al., 2016). This
affects the maternal allocation of time between working and parenting, with potential
effects on children’s test scores. More precisely, endogenous labor supply responses
affect child development through two channels. An increase in maternal hours worked
generates an income effect, with additional resources coming from a boost in labor
3Dahl and Lochner (2017), after the analysis by Lundstrom (2017), adjust for a coding error in
their previous work in the creation of the after-tax total family income. The results of the original
and reviewed studies are similar.
4Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Nichols and Rothstein (2016) summarize theoretical and empirical
findings about the effect of the EITC on maternal labor supply. Blundell et al. (2016) analyze the
case of the U.K. and find substantial elasticities for women’s labor supply (in particular for the
group of single mothers).
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income. At the same time, changes in maternal hours worked can also generate
a substitution effect, with changes in the time that mothers allocate to child care
(Heckman and Mosso, 2014a; Del Boca et al., 2014a). Moreover, this paper is related
to previous works that consider the effect of time and monetary resources on children
by estimating a structural model of household choices and child development (see Del
Boca et al., 2014a; Mullins, 2016).
An additional contribution of our study relates to the broad definition used for
child development. While many works (see Dahl and Lochner, 2012b; Del Boca et al.,
2014a) exclusively focus on test scores for cognitive achievements, we extend the anal-
ysis to proxies for child noncognitive development. 5 As stated by Heckman and
Rubinstein (2001), standard test scores only capture some of the multiple skills de-
termining individual success and well-being. Moreover, early childhood interventions
that boost personal traits such as self-discipline or motivation are usually deemed as
extremely effective (Heckman, 2000). Socio-emotional skills are often more predictive
of later-life success than cognitive skills. 6
Our empirical analysis is based on the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979
(NLSY79) data set matched with its Children (NLSY79-C) section. This combined
data set provides longitudinal information about measures of child development, fam-
ily income, and hours worked by the mother. At the same time, the longitudinal
structure allows us to account for individual unobserved heterogeneity through child
fixed effects. Cognitive development is measured through children’s achievements on
the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), a set of tests assessing proficiency
5We also explore features related to early childhood development (1–7 years old).
6For example, data from the Perry Preschool Program, a high-quality U.S. preschool education
program, suggest that increased academic motivation generates 30 percent of the effects on achieve-
ment and 40 percent on employment for females. Reduced externalizing behavior decreases lifetime
violent crime by 65 percent, lifetime arrests by 40 percent, and unemployment by 20 percent. Visit
heckmanequation.org/resource/early-childhood-education-quality-and-access-pay-off/ for a discus-
sion of these results.
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in mathematics and reading. To study noncognitive development, we take advantage
of the Behavior Problems Index (BPI). This comprehensive index is comprised of
several different indicators for behavior such as aggressiveness or hyperactivity that
are likely to shape children’s future life opportunities.
Given the strong interdependence between maternal labor supply and family in-
come, there is no suitable identifying source of variation that is likely to exclusively
affect one variable of interest. Hence, in order to identify the single causal effect of
either family income or maternal labor supply on child development, it is necessary
to allow for the endogeneity of both inputs. To deal with this challenge, we exploit
two instrumental variables. The first instrument is based on the longitudinal changes
in monetary benefits of the EITC, one of the largest U.S. federal income support
programs. This variation provides us with exogenous changes in family resources to
allocate in child development. At the same time, only working people are eligible for
EITC benefits, creating incentives for mothers to work. The second instrument is
constructed by using longitudinal shocks in the local labor market demand. Shifts in
local demand for labor affect equilibrium prices (wages) and, subsequently, the family
income resources and the equilibrium labor quantity. 7
Our instrumental variable analysis suggests different results for cognitive and be-
havioral development. An additional $1,000 in family income improves cognitive
development by 4.4 percent of a standard deviation. 8 The same income change has
no effect on child behavioral development. An additional $1,000 improves behavioral
7We provide evidence throughout the paper that both identifying sources of variation do not con-
found other contemporaneous state-specific factors, like state-specific trends in children’s achieve-
ments or changes in the per-pupil financial resources of schools in different states. Moreover, in the
spirit of Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017), we assess the validity of our labor demand shock instru-
ment by formally testing for any parallel pre-trends between the instrument and child development.
We reject the hypothesis of the existence of any pre-trends.
8This result is in line with the findings of Dahl and Lochner (2012b) and Dahl and Lochner
(2017).
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development by 1.3 percent of a standard deviation, and the result is not statistically
significant.
We find that the income effect is counterbalanced by a negative effect of hours
worked by the mother on child development. An increase in maternal labor supply of
100 hours per year causes a statistically significant decrease in both child cognitive
and behavioral development by approximately -6 percent and -5 percent of a standard
deviation. The strong negative impact of the number of hours worked by the mother,
both in terms of cognitive test scores and behavioral problems, encourages the debate
in a new dimension: how to address concerns about the effect of maternal employment
on child development.
We attempt to answer this question in the last part of our study. By using the
time diary component of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), we illustrate the
mechanism underlying the negative impact of hours worked by the mother on child
development. Similar to Sayer et al. (2004), Guryan et al. (2008), and Fox et al.
(2013), we find that working mothers, conditional on income, invest less time in their
children. As a consequence, labor market conditions play a role in shaping the effect
of labor supply on child development.
We focus on the role of wages and show that, according to our results, an after-
tax hourly wage up to $13.50 makes the substitution effect (less maternal time with
the child) dominant over the income effect (higher earnings). With higher earnings,
families face the option of substituting their decreased time investment with better
and more productive alternatives (e.g. nonparental care, additional schooling, youth
clubs, music activities, etc.).
We look for possible heterogeneous effects in different subgroups in order to high-
light the potential importance of alternative inputs in the child development process.
Behavioral development does not display evidence of heterogeneous impacts of income
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or hours worked by the mother. On the contrary, the negative effect of hours worked
by the mother on cognitive development only appears in less educated, low-skilled, or
single mothers. More educated and high-skilled mothers are likely to access to better
nonparental child care options. Moreover, the differences in the labor supply effect
can be reconciled with heterogeneous preferences for child care activities, generating
different patterns of time allocation between working, child care, and leisure time
(Guryan et al., 2008).
We further investigate these channels by comparing the investment in the child by
maternal employment status and family income. The Child Development Supplement
(CDS) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) collects detailed information
about a wide set of children’s activities and parental investment for a representative
sample of U.S. families. Results obtained with this data set highlight some evidence
of differential investments as a response to the maternal employment status when
low-income families are compared to high-income families.
Policymakers might obtain several suggestions from our results. First, by showing
the trade-off between the income and substitution effect in terms of child development,
this work speaks to the growing body of literature about the effect of conditional
versus unconditional cash transfers. Many income subsidies worldwide base monetary
transfers on work requirements. In this context, only looking at the effect of income
on child development might lead to biased policy predictions. Our results support
the idea that policies aimed at fostering maternal labor supply can be beneficial to
child development if integrated with specific consideration about a minimum wage
or the taxation of family income. Alternatively, policies that encourage maternal
employment in low-income families should also consider how to guarantee alternative
sources of child care to support child development.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
empirical model and the identification strategy. The data used for the analysis are
presented in Section 4.3, while the results are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
sheds light on the mechanism underlying the main findings of the work. Section 4.6
concludes.
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Chapter 2
IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE TECHNOLOGY OF
CHILDREN’S SKILL FORMATION (WITH MATTHEW WISWALL)
2.1 Introduction
The wide dispersion of measured human capital in children and its strong corre-
lation with later life outcomes has prompted a renewed interest in understanding the
determinants of skill formation among children (for a recent review, see Heckman and
Mosso, 2014a). However, the empirical challenges in estimating the skill formation
process, principally the technology of child development, is hampered by the likely
imperfect measures of children’s skills we have available. While measurement issues
exist in many areas of empirical research, they may be particularly salient in research
about child development. There exists a number of different measures of children’s
skills, and each measure can be arbitrarily located and scaled and provide widely
differing levels of informativeness about the underlying latent skills of the child. 1
In the presence of these measurement issues, identification of the underlying latent
process of skill development is particularly challenging, but nonetheless essential be-
cause ignoring the measurement issues through ad hoc simplifying assumptions could
severely bias our inferences.
In this paper, we develop a new method to estimate the skill formation process
in children when skills are not observed directly but instead measured with error.
Rather than assuming skills are measured perfectly by a particular measure, we ac-
commodate the variety of skills measures used in practice and allow latent skills to be
1For a recent analysis of how measurement issues can be particularly salient, see Bond and Lang
(2013b) and Bond and Lang (2013a) who analyze the black-white test score gap.
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measured with error using a system of arbitrarily located and scaled skill measures.
In our framework, we treat the parameters of the measurement model as “nuisance”
parameters and use transformations of moments of the measurement data to elim-
inate them, analogous to the transformations used to eliminate fixed effects with
panel data. We show non-parametric identification of the primitive parameters of the
production technology, without assuming any particular values for the measurement
process parameters or “re-normalizing” latent skills each period.
The heart of our identification analysis is a characterization of the classes of pro-
duction technologies which can be identified given different assumptions about the
measurement process. We introduce the concept of production technologies that have
a known location and scale, technologies which are implicitly restricted so that the
location and scale is already known. These known location and scale (KLS) tech-
nologies include the CES production technologies considered in a number of previous
papers (Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010; Cunha and Heckman, 2008;
Pavan, 2015). Starting with this class of technologies, we show that standard measure-
ment error assumptions non-parametrically identify the primitive production function
parameters, up to a normalization on the initial conditions only. Importantly, identifi-
cation is obtained without restrictions on the later skill measures as imposed in some
previous papers, which can bias the production function estimates (see Agostinelli
and Wiswall (2016b) for a discussion).
Our identification analysis builds on previous work but offers a distinct approach
to the empirical challenges. Previous approaches apply the techniques developed
for cross-sectional latent factor models (Anderson and Rubin, 1956; Jo¨reskog and
Goldberger, 1975; Goldberger, 1972; Chamberlain and Griliches, 1975; Chamberlain,
1977a,b; Carneiro et al., 2003) to the dynamic latent factor models describing the
development of children’s skills. In an influential paper applying latent factor model-
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ing to child development, Cunha et al. (2010) identify the skill production technology
by first “re-normalizing” the latent skill distribution at each period, treating the
skills in each period as separate latent factors. While latent skills, which lack a
meaningful location and scale, require some normalization (say at the initial period),
repeated re-normalization every period is an unnecessary over-identifying restriction
if the production function estimated already has a known location and scale, as is
the case for the technology estimated by Cunha et al. (2010). We show that non-
parametric identification of this class of KLS production functions is possible without
these re-normalization restrictions, and our identification approach avoids imposing
restrictions these restrictions because they can bias the estimation (Agostinelli and
Wiswall (2016b)).
In an important extension of our baseline results, we develop additional restric-
tions on the measurement process which are sufficient for identification of more gen-
eral production technologies, including those exhibiting Hicks neutral total factor
productivity (TFP) dynamics and non-constant returns to scale. Using standard as-
sumptions, these more general technologies cannot be identified because the location
and scale of the technology cannot be separately identified from the location and
scale of the measures. These more general aspects of the skill development formation
process are nonetheless potentially important as restricting the technology can reduce
the permissible skill dynamics and productivity of investments, substantially chang-
ing our inferences about the child development process and our evaluation of policy.
Our paper provides the first identification results for these more general models. Our
analysis makes clear the key identification tradeoff researchers face: identification
of restricted KLS technologies is possible with standard measurement assumptions,
but identification of more general technologies requires stronger assumptions. We
evaluate the empirical relevance of these additional assumptions, and provide guid-
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ance to researchers to evaluate whether the measures available to them satisfy these
assumptions.
In the second part of our paper, we estimate a flexible parametric version of
our model using data from the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
We examine the development of cognitive skills in children from age 5 to age 14,
and estimate a model of cognitive skill development allowing for complementarties
between parental investment and children’s skills; endogenous parental investment
responding to the stock of children’s skills, maternal skills, and family income; Hicks
neutral dynamics in TFP; non-constant returns to scale; and unobserved shocks to
the investment process and skill production. Following Cunha et al. (2010), our
empirical framework treats not only the child’s cognitive skills as measured with
error, but investment and maternal skills as well.
Constructively derived from our identification analysis, we form a method of mo-
ments estimator. Our estimator is not only relatively simple and tractable but also
robust because it does not impose parametric distributional assumptions on the distri-
bution of latent skills and measurement errors, as is commonly imposed in previous
estimators. We jointly estimate the technology of skill formation, the process of
parental investments in children, and the adult distribution of completed schooling
and earnings, allowing the production technology and investment process to freely
vary as the child ages. Our estimates of high TFP and increasing returns to scale
at early ages indicate that investments are particularly productive early in the de-
velopment period. We also find that the marginal productivity of early investments
is substantially higher for children with lower existing skills, suggesting the optimal
targeting of interventions to disadvantaged children.
Our estimates of the dynamic process of investment and skill development allow us
to estimate the heterogeneous treatment effects of some simple policy interventions.
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We show that even a modest transfer of family income to families at age 5 would
substantially increase children’s skills and completed schooling, with the effects larger
for low income families. When we compare these estimates to those using models
which restrict the technology or ignore measurement error, we estimate policy effects
which are substantially smaller, indicating that the generalities we allow are important
quantitatively to answering key policy questions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections, we develop the model
of skill development and the measurement process. The next sections analyze the
identification of this model, first under weak assumptions about the measurement
process, and then under stronger assumptions about measurement which allows the
identification of more general technology specifications, including those with TFP
dynamics and non-constant returns to scale. The remainder of the paper develops
our estimator and discusses our estimation results.
2.2 A Model of Skill Development in Children
In this section, we lay out our simple stylized model of skill development. In later
sections, we develop a more detailed, and in many respects more general, empirical
model which we take to the data.
Child development takes place over a discrete and finite period, t = 0, 1, . . . , T ,
where t = 0 is the initial period (say birth) and t = T is the final period of childhood
(say age 18). There is a population of children and each child in the population is
indexed i. For each period, each child is characterized by a stock of skills θi,t, with
θi,t > 0 for all t and i, and a flow level of investments Ii,t, withe Ii,t > 0 for all i and
t. For each child, the current stock of skills and current flow of investment produce
next period’s stock of skill according to the skill formation production technology:
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θi,t+1 = ft(θi,t, Ii,t) for t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 (2.1)
where equation (2.1) can be viewed as dynamic state space model with θi,t+1 the
state variable for each child i. The production technology ft(·) is indexed with t to
emphasize that the technology can vary over the child development period. According
to this technology, the sequence of investments and the initial stock of child skills θi,0
produces the sequence of skill stocks for each child i: θi,0, θi,1, . . . , θi,T .
There are several features of the technology which have particular relevance both
to understanding the process of child development and in evaluating policy interven-
tions to improve children’s skills. We provide a more detailed analysis of policy inter-
ventions after the presentation of the full empirical model, but a few brief points are
important to emphasize here. First, a key question is the productivity of investments
at various child ages. At what ages are investments in children particularly productive
in producing future skills (“critical periods”) and, conversely, at what ages is it diffi-
cult to re-mediate deficits in skill? Second, how does heterogeneity in children’s skills,
at any given period, affect the productivity of new investments in children? Comple-
mentarity in the production technology between current skill stocks and investments
implies heterogeneity in the productivity of investments across children. Third, how
do investments in children persist over time and affect adult outcomes? Do early
investments have a high return because they increase the productivity of later in-
vestments (dynamic complementarities) or do early investments “fade-out” over time
as they are not reinforced by later investments? These features of the technology of
skill development then directly inform the optimal timing of policy interventions –
the optimal investment portfolio across early and late childhood – and the optimal
targeting of policy – to which children should scarce resources be allocated to, with
the goal of using childhood interventions to affect eventual adult outcomes.
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2.3 Measurement
The focus of this paper is estimating the technology determining child skill devel-
opment (2.1) while accommodating the reality that researchers have at hand various
arbitrarily scaled and imperfect measures of children’s skills. Our framework recog-
nizes that children’s skills are not directly measured by a single measure, but there
exists multiple measures which we hypothesize can have some relationship to the
unobserved latent skill stock θt.
2.3.1 Measurement Model
In our baseline case, we follow the literature and assume a commonly used (log)
linear system of measures. In later sections,. we explore a variety of other measures
and whether our identification results extend to these other types of measures. Each
measure m for child i skills in period (age) t is given by
Zi,t,m = µt,m + λt,m ln θi,t + ǫi,t,m, (2.2)
For period t, we have Mt ∈ {1, 2, . . .} measures for each child i skills (ln θi,t): m =
1, 2, . . . ,Mt. Zi,t,m are the measures, µt,m are the measurement intercepts, and λt,m
are the measurement “factor loadings” or “scaling” parameters, with λt,m > 0 for
all t and m. The µt,m and λt,m measurement parameters allow the latent skills to
be represented by arbitrarily located and scaled measures. Finally, ǫi,t,m are the
individual measurement errors, with E(ǫi,t,m) = 0 for all t,m (across children), which
given the free intercept µt,m, the assumption of mean zero ǫt,m errors is without
loss of generality. To focus on the key identification issues, we assume investments
It are observed without error. In the empirical model which we take to data, we
allow for investments to also be measured with error and allow the investments to be
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endogenously determined by the existing skill stocks.
This measurement system has two important advantages over the alternative ap-
proach of using a single measure and assuming it perfectly measure skills, that is
assuming Zi,t,m = ln θi,t. First, the measurement system allows for noisy measures,
in particular allowing measures to differ in their relative “noise” to “signal” ratio,
V (ǫi,t,m)/λ
2
t,mV (ln θi,t,m), thus allowing for the possibility that some measures have
higher correlations to latent skills than others. Given this flexibility the researcher
can then form estimators to take advantage of the greater signal some measures have
available.
A second advantage is that the measurement parameters allow a kind of “ar-
bitrariness” in the relationship between the measure and the latent skills. An ideal
measurement system is one which can accommodate arbitrary changes in the location
and scale of measures. Allowing the measures to have free measurement parameters
µt,m and λt,m, which can vary by measure, allows the measurement model to capture
the arbitrary location or scaling of particular measures. 2 We show below that the
estimator of the primitive production function parameters we develop is robust to
changes in the location and scale of the measures up to the initial normalization.
For the remainder of the paper, we omit the children’s i subscript to reduce
notational clutter. All expectations operations (E, V ar, Cov, etc) are defined over
the population of children (indexed i). For random variable Xi,t, we generically define
κt ≡ E(Xi,t) =
∫
Xi,tdFt, with Ft the distribution function for random variable Xi,t
in period t. For simplicity, we drop the i subscript and equivalently write this as
κt ≡ E(Xt).
2Measures, such as test scores, can be arbitrarily scaled and located in the sense that for any
measure Z, we could create a new measures Z ′ = a + bZ, where a and b > 0 are some constants,
and the new measure Z ′ therefore preserves at least the ordinal ranking of latent skills given by Z.
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2.3.2 Normalization
Latent skill stocks θt have no natural scale and location. A normalization is then
required to fix the scale and location of the latent skill stocks to a particular measure.
We normalize the latent skill stock to one of the measures of initial period skills:
Normalization 1 Initial period normalizations
(i) E(ln θ0) = 0
(ii) λ0,1 = 1
This normalization fixes the location and scale of latent skills θ0 to a particular
measure, Z0,1, where the choice of the normalizing measure as measure m = 1 is
arbitrary. For the normalizing measure, we then have the following:
Z0,1 = µ0,1 + ln θ0 + ǫ0,1,
where µ0,1 = E(Z0,1) given the normalization E(ln θ0) = 0. The latent skill stock θ0
shares the scale of the normalizing measure in the sense that an 1 unit increase in log
latent skills is equal to a 1 unit increase in the level of the normalized measure Z0,1:
∂Z0,1
∂ ln θ0
= 1, where, for intuition, we have treated the Z as a deterministic function. For
symmetry with the latent skills, we also normalize log investment to be mean zero in
the initial period E(ln I0) = 0.
3
While the issue of model normalizations are typically trivial in most cases, in the
case of dynamic models such as this, the type of assumed normalization is actually
3In practice, if investments are truly observed without error, this can be accomplished by simply
de-meaning the investment data so that the sample mean of ln I0 is zero. In the more general model
we estimate, we assume investment is also observed with error and there are multiple measures of
latent investments. For now, given we assume investment is observed, this normalization is merely
for convenience.
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quite important. Our limited normalization for the initial period skills is quite dif-
ferent from the “re-normalization” approach used in much of the prior research (see
Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010; Attanasio et al., 2015a,b). In this
approach, skills are re-normalized every period such that latent skills are assumed to
be mean log stationery (E(ln θt) = 0 for all t) and latent skills “load” onto a differ-
ent arbitrarily measure in each period (λt,1 = 1 for all t). Agostinelli and Wiswall
(2016b) analyze the implications of the re-normalization approach and find that in
many standard cases these assumptions are not necessary for point identification and
can bias the estimates of the production technology.
We argue that our limited normalization is appropriate for the dynamic setting
of child development we analyze. With our normalization for the initial period only,
latent skills in all periods share a common location and scale with respect to the one
chosen normalizing measure. This approach is analogous to deflating a nominal price
series to a particular base year; that is, “normalizing” prices to some chosen base
year (e.g. 2012 US Dollars). 4 As in the price normalization context, the choice
of normalizing skill measure does affect the interpretation of the production function
parameters, and we return to this issue when interpreting our particular estimates.
2.3.3 Ignoring Measurement Error
Before analyzing the identification of the model, it is helpful to motivate our anal-
ysis by briefly pausing to consider the consequences if we were to ignore measurement
error. Consider a simple regression estimator in which we regress a measure of skills
4Given the normalizing measure we use is for young children, as children develop, their stock of
skill may increase to the extent that the implied measure of skill using the initial normalizing measure
Z0,1 exceeds the sample maximum level of the measure. This is not an issue for the identification of
the model since the measurement system assumes no floor or ceiling to the measures. The measures,
and the normalization we use, fixes only the location and scale of the skills, but not the maximum or
minimum values. We briefly discuss the issues of measurement floor and ceilings in the Appendix.
For an example of an alternative measurement system which respects the discreteness, floor, and
ceiling of a particular skill measure, see Del Boca et al. (2014b).
10
in period t+ 1 on a measure of skills in period t:
Zt+1,m = β0 + β1Zt,m + ηt,m
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimand is
β1(OLS) =
Cov(Zt+1,m, Zt,m)
V (Zt,m)
Assuming the measurement system above (2.2) and that the measurement errors ǫt,m
are uncorrelated with latent skills ln θt for all t,m and uncorrelated across time, we
have
β1(OLS) =
λt+1,mλt,mCov(ln θt+1, ln θt)
λ2t,mV (ln θt) + V (ǫt,m)
This expression makes clear several problems in naively using observed measures to
uncover latent production function relationships given by Cov(ln θt+1, ln θt). First, the
standard issue of attenuation bias: as the “noise” in the measure V (ǫt,m) increases
the OLS estimand goes to 0, biasing the inference of the relationship in latent skills
given by Cov(ln θt+1, ln θt). Second, the OLS estimand β1(OLS) is a combination
of model primitives (production technology parameters) and measurement parame-
ters, but we cannot directly separately identify them from the data. One common
solution is simply to set λt+1,m = 1 and λt,m = 1 (a “single measure” approach).
If this assumption is incorrect, then the resulting inference about latent production
function relationships are biased. 5 The problem is even more severe if we consider
5Other approaches include age standardizing the measures such that the measures have 0 mean
and standard deviation 1 at each child age. However this approach does not imply λt+1,m = 1.
Another approach is to re-normalize measures at all periods. This approach biases the resulting
estimates. See Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016b) for more discussion of these issues. Similar issues
arise if we to examine conditional expectations, E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m), instead of covariances. In this case,
the intercept of the measurement equations, µt,m and µt+1,m, would also come into play.
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regressions including higher order terms (with the goal of identifying some curvature
or complementarities in the skill production process):
Zt+1,m = β0 + β1Zt,m + β2Z
2
t,m + ηt,m
where
Z2t,m = (µt,m + λt,m ln θt + ǫt,m)
2
In this case, λt,m (factor loadings), µt,m (measurement intercepts), and in general
the ǫt,m distribution need to be identified to uncover structural relationships between
latent skills.
2.4 Identification
This section provides our main identification results. These identification results
are constructive in the sense that they form the basis of our estimator of the skill
development technology.
Our identification analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we identify the distribu-
tion of latent skills and investments in the initial period G0(θ0, I0). Our identification
of the initial conditions follows standard arguments used in the current literature
(e.g.: Cunha et al., 2010), but for completeness we fully specify this first step of the
identification analysis. The second step of our identification analysis is to identify the
production technology. This identification analysis is new.
We consider identification under the following assumptions about the joint distri-
bution of latent skills ({θt}t), investments {It}t, and measurement errors ({ǫt,m}t,m):
Assumption 1 Measurement model assumptions:
(i) ǫt,m ⊥ ǫt,m′ for all t and m 6= m′
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(ii) ǫt,m ⊥ ǫt′,m′ for all t 6= t′ and all m and m′
(iii) ǫt,m ⊥ It′ for all t and t′ and all m
(iv) ǫt,m ⊥ θt′ for all t and t′ and all m
Assumption 1 (i) is that measurement errors are independent contemporaneously
across measures. Assumption 1 (ii) is that measurement errors are independent over
time. Assumption 1 (iii) and (iv) are that measurement errors in any period are
independent of the latent stock of skills and parental investments in any period.
While these assumptions are strong in some sense, they are common in the current
literature. 6
2.4.1 Identification of Initial Conditions
Under Normalization 1, Assumption 1, and with at least 3 measures in the first
period, M0 ≥ 3, we identify the λ0,2, λ0,3, . . . , λ0,M0 factor loadings from ratios of
measurement covariances:
λ0,m =
Cov(Z0,m, Z0,m′)
Cov(Z0,1, Z0,m′)
, (2.3)
for m 6= m′, m 6= 1, m′ 6= 1, where measure m = 1 is the normalizing measure.
Further, under the normalization that E(ln θ0) = 0 (Normalization 1), we identify
the µ0,1, µ0,2, . . . , µ0,M0 intercepts from
µ0,m = E(Z0,m). (2.4)
We then construct the following “residual” skill measures from the original raw mea-
sures:
6Our assumption of full independence is sufficient, but not necessary, for at least some of our
identification analysis. Below, we point out instances where weaker assumptions, allowing for some
forms of dependence among measures and among measures and latent variable, can be used for
identification.
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Z˜0,m =
Z0,m − µ0,m
λ0,m
, (2.5)
where Z˜0,m identifies the sum of the latent skill and a scaled version of the measure-
ment error:
Z˜0,m = ln θ0 +
ǫ0,m
λ0,m
.
Applying the Kotalarski Theorem (Kotalarski 1964) to the {Z˜0,m}M0m=1 residual
measures, conditional on each level of investment I0, we identify the distribution of θ0
for any level of investment I0. This then allows us to identify the joint distribution of
latent skills and investment in the initial period G0(θ0, I0), up to the normalizations
given in Normalization 1. 7
2.4.2 Identification of the Production Technology
With the initial distribution for latent skills and investmentsG0(θ0, I0) identified in
the first step, we next identify the process of child development given by the sequences
of production technologies f0(θ0, I0), . . . , fT−1(θT−1, IT−1). Our identification analysis
is sequential, and uses the production technology in period t, ft(θt, It), to identify the
distribution of latent skills (and investments) in the next period, Gt+1(θt+1, It+1). We
first establish a general identification result for any periods t and t + 1. We then
conclude this section by describing the sequence of identification steps starting from
the initial period t = 0.
7The key necessary condition for the Kotalarski theorem to hold in this case is that at least two
of the residual measures in the set of measures {Z˜0,m}M0m=1 have full support conditional on I0, that
is Z˜0,m ∈ R conditional on I0.
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From Measures to Latent Relationships
Given the generalities we have allowed, in which we do not assume that skills are
measured perfectly in data, identification of the production technology now poses
considerable challenges. The production technology in some period t would in prin-
ciple be identified by the relationship between output θt+1 and inputs θt, It. We
do not directly observe latent skills θt+1 or θt in data. Instead, we observe relation-
ships among measures Zt+1,m and Zt,m. Under Assumption 1, we have the following
relationship between measures and latent variables:
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m, ln It) = µt+1,m + λt+1,mE(ln θt+1|Zt,m, ln It)
This expression shows that E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m, ln It) does not identify a production func-
tion relationship directly, but instead a combination of latent skill relationships and
measurement parameters.
In the following Lemma, we first show that we can identify dynamic production
function relationships, E(ln θt+1| ln θt, ln It), from measures of latent skills in periods
t and t+1, Zt,m and Zt+1,m, up to the measurement parameters for the t+1 measure,
µt+1,m and λt+1,m.
8
Lemma 1 Given i) Gt(θt, It) is known, ii) a pair of measures Zt,m and Zt+1,m which
satisfy Assumption 1, and iii) measurement parameters for Zt,m (µt,m, and λt,m) are
known, E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) is identified for some (a,ℓ) ∈ R2 and is equal to
µt+1,m + λt+1,mE(ln θt+1| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ).
Proof. See Appendix.
8Note that the measure m for t+1, Zt+1,m, which is used to measure ln θt+1, can be a completely
different “kind” of measure from the measure Zt,m used to measure ln θt. The use of the same
measure index m does not connote any relationship.
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Lemma 1 establishes that while we cannot use realizations of measures Zt,m = z to
identify particular values of the latent variable θt = p, we can identify moments of
the latent distribution.
Substituting the production technology θt+1 = ft(θt, It), Lemma 1 shows that
measures Zt+1,m and Zt,m identify the following:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) = µt+1,m + λt+1,m ln ft(ea, eℓ) (2.6)
Note that the left-hand side of (2.6) is not directly observed in data (given the un-
observability of ln θt) but is identified from observed measures (Lemma 1). The
right-hand side of (2.6) is a combination of production function relationships and
measurement parameters µt+1,m and λt+1,m.
9 If we do not know the measurement
parameters µt+1,m, λt+1,m, we cannot directly use E(Zt+1| ln θt, ln It) to identify the
production technology. One simple but problematic solution to this problem is to
assume values for the µt+1,m and λt+1,m parameters, and identification is trivially
obtained. 10 However, if the assumptions on the measurement parameters are
incorrect, then estimation under these assumptions can be biased.
Transformations to Eliminate Measurement Parameters
Our solution to this problem is to treat the measurement parameters µt,m and λt,m
for all t > 0 as “nuisance” parameters and use transformations of the moments (2.6)
to eliminate them. Using four pairs of (ln θt, ln It) = {(a1, l1), (a2, l2), (a3, l3), (a4, l4)},
9Note that we have used the fact that in our stylized model, there are no stochastic elements to
the production process, hence θt+1 given θt, It is a constant for all t. We return to the topic of how
to identify a shock to the production technology below. In brief, adding a mean 0 (log) shock to the
production technology does not change the main identification analysis. Re-write the technology as
θt+1 = ft(θt, It) exp(ηt), where E(ηt) = 0 and ηt is independent of θt, It, and ǫt,m, ǫt+1,m. Log skills
are then ln θt+1 = ln ft(θt, It) + ηt, and mean log skills are ln ft(θt, It) as before.
10For example, the researcher could assume the values µt,m = 0 and λt,m = 1 for all t and m, as
in the case when all measures are assumed to be “classical” in the sense that Zt,m = ln θt + ǫt,m,
and ǫt,m is simply a mean zero measurement error.
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we compute the following transformation of the conditional expectations:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a1, ln It = ℓ1)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a2, ln It = ℓ2)
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a3, ln It = ℓ3)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a4, ln It = ℓ4)
=
ln ft(e
a1 , eℓ1)− ln ft(ea2 , eℓ2)
ln ft(ea3 , eℓ3)− ln ft(ea4 , eℓ4) (2.7)
where the values ak, ℓk, k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are such that E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a3, ln It = ℓ3) 6=
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a4, ln It = ℓ4).
The left-hand side of (2.7) is a transformation of moments which are identified
directly from the measures of skills for periods t+1 and t (Lemma 1), and the right-
hand side is the corresponding transformation of the technology. The transformation
in (2.7) has eliminated the measurement parameters µt+1,m and λt+1,m without making
any assumption about their values. This transformation is analogous to the transfor-
mation used in panel data analysis where differences at the observation level are used
to eliminate common fixed effects. 11 As in the panel data literature, we exploit
the particular form of the measurement equations and Assumption 1 to find an ap-
propriate transformation to eliminate the nuisance measurement parameters. Other
transformations can accomplish the same goal, and for convenience in some examples,
we work with ratios of covariances, which already implicitly eliminate dependence on
the measurement intercepts µt,m.
Location and Scale of the Production Technology
Much of our analysis centers on the classes of production technologies which can be
identified given that some inputs (latent skills) are measured with error. Crucial to
our analysis is whether the production technology has a known location and scale
or whether the location or scale is unknown in the sense that it depends on free
11Consider the model yi,t = µi+X
′
i,tβ+ ǫi,t, and the within transformation of the data yi,t+1−yit
eliminates the µi fixed effects.
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parameters which need to be estimated. This concept is new to the production
function identification literature, as far as we know. This concept is key to our analysis
because our results below show that we can identify the production technologies up
to location and scale, and can therefore point identify production technologies which
already have a known location and scale.
We first define the concept of a production function with “known location and
scale”:
Definition 1 A production function ft(θt, It) has known location and scale (KLS) if
for two non-zero input vectors (θ′t, I
′
t) and (θ
′′
t , I
′′
t ), where the input vectors are distinct
(θ′t 6= θ′′t or I ′t 6= I ′′t ), the output ft(θ′t, I ′t) and ft(θ′′t , I ′′t ) are both known (do not depend
on unknown parameters), finite, and non-zero.
A production technology with known location and scale implies that for a change
in inputs from (θ′t, I
′
t) to (θ
′′
t , I
′′
t ), the change in output ft(θ
′
t, I
′
t)− ft(θ′′t , I ′′t ) is known.
Other points in the production possibilities set may be unknown, i.e. depend on free
parameters to be estimated.
For example, consider the class of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) skill
production technologies, the class of technologies estimated in a number of previous
studies (e.g.: Cunha et al., 2010). 12 The CES technology is
θt+1 = (γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt )1/φt . (2.8)
with γt ∈ (0, 1) and φt ∈ (−∞, 1], and φt → −∞ (Leontif), φt = 1 (linear), φt → 0
(log-linear, Cobb-Douglas). The elasticity of substitution is 1/(1− φt).
12The functions estimated by Cunha et al. (2010) also include a mean zero production function
shock. We consider identification of these functions below. In general, including a mean zero shock
does not change the main results of the identification analysis, see Footnote 9.
18
The production technology (2.8) satisfies Definition 1 because for inputs It = θt =
α > 0, θt+1 = α. That is, for inputs which are known to be equal at value α, we
also know the output is α as well. This property of known location and scale is
related to constant returns to scale property of this function, but constant returns to
scale is not necessarily a sufficient property to satisfy Definition 1, as shown below.
While the scale and location of the production function (2.8) are known, other points
in the production possibilities set are determined by the free parameters γt and φt.
Identifying these remaining parameters is the subject of the section.
Another example of KLS production technologies are those based on the translog
function, a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production technology which does not
restrict the elasticity of substitution to be constant:
ln θt+1 = γ1t ln θt + γ2t ln It + γ3t(ln θt)(ln It) (2.9)
with
∑3
j=1 γjt = 1. Consider the points (θt, It) = (1, 1) and (e, e). For these points,
the output of the production technology is known at ln θt+1 = 0 and 1, respectively,
and thus this function satisfies Definition 1.
In contrast, a class of technologies which does not satisfy the known location and
scale property (Definition 1) is the following
θt+1 = At(γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt )1/φt (2.10)
with At > 0 representing Total Factor Productivity (TFP). The previous case (2.8)
is a special case of (2.10) with At = 1. In the more general case, the addition of the
unknown TFP process term At implies that the scale of the function is unknown. For
example, for θt = It = α > 0, we have ft(α, α) = Atα, where At is a free parameter.
This class of technologies has constant returns to scale but does not have a known
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location and scale. 13
Another class of technologies which does not satisfy Definition 1 is CES technolo-
gies without constant returns to scale:
θt+1 = (γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt )ψt/φt . (2.11)
where ψt > 0 is a returns to scale parameter, with ψt = 1 constant returns to scale,
ψt < 1 decreasing returns to scale, and ψt > 1 increasing returns to scale. In this
case, ft(α, α) = α
ψt . For this function, while we know the point ft(1, 1) = 1, and can
identify the location of the function, we do not know a second point in the production
possibilities set, and therefore cannot identify the scale of the function. Similarly, the
translog function (2.9) with
∑3
j=1 γj,t not equal to a known constant would not satisfy
the KLS definition (Definition 1).
Per Period Identification of the Production Technology
We next proceed to the main identification result. We show that with the distribution
of skills and investments in period t, Gt(θt, It) and the measurement parameters, µt,m
and λt,m, known for period t, then a single measure of skills in period t + 1, Zt+1,m,
with sufficient support, non-parametrically identifies a production technology θt+1 =
ft(θt, It) with known location and scale (satisfying Definition 1). The key aspect of the
identification result is that we identify the production technology without knowledge
of the period t+1 measurement parameters, µt+1,m and λt+1,m. We specify the exact
conditions for identification in the following theorem.
13Similarly, a function where the factor share parameters did not sum to a known constant would
also lack a known scale, for example θt+1 = (γ1tθ
φt
t + γ2tI
φt
t )
1/φt , with γ1t + γ2t 6= 1. In this case,
θt = α, It = α, we have ft(α, α) = ((γ1t + γ2t)α)
1/ψt .
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Theorem 1 If i) the distribution of skills Gt(θt, It) is known, ii) measurement pa-
rameters µt,m, λt,m are known, iii) there exists at least one measure Zt+1,m which
satisfies Assumption 1, iv) the measure Zt+1,m has full support, Zt+1,m ∈ R, and v)
the production technology ft(θt, It) has known location and scale (Definition 1), then
the production technology ft(θt, It) is identified for all (θt, It) ∈ R2+.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 indicates that we can identify production technologies which have a
known scale (Definition 1), such as the CES technologies (2.8) considered in much
of the previous literature (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010). The
limitation of Theorem 1 is that we cannot apply it to more general production tech-
nologies which do not satisfy the known location and scale property. In the next
section, we propose stronger assumptions on the measurement process which could
allow for identification of more general production technologies.
Sequential Production Function Identification
Theorem 1 shows identification of the production technology for period t, θt+1 =
ft(θt, It), given measures Zt+1,m and Zt,m. We now apply these per-period results to
show how we can sequentially identify the full sequence of production technologies,
f0(θ0, I0), . . . , fT−1(θT−1, IT−1), and hence the distribution of the sequence of skill
stocks (θ1, . . . , θT ). The minimal data we require are at least 3 measures of latent
skills for the initial period Z0,1, Z0,2, Z0,3, and a single measure m of latent skills in
the following periods, Z1,m, Z2,m, . . . , ZT,m.
The sequential identification proceeds as follows. First, using the measures for
the initial period, following the analysis above, we identify the initial distribution
of skills and investments G0(θ0, I0), and initial measurement parameters, µ0,m and
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λ0,m, for some measure Z0,m. Then, applying Theorem 1, we identify the production
technology for period 0, θ1 = f0(θ0, I0), where the technology is assumed to be of
the known location and scale class (satisfying Definition 1). With the production
function identified, we identify the distribution of period 1 skills from the production
technology:
G1(θ1|I0) = pr(θ1 ≤ θ|I1) =
∫
pr(f0(θ0, I0) ≤ θ)dG0(θ0|I0)
where G1(θ1|I0) is the conditional distribution of latent skills, which given that in-
vestments are assumed observed, can then be used to identify the joint distribution
of skills and investment.
We then proceed to identify the measurement parameters for measure Z1,m used
to measure period 1 latent skills. The factor loadings can be identified from the across
time correlation in measures of skills, Cov(Z1,m, Z0,m):
λ1,m =
Cov(Z1,m, Z0,m)
λ0,mCov(ln θ1, ln θ0)
.
where Cov(ln θ1, ln θ0) is identified from the production technology and the initial
distribution of skills:
Cov(ln θ1, ln θ0) = Cov(ln f0(θ0, I0) , ln θ0).
=
∫
(ln f0(θ0, I0) ln θ0)dG(θ0, I0)
The measurement intercept for period 1 is then identified from
µ1,m = E(Z1,m)− λ1,mE(ln θ1),
where as above E(ln θ1) is identified from the production technology, as above:
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E(ln θ1) =
∫
ln f0(θ0, I0)dG(θ0, I0).
This shows the identification of the technology f0(θ0, I0) and the measurement
parameters for µ1,m and λ1,m. We can continue to follow these steps, applying
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 sequentially, to identify the technology in the next periods,
f1(θ1, I1), . . . , fT−1(θT−1, IT−1).
2.4.3 Intuition
Before we continue with examples and extensions to our identification concept,
we pause to consider some simple intuition for our idea in a general setting. Consider
a general production technology Y = f(X1, X2), where Y is some latent unobserved
output and X1 and X2 are some observed inputs. We have measure Z of the output,
and the measure has error of the form we consider above: Z = µ+ λ lnY + ǫ, where
ǫ is uncorrelated with lnY , X1, and X2, and µ and λ are measurement parameters.
The ratio of covariances of the measure of the output Z with the two inputs X1, X2
is
Cov(Z,X1)
Cov(Z,X2)
=
λCov(lnY,X1)
λCov(lnY,X2)
=
Cov(lnY,X1)
Cov(lnY,X2)
.
The ratio of covariances has eliminated the “nuisance” measurement parameter
λ. Working with covariances, rather than conditional expectations, has already elim-
inated dependence on the measurement intercept µ. This expression makes clear that
even with output mis-measured in data and with free unknown measurement param-
eters allowing for arbitrary scale and location, we can still learn something about the
production technology. For example, the ratio in this example is related to the relative
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marginal product of the two inputs X1, X2. Considering ratios of higher order covari-
ances, such as Cov(Z,X21 )/Cov(Z,X1) and Cov(Z,X1X2)/Cov(Z,X1), can similarly
provide information about the “curvature” of the production function and the degree
of complementarities between inputs. Our results above show identification in models
which generalize this simple example, allowing for a dynamic production technology
and mis-measured inputs as well.
2.4.4 Examples
We next proceed to demonstrate the identification results using simple two period
models and commonly used production technologies.
Example 1 Log-Linear (Cobb-Douglas) Technology
There are two periods T = 2. Skills in t = 1 are given by the following log-linear
(Cobb-Douglas) production technology:
ln θ1 = γ0 ln θ0 + (1− γ0) ln I0 (2.12)
where γ0 ∈ (0, 1) is the unknown production function parameter we would like to
identify. Like the more general CES class to which it belongs, this production function
has a known location and scale (Definition 1).
We have three measures of initial period skills: Z0,1, Z0,2, Z0,3. We have one mea-
sure of skills in period 1, Z1,m. The measures satisfy Assumption 1.
We normalize initial period skills as E(ln θ0) = 0 and initial investments E(ln I0) =
0. We normalize the factor loading for the first measure as λ0,1 = 1. Following the
analysis above, we then identify the remaining measurement factor loadings λ0,2, λ0,3
and measurement intercepts µ0,1, µ0,2, µ0,3 for the initial period measures. We then
identify the joint distribution of the latent skills and investments, G0(θ0, I0). Applying
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Lemma 1 identifies E(Z1,m| ln θ0, ln I0) for values of ln θ0, ln I0 from the measures Z1,m
and Z0,m and the identified measurement parameters µ0,m and λ0,m.
Next we apply Theorem 1 to identify the production function parameter γ0. The
key to our analysis is that we identify the production function primitive without
making any assumptions about the values of measurement parameters µ1,m or λ1,m.
We compute the following transformations of conditional expectations (algebra is
given in the Appendix):
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = a, ln I0 = 0)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 0, ln I0 = 0)
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 1, ln I0 = 1)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 0, ln I0 = 0) =
γ0a
1
Letting ∆ be the left-hand side of the expression and solving for the production
function parameter, we have
γ0 =
∆
a
This expression shows that the unknown parameter γ0 of the production technology
is identified from the transformation of the conditional expectations. Identification
of γ0 requires only a single measure of latent skills in period 1 and is invariant to the
measurement parameters, µ1,m and λ1,m.
With the production technology f0(θ0, I0) identified, we can now identify the mea-
surement parameters for Z1,m. λ1,m is identified from
λ1,m =
Cov(Z1,m, Z0,m)
λ0,mCov(ln θ1, ln θ0)
where we can use any of the three first period measures, m = 1, 2, 3 to form the
right-hand side. Substituting for the production technology, we have
λ1,m =
Cov(Z1,m, Z0,m)
λ0,mCov(γ0 ln θ0 + (1− γ0) ln I0, ln θ0)
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=
Cov(Z1,m, Z0,m)
λ0,m(γ0V (ln θ0) + (1− γ0)Cov(ln θ0, ln I0)) .
Given the identification of γ0, and that we have already identified the initial joint
distribution of θ0, I0 (and can compute V (ln θ0) and Cov(ln θ0, ln I0) ), we can compute
the right-hand side.
µ1,m is then identified from
µ1,m = E(Z1,m)− λ1,mE(ln θ1),
where, for this particular production technology, we have E(ln θ1) = γ0E(ln θ0) +
(1− γ0)E(ln I0) = 0, given the normalization for the initial period (E(ln θ0) = 0 and
(E(ln I0) = 0). As described in more detail below, the mean of log latent skills will
in general not be 0 in periods after the initial period. For alternative production
functions, E(ln θ1) can be computed from the identified production technology.
Example 2 General CES Technology
In our second example, we maintain the same setup as Example 1 but consider
the general CES function (2.8):
θ1 = (γ0θ
φ0
0 + (1− γ0)Iφ00 )1/φ0 .
with parameters defined as in (2.8). For this technology, there are two unknown
production function parameters we wish to identify, γ0 and φ0. We have the same
measures as in Example 1 and identify the initial condition as before.
As in Example 1, we compute the following:
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = ln a1, ln I0 = ln ℓ1)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = ln a2, ln I0 = ln ℓ2)
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = ln a3, ln I0 = ln ℓ3)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = ln a4, ln I0 = ln ℓ4) =
ln f0(a1, ℓ1)− ln f0(a2, ℓ2)
ln f0(a3, ℓ3)− ln f0(a4, ℓ4)
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Now define ∆1 to be the left-hand side of the above equation and take values
a1 6= 0, a3 6= 0, where a1 6= a3, a2 = a4 = ℓ2 = ℓ4 = 1, ℓ1 = 0 and a3 = ℓ3 = e1. We
have (see Appendix for omitted algebra):
∆1 =
ln f0(a1, 0)− ln f0(1, 1)
ln f0(e1, e1)− ln f0(1, 1) ,
∆1 =
ln(γ0a1)
1
,
Solving for γ0 , we have
γ0 =
e∆1
a1
This expression identifies γ0. With γ0 identified, we form a second ratio:
∆2 =
ln f0(a1, 1)− ln f0(1, 1)
ln f0(a3, 0)− ln f0(1, 1) ,
=
ln(γ0a
φ0
1 + 1− γ0)
ln(γ0a3)
,
Solving for φ0 (see Appendix for omitted algebra), we have
φ0 =
ln
(
(γ0a3)∆2−1+γ0
γ0
)
ln(a1)
This analysis shows that a single measure of period 1 skills identifies the unknown
production function parameters γ0, φ0 without imposing any restrictions on the values
of the period 1 measurement parameters. We can follow the same analysis as in
Example 1 to identify the measurement parameters.
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2.4.5 Comparison to Cunha et al. (2010)
Our results show identification of a production function with known location and
scale without imposing any particular values for the measurement parameters after
the initial period. Cunha et al. (2010) provide identification results in which they not
only normalize initial period latent skills, as we do here, but also “re-normalize” latent
skills each period. In our notation, their re-normalization restriction is E(ln θ0) =
E(ln θ1) = · · · = E(ln θT ) = 0 and λ0,1 = λ1,1 = · · · = λT,1 = 1 for the normalized
measure m = 1.
Some normalization is necessary (and we impose a normalization on the initial
period), but, as we prove here, the additional restrictions on later periods are not
necessary for identification of a known location and scale technology. The function
Cunha et al. (2010) estimate is a known location and scale CES technology of the
form given by (2.8). Because this function is already restricted (as compared to the
more general functions with non-constant returns to scale and TFP dynamics), the
additional normalizations are unnecessary and over-identifying. Importantly these
re-normalization restrictions are not cost free as these additional normalizations can
bias the technology estimates toward the Cobb-Douglas technology and away from
more general patterns of substitution (see Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016b).
2.4.6 Errors-in-Variables Formulation
The KLS class of technologies can also be understood as a restriction in a tradi-
tional error-in-variables model (Chamberlain (1977a)). In this literature, identifica-
tion is often achieved by proportionality restriction (linear regression parameters are
assumed proportional to each other) within the context of a “reduced form” linear
regression model. In our case, the restrictions we consider come from restrictions
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on the primitive production function, which is intuitively appealing because we can
understand the consequences of these restrictions on the primitive production rela-
tionships.
Consider the Cobb-Douglas case (2.12). Using the normalizations on the initial
period, we proceed as before and form measures for the initial period:
Z˜0,m =
Z0,m − µ0,m
λ0,m
= ln θ0 + ǫ0,m.
We also have a single measure of period 1 skills θ1 given by
Z1,m = µ1,m + λ1,m ln θ1 + ǫ1,m
As in all of our analysis above, the measurement parameters µ1,m and λ1,m are treated
as free parameters.
Substituting the production technology into the period 1 measurement equation,
we have
Z1,m = µ1,m + λ1,m[γ0 ln θ0 + (1− γ0) ln I0] + ǫ1,m
Substituting one of the measures for ln θ0, say Z˜0,m, we have
Z1,m = µ1,m + λ1,m[γ0(Z˜0,m − ǫ˜0,m) + (1− γ0) ln I0] + ǫ1,m
with ǫ˜0,m = ǫ0,m/λ0,m.
Re-arranging, we have
Z1,m = µ1,m + λ1,mγ0Z˜0,m + λ1,m(1− γ0) ln I0 + (ǫ1,m − λ1,mγ0ǫ˜0,m)
= β0 + β1Z˜0,m + β2 ln I0 + π1,m (2.13)
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where β0 = µ1,m, β1 = λ1,mγ0, β2 = λ1,m(1 − γ0), and π1,m = ǫ1,m − λ1,mγ0ǫ˜0,m. The
“reduced form” equation (2.13) now has the standard errors-in-variables form: (2.13)
is a linear regression of a measure of period 1 skills Z1,m on a measure for period 0
skills Z˜0,m. The β1 and β2 coefficients are combinations of the measurement factor
loading λ1,m and the production function parameter γ0.
Identification takes two steps. First, the standard error-in-variables problem is
that the OLS regression estimands for β1 and β2 do not identify β1 and β2. We can
solve this problem using any number of standard techniques. In this setting with
multiple measures available satisfying independence assumptions, a second measure
for period 0 skills, Z˜0,m′ , can be used as an instrument for Z˜0,m, and we identify β1 and
β2. Second, with β1 and β2 identified, we can then solve for the underlying primitive
parameters γ0 and λ1,m:
γ0 =
β1
β1 + β2
, λ1,m = β1 + β2 and µ1,m = β0
The key to the identification here is that this commonly used production function
(2.12) is already restricted (the factor shares sum to 1) and hence we can identify the
production function parameters separately from the measurement parameters. With-
out this restriction on the production function, a function ln θ1 = γ0,θ ln θ0+γ0,I ln I0,
where γ0,θ and γ0,1 are free parameters and do not sum to 1, point identification is
not possible as there would be three unknown parameters γ0,θ, γ0,I , and λ1,m and only
two regression coefficients β1, β2.
2.4.7 Robustness to Alternative Types of Measures
One of the characteristics of the data used to study child development is the rich
variety of skill measures. Here we considered identification where the skill measures
are in a “raw” form: each measure is a linear function of the latent log skill. This mea-
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surement system, while commonly assumed in the prior literature, is in some respects
a “best case.” In the Appendix, we briefly discuss alternative forms of measures and
re-examine whether we can identify the same types of production technologies using
these alternative measures. We consider four classes of measures which are sometimes
encountered empirically: (i) age-standardized measures where the raw measures are
transformed ex post (in the sample) to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1; (ii)
relative measures where the measures reflect not the level of a child’s skill but the
child’s skill relative to the population mean (i.e. other children); (iii) ordinal mea-
sures which provide a discrete ranking of children’s skills; and (iv) censored measures
where the measures are truncated with a “floor” (finite minimum value) and/or a
“ceiling” (finite maximum value).
For the age-standardized and relative measures, we find that our identification
results continue to hold because these alternative measures can be expressed as al-
ternative linear functions of the latent skills with particular measurement intercepts
and factor loadings. Our identification results are invariant to these measurement pa-
rameters as the measurement parameters would be “transformed away,” as described
above (2.7). More generally, our identification results are robust to any linear in-
creasing transformation of the original raw measures. On the other hand, without
additional assumptions, the latter two classes of measures would appear to not allow
non-parametric identification, at least globally, as these measures do not provide a
one-to-one mapping between latent variables and measures (in expectation) as with
the linear continuous measurement system we consider here.
2.5 Identification of General Technologies
The preceding analysis demonstrated that production functions with known loca-
tion and scale (KLS, Definition 1) are non-parametrically identified using measures
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of latent skills that satisfy Assumption 1. This class of production technologies in-
clude the CES technologies analyzed in much of the previous work (see Cunha and
Heckman, 2007; Cunha et al., 2010). These types of production functions are re-
stricted, and these restrictions can affect our inferences about the child development
process and the effects of policy interventions, as we demonstrate empirically below.
14 We next consider classes of technologies which are more general and no longer
have a known location and scale, and we analyze identification of these more general
technologies under additional assumptions about the measurement error process. We
conclude this section with a discussion of what empirical measures may justify these
additional assumptions.
2.5.1 Identifying Production Technologies with Dynamics in TFP
Consider a general class of technologies which exhibit Hicks-neutral TFP growth:
θt+1 = Atf˜t(θt, It) (2.14)
where At > 0 is the TFP term and the f˜t(θt, It) sub-function is a known location and
scale (KLS) production technology. An example of this class of functions is the CES
production technologies augmented with TFP dynamics:
θt+1 = At(γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt )1/φt
We first establish that our identification result for KLS production technologies
fails in this case because we cannot separately identify the TFP parameter At from
the measurement parameters. To see this, write the production technology in logs:
14See the Appendix for more discussion. For example, a CES technology with constant returns to
scale implies that the elasticity of skill formation with respect to investment must be between 0 and
1, regardless of the data. This restriction can then bias downward the effects on skill formation of
investment and interventions which increase investment.
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ln θt+1 = lnAt + ln f˜t(θt, It)
Note that At is the scale of the production technology in levels, but lnAt is the
location of the production function in logs.
Next consider the following difference in the conditional expectations for a latent
log skill measure m, Zt+1,m:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a1, ln It = ℓ1)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a2, ln It = ℓ2)
= µt+1,m + λt+1,m(lnAt + ln f˜t(e
a1 , eℓ1))− [µt+1,m + λt+1,m(lnAt + ln f˜t(ea2 , eℓ2))]
= λt+1,m(ln f˜t(e
a1 , eℓ1)− ln f˜t(ea2 , eℓ2))
From this expression, it is clear that the TFP location lnAt cannot be identified.
Without further restrictions, the location of the production function (in logs) can-
not be separately identified from the location of the measurement equations (which
measure skills in logs) given by µt,m intercept.
Given the failure of identification for this more general technology, it is natural
to ask what additional assumptions would be sufficient for identification. We show
that if we have some auxiliary information on the relationship between measurement
intercepts over time, then we can identify the At TFP terms in production functions
of the form (2.14. We consider identification under the following assumption:
Assumption 2 For some measures Zt+1,m = µt+1,m + λt+1,m ln θt+1 + ǫt+1,m and
Zt,m′ = µt,m′ + λt,m′ ln θt + ǫt,m′, we have µt+1,m = g(µt,m′), where g(·) is a known
relationship.
Whether Assumption 2 holds depends on the particular measures the researcher
has available. We discuss the applicability of this assumption to our particular data
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and measures in our empirical application. This assumption could be justified if
the measure in period t + 1 and period t are age-invariant measures, as discussed
below, where for example the measure is the same test given to children of different
ages. In this case, it is plausible that the measures have the same location so that
µt+1,m = µt,m. This assumption of age-invariant intercepts is of course sufficient but
not necessary. And, to be clear, Assumption 2 does not require the researcher to
assume any particular values for the measurement intercepts, but simply that they
are related to each other in a known way.
We next present identification results which show that with Assumption 2, and
the other assumptions previously used to prove Theorem 1, we can now identify skill
development technologies of the form given in (2.14) which do not have a known
location and scale:
Theorem 2 Consider a production technology of the form ft(θt, It) = Atf˜t(θt, It)
where f˜t(θt, It) has known scale and location (Definition 1) and At ∈ R++. Under
Assumption 1, Assumption 2, the full support assumption on some measure Zt+1,m
and the conditions for Theorem 1, the technology f˜t(θt, It) and At are separately iden-
tified.
Proof.
The identification of f˜t(θt, It) follows directly from Theorem 1, as the unknown At
term is “differenced” away allowing identification of the f˜t(θt, It) KLS sub-function.
We identify the factor loading for the measure λt+1,m as well because identification of
this parameter does not depend on the At value. We then identify At from the mean
of the measure of skills in period t+ 1, E(Zt+1,m), and re-arranging for lnAt:
lnAt =
E(Zt+1,m)− (µt+1,m + λt+1,mE(ln f˜t(θt, It)))
λt+1,m
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From Assumption 2, with µt,m known, we also identify the measurement intercept for
t+ 1 from µt+1,m = g(µt,m).
From the proof we have some intuition for our result. As is common in the
literature estimating TFP in a variety of contexts, TFP here is also identified by the
residual growth in mean measured skills from period 0 to period 1 (scaled by λt+1,m
factor loading), netting out the growth due to period t inputs θt, It. Identification of
the full sequence of production technologies then proceeds as above in a sequential
fashion, and we identify the production function parameters, including the sequence
of At TFP terms, for all periods. In the estimation sections below, we use this
identification result constructively to develop an estimator for the TFP sequence.
2.5.2 Example
Next consider an example:
Example 3 Log-Linear (Cobb-Douglas) Technology with TFP
Return to the two period Cobb-Douglas example considered above (Example 1)
but now add a scaling factor A0 > 0:
ln θ1 = lnA0 + (γ0 ln θ0 + (1− γ0) ln I0)
Assume the single period 1 measure Z1,m satisfies Assumption 2 and µ1,m = g(µ0,m)
for some m = 1, 2, 3. We proceed as before to identify γ0 from
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = a, ln I0 = 0)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 0, ln I0 = 0)
E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 1, ln I0 = 1)− E(Z1,m| ln θ0 = 0, ln I0 = 0) =
lnA0 + γ0a− lnA0
lnA0 + 1− lnA0
where the lnA0 TFP terms drop out of the expression. As in Example 1, we can then
solve for the γ0 production function parameter.
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The TFP term lnA0 is identified from
lnA0 =
E(Z1,m)− (µ1,m + λ1,mE(ln f˜0(θ0, I0)))
λ1,m
=
E(Z1,m)− g(µ0,m)
λ1,m
because E(ln f˜0(θ0, I0)) = 0 for this log-linear production function. lnA0 is iden-
tified from the growth in mean measured skills because µ0,m = E(Z0,m) given the
normalization of the initial conditions. Substituting, the TFP term is then
lnA0 =
E(Z1,m)− g(E(Z0,m))
λ1,m
.
TFP is identified from the growth in mean skills between periods 0 and 1, scaled by
the identified measurement factor loading for the period 1 measures, λ1,m.
2.5.3 Identifying Production Technologies with Unknown Scale
We next consider a parallel problem to that of identifying the location (in logs)
of the production technology considered above: identifying a production technology
with an unknown scale. Consider the following production technology:
θt+1 = f˜t(θt, It)
ψt , (2.15)
where ψt ∈ R+ is an unknown scaling parameter and f˜t is a sub-function with known
location and scale. Given the unknown scaling parameter, the technology described
in (2.15) is not a known location and scale technology (Definition 1). An example of
this type of production function is the following CES function with unknown scale:
θt+1 = (γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt )ψt/φt (2.16)
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As in the TFP case above, we cannot separately identify the scale parameter ψt from
the measurement factor loading λt+1,m. We consider an auxiliary restriction on the
factor loadings which would allow identification:
Assumption 3 For some measures Zt+1,m = µt+1,m + λt+1,m ln θt+1 + ǫt+1,m and
Zt,m′ = µt,m′ + λt,m′ ln θt + ǫt,m′, we have λt+1,m = q(λt,m′), where q(·) is a known
function.
We show that with Assumption 3, together with the other assumptions previously
used to prove Theorem 1, we can now identify skill development technologies of the
form given in (2.15), which do not have a known scale:
Theorem 3 Consider a production technology of the form ft(θt, It) = f˜t(θt, It)
ψt,
where f˜t(θt, It) has known scale and location (Definition 1) and ψt ∈ R++. Under As-
sumption 1, Assumption 3, the full support assumption on some measure Zt+1,m and
the conditions for Theorem 1, the technology f˜t(θt, It) and ψt are separately identified.
Proof.
Identification of f˜t(θt, It) follows directly from Theorem 1, as the unknown ψt term
drops out allowing identification of the f˜t(θt, It) KLS sub-function. To identify ψt,
take the covariance between a measure of latent skills at age t+ 1 and at age t:
Cov(Zt+1,m, Zt,m) = λt+1,mλt,mCov(ln θt+1, ln θt)
= q(λt,m)λt,mψtCov(ln f˜t(θt, It), ln θt)
Given λt,m is known and Cov(ln f˜t(θt, It), ln θt) can be computed from the identified
sub-function f˜t(θt, It), then we can re-arrange this expression to solve for ψt.
This proof mirrors the identification result for TFP. If we assume that the factor
loading in the measurement equation (which provides the scale of the measure) has
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some known relationship with already identified factor loadings, then we can identify
the scale of the production technology.
2.5.4 Age-Invariant Measures
We conclude this section with a discussion of measures which would satisfy these
auxiliary assumptions. An extensive literature, principally in the field of psycho-
metrics, is concerned with designing skill measures which can be “equated” across
children of different ages so that the development of children can be tracked using a
coherent single measure. These measures consist of tests which are designed to be
applicable for children of various ages, and include a range of test items (questions)
which show meaningful variation for both younger and older children. Tests such as
the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT)and the Woodcock-Johnson tests
are designed so that they include a range of questions of various difficulty levels. The
simple raw scores on these tests, reflecting the total number of questions answered
correctly, can then be interpreted as an age-invariant measure of skills. 15
We formalize this notion of age-invariant measures in the following definition.
A pair of measures are age-invariant if their measurement parameters are constant
across child ages:
Definition 2 A pair of measures Zt,m and Zt+1,m is age-invariant if E(Zt,m|θt =
p) = E(Zt+1,m|θt+1 = p) for all p ∈ R++ .
15In practice, these types of age-invariant tests are often administered such that the questions are
endogenously determined by the previous answers of the child. Therefore, while not all children are
in fact answering the exact same test questions, their scores are determined in an age comparable
way. The typical test includes a number of test items ranging from low difficulty to high difficulty
questions. Testing begins by first establishing a baseline test item for each child. While the baseline
is initially based on the child’s age, the baseline adjusts downward (to less difficult questions) as
the child is unable to answer questions correctly. Once the baseline is established, the test then
progressively asks more difficult questions. Testing stops when the child makes a certain number
of mistakes. The score is then determined as the number of correct answers before testing stops.
Included in this number of correct answers are the lower difficulty test items prior to the baseline
item because it is assumed the child would have answered these items correctly (given she was able
to answer more the difficult items).
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Age-invariant measures imply that two children of different ages t and t + 1 would
nonetheless have the same expected level of measured skill if the children have the
same latent level of skill: θt = θt+1 = p.
16 In this case, the younger child, aged t,
could be considered “ahead” of her age group, and the older child, aged t+ 1, could
be considered “behind” her age group. The age invariant measures Zt,m and Zt+1,m
would report the same score (in expectation) for these two children. Definition 2
implies that for age-invariant measures both Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 hold,
allowing identification of the technology with unknown TFP and unknown return to
scale (see Theorem 3 (i)-(ii)). 17
Finally note that whether a given pair of measures is age-invariant depends on
the measures and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Using pairs of unrelated
measures, such as birth weight to measure cognitive skills at birth and SAT scores to
measures skills at age 18, would not seem to constitute a set of age-invariant measures
as there is no reason to believe these measures would have a common location and
scale.
2.6 Estimation
In this section we discuss the empirical model we take to the data, the estimation
algorithm we develop based on the identification analysis of the preceding sections,
and briefly describe the data. Additional details about the data and sample are left
for the Appendix.
16Age-invariant measures should not be confused with “age-standardized” measures, which are
measures the researcher constructs to be mean 0 and standard deviation 1 at all ages for the particular
sample at hand (See the Appendix). Our concept of age-invariant measures concerns the underlying
primitive and unobserved parameters of the measurement equations. Age-standardized measures
would in fact not represent any growth in average skills or changes in the dispersion of skills as
children age.
17Age-invariance implies the following restrictions on measurement parameters: µt+1+λt+1 ln p =
µt + λt ln p for all p. Re-arranging, we have (µt+1 − µt) = ln p (λt − λt+1) for all p. This is the case
if and only if µt = µt+1 and λt = λt+1.
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2.6.1 Empirical Model
There are five parts to the empirical model: 1) a model of skill development where
skills in the next period are produced by the stocks of existing skills and parental in-
vestments; 2) a model of parental investment where investment depends on household
characteristics and the existing stock of skills; 3) a distribution of initial conditions of
household characteristics and child skills; 4) a model of the relationship between final
childhood skills and adult outcomes (schooling and earnings); and 5) a measurement
model relating each of the latent model elements to observed data measures. Be-
sides specifying particular functional forms for the production technology, the major
distinction between the empirical model and the preceding identification analysis is
that we assume parental investment is also measured with error and allow parental
investment to be endogenously related to the stock of existing children’s skill.
The timing of the model is as follows. There are five biannual periods of child
development: ages 5-6 (t = 0), 7-8 (t = 1), 9-10 (t = 2), 11-12 (t = 3), 13-14 (t = 4).
While it would be ideal to extend the model to even earlier ages (to birth or even to
pre-natal periods), we face the common tradeoff of assuming “too much” relative to
the data we have available. We have chosen here to focus on the childhood period
from age 5 to 14 where we have more skill measures, and plausibly age-invariant
measures, and can judge the performance of the model and estimator in closer to
ideal conditions.
Skill Production Technology
At each age t the current level of latent cognitive skills and investment produce the
next period’s (t+ 1) skills. The technology takes a stochastic translog specification:
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ln θt+1 = lnAt + γ1,t ln θt + γ2,t ln It + γ3,t ln It · ln θt + ηθ,t, (2.17)
where lnAt is the TFP term, and ηθ,t is the stochastic production shock, which is
assumed i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2θ,t) for all t and independent of the current stock of skills and
investment. The translog specification is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas specifi-
cation, where the special case γ3,t = 0 is the typical Cobb-Douglas specification (with
the addition of a TFP term and a stochastic shock). We use the translog specification
because of its flexibility relative to the Cobb-Douglas and other CES functions. The
translog function allows a non-constant elasticity of substitution between inputs and
can be expanded with the inclusion of additional terms to a close provide an approx-
imation of any unknown production technology. The log-linear form of the function
also facilitates convenient and fast closed form estimators, as detailed below. Our
general translog function also allows non-constant returns to scale. With γ3 6= 0, the
elasticity of skill production with respect to investment depends on the current level
of children’s skills:
∂ ln θt+1
∂ ln It
= γ2,t + γ3,t ln θt,
where γ3,t > 0 implies a higher return to investment for children with currently high
levels of skill than for children with low levels of skill, a dynamic complementarity
where past skills (and past investments which produced those skills) affect the pro-
ductivity of current investments. Moreover, γ3,t 6= 0 implies that the elasticity of next
period skills with respect to investment is a function of the child’s stock of skills.
Parental Investment
We specify a parametric policy function for parental investment. Investment is en-
dogenously determined by the current stock of the child’s skills, mother’s skills, and
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family income:
ln It = α1,t ln θt + α2,t ln θMC + α3,t ln θMN + α4,t lnYt + ηI,t (2.18)
where
∑
j αj,t = 1 for all t, θMC is the mother’s stock of cognitive skills, θMN is
the mother’s stock of non-cognitive skills, Yt is household income, and ηI,t is the
investment shock, where ηI,t i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2I,t) for all t and independent of latent
skills and income. Our concept of investment represents both quantity and quality
aspects, where we use measures of investments which capture quantity aspects of
investment (time parents spent reading to children) and quality aspects (whether
children are “praised” by their parents).
This specification of investment is a kind of “reduced form” specification repre-
senting a policy function for parental investment which is not derived from an explicit
economic model of the household behavior. This approach follows Cunha et al. (2010);
Attanasio et al. (2015a,b). The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, this
approach provides a simple and tractable model of the investment process which
avoids the computational burden of solving and estimating a formal model of house-
hold behavior. Second, this approach has the potential to allow for some generality as
our specification of the investment process can be consistent with multiple models of
the households. Other work derives parental investment from explicit models of the
household, including explicit representations of household preferences, decision mak-
ing, beliefs, and constraints (see for example Del Boca et al., 2014b, 2016; Cunha,
2013a; Cunha et al., 2013; Bernal, 2008). The advantage of these latter approaches is
that the counterfactual policy analysis incorporates well defined household responses
to policy, see Del Boca et al. (2016) for some discussion.
Given the investment function does not derive from an explicit model, the inter-
pretation of the parameters is in some sense speculative. α1,t can be interpreted as
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reflecting whether parents “reinforce” existing skill stocks (α1,t > 0) or “compensate”
for low skill stocks (α1,t < 0). α2,t and α3,t reflect the extent to which the mother’s
skills relate to the quantity and quality of her parental investment as in the case
where more skilled mothers read to their children more or provide higher quality in-
teractions. Finally, α4,t reflects the influences that household resources have on the
extent of parental investments, and reflects the combined effects of constraints the
household faces (such as credit market constraints) and preferences the household has
to invest scarce resources in children (see Caucutt et al., 2015).
Finally, to close the investment model, we assume that log-family income (lnYt)
follows an AR(1) process which allows for life-cycle trends in income:
lnYt+1 = µY + δY · t+ ρY lnYt + ηY,t (2.19)
where the innovation is ηY,t i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ2Y ) and is assumed independent of all
latent variables. Initial family income Y0 is allowed to be correlated with mother’s
and children’s initial skills, and hence our model captures important correlations
between household resources and the skills of parents and children.
Initial Conditions
The initial conditions consist of the child’s initial (at age 5-6) stock of skills θC,0, the
mother’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills (θMC and θMN), which are assumed to be
time invariant over the child development period, and the level of family income at
birth (Y0). Define the vector of initial conditions as
Ω = (ln θ0, ln θMC , ln θMN , lnY0)
We assume a parametric distribution for the initial conditions:
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Ω ∼ N(µΩ,ΣΩ)
where µΩ = [0, 0, 0, 0, µ0,lnY ]. µ0,lnY is the mean of the family log income when
children are 5-6 years old. The means of the remaining variables are set to zero by
Normalization 1. ΣΩ is the variance-covariance matrix for the initial conditions.
Adult Outcome
In order to provide a more meaningful metric to evaluate policy interventions in our
model, we relate adult outcomes to the stock of children’s skills in the final period of
the child development process (period T = 4 or age 13-14):
Q = µQ + αQ ln θT + ηQ, (2.20)
where ηQ is independent of ln θT . We use years of schooling measured at age 23 and
log earnings at age 29 as adult outcomes. Schooling is an attractive adult outcome to
use because it explains a large fraction of adult earnings and consumptions, is largely
determined at an early point in adulthood and, unlike realized labor market earnings,
does not suffer from a censoring issue due to endogenous labor supply.
Measurement
The final piece of our model is the model of measurement relating latent variables to
observed data. Children’s skills, parental investment, and mother’s skills are all as-
sumed to be measured with error. There are 4 latent variables: ω ∈ {θ, θMC , θMN , I}.
There are in general multiple measures for each latent variable. Each measure is
assumed to take the following form:
Zω,t,m = µω,t,m + λω,t,m lnωt + ǫω,t,m
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where m indexes the measures for each latent variable ω ∈ {θ, θMC , θMN , I}.
We assume a generalized version of Assumption 1 appropriate for this more gen-
eral empirical model. All measurement errors are assumed independent of each other
(across measures and over time), and all measurement errors are assumed independent
of the latent variables, household income, and the “structural” shocks (ηI,t, ηθ,t, ηQ).
This assumptions is strong, and weaker assumptions of mean-independence are suf-
ficient for identification of the parametric model. While we assume strong indepen-
dence assumption, we make no other restrictions on the distribution of measurement
error (e.g. we do not assume ǫω,t,m is distributed Normal) as is common in previ-
ous approaches. Our sequential estimator, described below, is therefore robust to
mis-specification of the marginal distributions of measurement errors.
2.6.2 Estimation Algorithm
Our estimation algorithm is formed from the identification results presented above,
and in particular relies on the error-in-variable formulation from Section 2.4.6. Be-
fore describing the steps of the algorithm, consider several estimation options. One
approach, a kind of “brute force” approach, is to simulate the full sequence of latent
variables and measures from candidate primitive parameters and explicit assump-
tions about the distribution of measurement errors (e.g. assume they are Normally
distributed) and compute a likelihood function or a set of moments to form the basis
of an estimator. We do not prefer this approach because it requires additional as-
sumptions about the distribution of measurement errors which are not required for
identification. This approach may also involve a tremendous amount of computation-
ally costly simulation given the non-linear nature of the model.
A second estimation approach is to use the measures directly to simulate the
distribution of latent variables by assuming a particular distribution for the latent
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variables. One then could estimate the production function in a second step from
the simulated distribution of latent variables. This is the approach of Cunha et al.
(2010) and Attanasio et al. (2015a,b) in which both assume the latent variables are
distributed according to a mixture of 2 Normal distributions. This approach too
makes specific parametric assumptions which are not required.
Our estimation approach directly follows our identification approach in treating
the measurement parameters as nuisance parameters which can be computed sequen-
tially along with the primitive parameters of the model generating the latent variables.
Following the estimation of the initial conditions using standard techniques, we se-
quentially estimate for each age the investment and production functions, followed
by the measurement parameters for the measures used for that age. The sequential
algorithm we develop has the advantage of tractability because our estimator does
not require the simulation of the full model; the primitives of the production tech-
nology and investment functions can be estimated directly from data. In addition,
another advantage of our approach over a joint estimation approach is by breaking
the estimator into steps, we make the identification assumptions as transparent as
possible. Of course, the disadvantage of our approach is a potential loss of efficiency
from not estimating the parameters jointly and exploiting “cross-step” restrictions.
We present two versions of the estimation algorithm. The first version works with
a unrestricted version of the technology:
Model 1 (General): lnAt free and
∑3
j=1 γj,t free. At least one measure is age-
invariant.
The availability of this age-invariant measure allows us to identify the more general
technology.
The second version of the model restricts the production technology (2.17) to have
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a known location and scale.
Model 2 (Restricted): lnAt = 0 for all t (no TFP dynamics) and
∑3
j=1 γj,t = 1
for all t (constant returns to scale).
Estimation of Model 2 (Restricted)
We begin with the estimator for the second version of the model, using the restricted
technology. The estimator for the more general technology (Model 2) is below.
Step 0 (Estimate Initial Conditions and Initial Measurement Parameter)
First, we estimate the measurement parameters at the initial period (age 5-6),
λω,0,m, µω,0,m for all measures m, for both children’s and mother’s skills. To estimate
these measurement parameters, we use ratios of covariances and measurement means
as outlined above (2.3) and (2.4). We choose one measure for children’s cognitive
skills, mother’s cognitive skills, and mother’s non-cognitive skills as the normalizing
measure (which we label m = 1, without loss of generality) and normalize the factor
loading for this measure to be 1: λθ,0,1 = 1, λMC,0,1 = 1, λMN,0,1 = 1.
18 We estimate
the remaining factor loadings using the average of the covariances between all of the
remaining measures, where each factor loading is computed from
λω,0,m =
Cov(Zω,0,m, Zω,0,m′)
Cov(Z0,ω,1, Zω,0,m′)
∀m 6= m′ and ∀ω ∈ {θ,MC,MN}.
Given the normalization that log skills are mean 0 in the initial period, we compute
the initial measurement intercepts as
18Note that while investment is a latent variable as well, we do not need to normalize the scale
and location of latent investment because investment already has a scale and location specified by
the KLS investment equation (2.18).
47
µω,0,m = E(Zω,0,m) ∀m and ∀ω ∈ {θ,MC,MN}
With the factor loading estimates in hand, we then estimate the initial period
variance-covariance matrix ΣΩ using variances and covariances in measures of skills
and family income (assumed measured without error). This step provides estimates
of the initial joint distribution of children’s skills, mother’s skills, and family income.
In this initial step, we also estimate the parameters of the income process (2.19) using
a regression of income on lagged income and a time trend.
Finally, given the estimates of the measurement parameters for children and
mother skills, we form the following “residual” measures:
Z˜ω,0,m =
Zω,0,m − µω,0,m
λω,0,m
∀m and ∀ω ∈ {θ,MC,MN}
We are now ready to estimate the investment function for period t = 0, where
the investment in this first period depends on the initial child’s skills and household
characteristics (mother’s skills and family income).
Step 1 (Estimate Investment Function Parameters):
Following the errors-in-variables formulation described above, substitute a “raw”
measure for investment ZI,0,m and a “residual” measure for each of the latent skills
(Z˜θ,0,m, Z˜MC,0,m, Z˜MN,0,m) into the model of investment defined in terms of primitives
(2.18):
ZI,0,m − µI,0,m − ǫI,0,m
λI,0,m
= α1,0(Z˜θ,0,m − ǫ˜θ,0,m) + α2,0(Z˜MC,m − ǫ˜MC,m)
+α3,0(Z˜MN,m − ǫ˜MN,m) + α4,0 lnY0 + ηI,0
Re-arranging, we have
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ZI,0,m = µI,0,m + λI,0,mα1,0Z˜θ,0,m + λI,0,mα2,0Z˜MC,m + λI,0,mα3,0Z˜MN,m + λI,0,mα4,0 lnY0
+ ǫI,0,m + λI,0,m(ηI,0 − ǫ˜θ,0,m − ǫ˜MC,m − ǫ˜MN,m)
= β0,0,m + β1,0,mZ˜θ,0,m + β2,0,mZ˜MC,m + β3,0,mZ˜MN,m + β4,0,m lnY0 + πI,0,m (2.21)
where βj,0,m = λI,0,mαj,0 for all j and
πI,0,m = ǫI,0,m + λI,0,m(ηI,0 − α1,0ǫ˜θ,0,m − α2,0ǫ˜MC,m − α3,0ǫ˜MN,m).
Estimation of (2.21) by OLS would yield inconsistent estimates of the βj,0,m coef-
ficients because the measures are correlated with their measurement errors (included
in the residual term πI,0,m). Here the structure of the model affords the researcher
several possible strategies to consistently estimate the βj,0,m coefficients. We use an
instrumental variable estimator with the vector of excluded instruments composed
of alternative measures of skills: [Zθ,0,m′ , ZMC,0,m′ , ZNC,0,m′ ]. Under Assumption 1,
these instruments are valid because each of these alternative measures is uncorrelated
with all of the components of πI,0,m. Using this IV strategy, we obtain consistent esti-
mators for the βj,t,m coefficients. The primitive parameters of the investment function
are then recovered from
αj,0 =
βj,0,m∑4
j=1 βj,0,m
Step 2 (Compute Measurement Parameters for Latent Investment):
After estimating the primitive parameters of the investment function, we recover
the scale and location for the investment equation without further re-normalizations
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on the measurement equation parameters. The intercept and factor loading for the
investment measure are given by
µI,0,m = β0,0,m
and
λI,0,m =
4∑
j=1
βj,0,m
With these consistent estimators for the measurement parameters for investment,
we form the “residual” measures for investment in period t = 0:
Z˜I,0,m =
ZI,0,m − µI,0,m
λI,0,m
Step 3 (Estimate Skill Production Technology)
Next, we use a similar technique to estimate the production technology. Substi-
tuting the residual measures into the production technology (2.17), we have
Zθ,1,m − µθ,1,m − ǫθ,1,m
λθ,1,m
= γ1,0(Z˜θ,0,m − ǫ˜θ,0,m) + γ2,0(Z˜I,0,m − ǫ˜I,0,m)
+ γ3,0(Z˜θ,0,m − ǫ˜θ,0,m)(Z˜I,0,m − ǫ˜I,0,m) + ηθ,0
With some algebra, we can re-write this as:
Zθ,1,m = δ0,0,m + δ1,0,mZ˜θ,0,m + δ2,0,mZ˜I,0,m + δ3,0,mZ˜θ,0,m · Z˜I,0,m + πθ,0,m (2.22)
where δ0,0,m = µθ,0,m, δj,0,m = λθ,1,mγj,0 for j = 1, 2, 3 and
πθ,0,m = ǫθ,1,m+λθ,1,m[ηθ,0−γ1,0ǫθ,0,m−γ2,0ǫI,0,m−γ3,0(Z˜θ,0,mǫI,0,m+Z˜I,0,mǫθ,0,m−ǫθ,0,mǫI,0,m)]
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As with the investment function, estimation of 2.22 using OLS would lead to
inconsistent estimates. We use the same IV approach as above using instruments
formed from alternative measures [Zθ,0,m′ , ZI,0,m′ , Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′ ]. Under Assump-
tion 1 these instruments are uncorrelated the residual error term πθ,0,m.
19 With
consistent estimates of δj,0,ms in hand, we can then recover the structural parameters
and for the production technology as:
γj,0 =
δj,0,m∑3
j=1 δj,0,m
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
Step 4 (Compute Measurement Parameters for Latent Skill):
The measurement parameters for the latent skill measure in period t = 1 (Zθ,1,m)
can then be recovered from
µθ,1,m = δ0,0,m,
λθ,1,m =
3∑
j=1
δj,0,0.
We then form the residual measure for latent skill as
Z˜θ,1,m =
Zθ,I,m − µθ,1,m
λθ,1,m
Step 5 (Estimate variance of Investment and Production Function Shocks):
19Perhaps the less obvious terms are terms such as this E(Z˜θ,0,mǫI,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′). Under
the assumption of independence of the errors, we have
E(Z˜θ,0,mǫI,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′) = E(Z˜θ,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′)E(ǫI,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′)
given ǫI,0,m is independent of Z˜θ,0,m. Given the independence assumption, the latter term is
E(ǫI,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′) = E(ǫI,0,m) = 0. Therefore, E(Z˜θ,0,mǫI,0,m|Zθ,0,m′ · ZI,0,m′) = 0.
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The remaining parameters to be estimated for this period are the variances of the
investment and production function shocks, σ2I,0 and σ
2
θ,0. To estimate σI,0, we use
the covariance between the residual from (2.21), πI,0,m and an alternative residual
measure of investment Z˜I,0,m′ = ln I0 + ǫI,0,m′ :
Cov(πI,0,m/λI,0,m, Z˜I,0,m′) = V (ηI,0) = σ
2
I,0
To compute the residual measure Z˜I,0,m we need to compute the measurement pa-
rameters for this measure. We do this by repeating the estimation in Steps 2 and 3
replacing the left-hand side variable in (2.21) with the alternative measure ZI,0,m′ .
The variance of the production shock is estimated in the same way using an
alternative measure of children’s skills in period t = 1:
Cov(πθ,1,m/λI,1,m, Z˜θ,1,m′) = V (ηθ,0) = σ
2
θ,0
Remaining Steps
We repeat Steps 1-5 for the remaining periods until the final period of child de-
velopment T . This algorithm produces estimates of the parameters of the investment
and production functions for all child ages.
Estimation of Model 1 (Unrestricted)
The preceding algorithm restricted the production technology to have no TFP dy-
namics and constant returns to scale (Model 2). Following Theorem 2 and Theorem
3, identification of the more general model can be accomplished with restrictions on
the measurement parameters. We assume we have available at least one child skill
measure which is age-invariant (Definition 2). Label the age-invariant measure to be
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measure m, and for this measure we have µθ,t,m = µθ,0,m for all t and λθ,t,m = λθ,0,m
for all t.
With this age invariant measure, we repeat Step 3 (Estimate Production Tech-
nology). The “reduced form” equation (2.22) and estimation of the δj,0,m parameters
remains the same. To allow for non-constant returns to scale we do not restrict the
structural γj,0 parameters to sum to 1. The structural parameters are computed as
γj,0 =
δj,0,m
λθ,1,m
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
With the inclusion of the TFP term lnA0, the δ0,0,m intercept from the reduced
form equation (2.22) is now
δ0,0,m = µθ,1,m + λθ,1,m lnA0
Given the age-invariance assumption, we can consistently estimate µθ,1,m and λθ,1,m
and compute lnA0.
With the addition of these computations to Step 3, the other steps in the algorithm
remain the same. We can use this extended to algorithm to compute the full sequence
of parameters for the investment and production functions for all child ages.
Estimating the Adult Outcome Equation
Finally, after we have computed the full path of primitive parameters for the invest-
ment and production functions, we are able to estimate the adult outcome process
(2.20). We focus on both final years of education at age 23 and log earnings at age
30. We use the same IV method as before to solve the measurement error issue.
Substituting the measures for skills at age 13-14 (t = 4) in equation (2.20), we have:
Q = µQ + αQZ˜θ,4,m + (ηQ − αQǫ˜θ,4,m) (2.23)
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We use a second measure for skills at age 13-14 as an IV to identify αQ.
2.6.3 Data
We estimate the model using information about children and their families ob-
tained from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY). Descriptive
statistics for the sample and additional data construction details are left for the Ap-
pendix.
The NLSY dataset is constructed by matching female respondents of the original
dataset with their children who were part of the Children and Young Adults surveys,
from 1986 to 2012. The dataset provides observations of the first period of the model
(age 5-6) through adulthood. The total number of children in our sample is 11,509.
The NLSY dataset contains multiple measures of children’s skills, mother’s skills,
and parental investments. The complete set of measures, their ranges and descrip-
tive statistics for our sample are included in the Appendix. For children’s skills we
rely on different sub-scales of the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) in
Mathematics, Reading and Recognition, and the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
(PPVT). Finally, we use information for children when they become young adults to
link the children skills into a more meaningful metric to evaluate policy intervention:
we use children’s highest grade completed at age 23 or older and their earnings at
age 29. The information about the educational attainment is measured as the highest
grade completed as of date of last interview. We considered schooling information
only for those young adults who were at least 23 years old or older in the last 2012
interview. Age 29 earnings is in real 2012 dollars.
For mother’s cognitive skills we use sub-scales of the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and for mother’s non-cognitive skills we use the Rotter
and Rosenberg indexes. For parental investments, we use the various HOME score
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measures from direct observation and interview with the mother. Family income
includes all sources of income for the parents, including mother’s and father’s labor
income, and any sources of non-labor income.
2.7 Results
In this section we discuss our parameter estimates, simulate the estimated model
to describe the development of children’s skills, and compute the effects of simple in-
terventions to improve skills and adult outcomes. We begin by presenting estimates
of the general model in which we allow for Total Factor Productivity (TFP) dynam-
ics and non-constant returns to scale (Model 1). Because this general technology
no longer has a known location and scale, we use an age-invariance restriction for
identification. Given the structure of the PIAT tests, which administer the same test
to children of various ages (given their ability level), we believe it is appropriate to
assume the measurement intercepts and factor loadings for these measures of cogni-
tive skills are age-invariant (Definition 2). Note that we do not assume any particular
values for these measurement parameters, only the age invariance of them, and treat
the measurement parameters as free parameters to be estimated.
We also consider results using alternative restricted models, and estimates which
do not correct for measurement error and treat the measures as error free measures.
We briefly discuss the policy predictions of these models below, but, for brevity, we
report estimates of these several alternative models in the Appendix.
Another key issue involves interpreting the magnitude of the parameter estimates.
Because the parameter estimates of the production technology and investment equa-
tions are relative to the initial skill normalizations, the magnitudes of many of the
parameters estimates are not directly interpretable in isolation. We conclude this
section with a series of policy counter-factual experiments using the estimated model.
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These exercises provide necessary metrics to interpret the estimates with respect to
adult outcomes, years of completed schooling at age 23 and earnings at age 29.
2.7.1 Parameter Estimates
Initial Conditions
Table 2.2 reports estimates of the initial conditions variance-covariance matrix ΣΩ
and the associated correlation matrix. We normalize children’s cognitive skills to
the PIAT-Mathematics test, mother’s cognitive skills to the ASVAB2 (Arithmetics
reasoning) and mother’s non-cognitive skills to the Self-Esteem1 (Rosenberg Self-
Esteem: “I am a person of worth”) measure. The variances and covariances of the
latent skills, and the investment and production function parameters, are interpreted
relative to these normalizations. As expected, we estimate that children’s skills,
mother’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and family income are all highly positively
correlated. For space considerations, estimates of the dynamic family income process
can be found in the Appendix.
Investment Function
Table 2.3 reports the estimates of the investment function specified in Section 2.6.1.
At ages 5-6, we find that investment is increasing in children’s skills, mother’s skills,
and family income. Because of the log-log form of the investment equation, we can
interpret parameter estimates as elasticities. The parameter estimate of 0.230 on the
log children’s skills variable indicates that a 1 percent increase in children’s skills
raises investment by 0.23 percent, an inelastic response. The positive coefficient sug-
gests that parents are “reinforcing” existing skills with further investments: children
with higher skills are receiving even more investment than children with lower skills.
Mother’s cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills also increase investment at ages 5-
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6, with non-cognitive skills of the mother estimated to have a substantially higher
elasticity than cognitive skills. These coefficients indicate that mothers with higher
skills are providing higher quantities and qualities of investments in children. Turn-
ing to the importance of income to parental investments, we find that a 1 percent
increase in family income raises investment by 0.34 percent. The response of invest-
ment with respect to mother’s skills and family income reflects the combination of
parental preferences and household constraints, which we cannot unfortunately sep-
arately distinguish using this reduced form model of investment. Given that positive
correlation between mother’s initial skills, child’s initial skills, and household income,
taken together, these estimates of the investment function indicate that endogenous
investment increases inequality in children’s skills. The estimated variance on the in-
vestment shock reveals how much of the remaining variation in parental investments
remains unexplained by this model, such as investments from schools, peers, and the
child herself.
Comparing parameter estimates of the investment function over the development
period reveals that the influence of the child’s prior skills on investments becomes
much smaller at later ages, indicating that parental investments are less reinforcing
of existing skill stocks at older ages. As the child develops, we find that mother’s
non-cognitive skills becomes the dominant influence on investment. However, while
the importance of family income falls somewhat from an elasticity of 0.34 at age 5-6
to 0.275 at age 11-12, income is still a significant and positive factor for parental
investment even at later ages.
Production Function
Table 2.4 reports the parameter estimates for the technology of skill formation, as
described in Section 2.6.1. We present measurement error corrected estimates of the
57
two versions of the model: our preferred unrestricted Model 1 and the restricted
Model 2. We turn first to the unrestricted Model 1 estimates.
At all ages, we find that skills are “self-productive” (next period’s skills are in-
creasing in existing skill stocks) and that skills are positively increasing in investment.
For age 5-6 skill production, we estimate a statistically significant from 0 negative co-
efficient on the interaction term (ln θt ln It) indicating that we reject the Cobb-Douglas
special case.
The elasticities of skill production with respect to investment are heterogeneous,
and we graph the skill elasticity for the age 5-6 production function in Figure 2.1 with
respect to the existing stock of children’s skill. The estimated negative coefficient on
the interaction term indicates that the elasticity of skill production with respect to
investment is decreasing in the child’s current skill level. For low skill children, the
elasticity approaches 1.4, indicating a that 1 percent increase in investment increases
next period’s skills by 1.4 percent. For already high skill children, the elasticity ap-
proaches 0.2, indicating that a 1 percent increase in investment raises future skills by
only 0.2 percent. These heterogeneous investment elasticities suggest that targeting
interventions to improve children’s skills would have the largest effect on skill disad-
vantage children. This estimate stands in contrast to the estimates reported in Cunha
et al. (2010). They estimate a CES technology which implies that the marginal pro-
ductivity of investment is higher for high skill children given that current investments
and the current stock of skills are complements. Note also that unlike the constant
returns to scale CES case, our unrestricted model allows investment elasticities to be
larger than 1, and we estimate, at least for some children, an elastic response of skill
formation to investment.
The high TFP estimate for age 5-6 and the increasing returns to scale (indicated
by the sum of the coefficients being greater than 1) indicate that existing skills and
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investments at this initial age are very productive relative to later ages. These esti-
mates of high returns to early investment will underlie the policy experiment results
we discuss next. As children age, Table 2.4 indicates that skills and investment be-
come generally less productive and skills less “malleable.” We graph the estimated
TFP at each age in Figure 2.2. Our estimate of TFP at age 11-12 falls to 1/6 the
level at age 5-6, indicating a dramatic slowdown in the productivity of existing skills
and investments in producing new skills. This feature of the technology is largely
consistent with the evidence that cognitive skills are difficult to change as children
after age 10.
Comparing these estimates for the unrestricted Model 1 to the restricted Model 2
in Table 2.4 reveals that we clearly reject the restricted technology of Model 2. The
estimated sum of the input coefficients far exceeds 1, with the estimated return to scale
of 2.66 in the early period indicating increasing returns to scale. The estimated return
to scale declines with the child’s age to a value of 1.3 at older ages, revealing that even
for older children we can reject constant returns to scale. In addition, the estimate
of high positive TFP term also indicates that we clearly reject the assumption of a
0 log TFP in Model 2. As discussed below, these differences in production function
estimates imply very different investment and policy effects, with the restricted Model
2 estimates implying a much smaller effect of an income transfer on children’s skill
development than in our preferred unrestricted model.
Adult Outcomes
Table 2.5 presents our estimates of the completed schooling outcome equation and
log earnings equation. We estimate that a percentage change in children skills at age
13-14 leads to an increase of 0.086 years of school. We also find that a 1 percentage
change in children skills leads to a 0.021 percentage change in earnings at age 29.
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Below, we use these estimates to “anchor” our policy estimates to a meaningful adult
outcome metric.
2.7.2 Estimated Child Development Path
We analyze the quantitative implications of the estimated model by simulating the
dynamic model. Simulation of the model proceeds by drawing 100,000 children from
the estimated initial conditions distribution and, for each child, forward simulating
the path of income, investments, children’s skills, and adult outcomes.
Figure 2.3 shows the estimated development path of mean log latent cognitive
skills. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the dynamics in the distribution of latent skills. And,
Figure 2.6 provides the estimated dynamics in the distribution of latent investment.
Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that children’s mean latent skills grow substan-
tially over this development period, from age 5 to 14, with the most rapid growth at
early ages and growth slowing somewhat in the later period. In addition to growth in
mean skills, we estimate that the latent distribution of cognitive skills becomes more
dispersed as children age. Inequality rises substantially as there are different rates of
skills growth for children at different percentiles of the initial skill distribution. Figure
2.5 shows that skills for high skill children at the 90th percentile grow 20% from age
5-6 to age 9-10 and grow 9% during the rest of the childhood. For low initial skill
children at the 5th percentile, growth is slower, with a 6 % growth rate from age 5-6
to age 7-8 and a 3 % growth rate from age 11-12 to age 13-14.
2.7.3 Policy Experiments
In this section, we explore implications of the estimated model by using the esti-
mated model to predict the effect of income transfers on childhood skill development
and adult outcomes. While we do not have a fully developed model of household re-
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source allocation to provide a more realistic setting to evaluate these policy, we argue
that the experiments do at the very least provide a meaningful metric to understand
the magnitude of the parameter estimates, and allow us to meaningfully compare the
importance of various model features such as measurement error and the specification
of general technologies.
Short and Long-Term Effects
Before we analyze the results for our particular parameter estimates, we first present
a brief discussion of the effects of income transfers in our model. To allow for the
possibility that an income transfer could have heterogeneous effects across households,
we examine policy effects conditional on a vector of current state variables Ωt =
[θt, θMC , θMN , Yt], which includes the child’s initial skills, the mother’s skills, and
initial family income. First, consider the expected short-term marginal effect of an
increase in household income Yt on the log of childhood skills in period t+ 1:
∆t+1,t(Ωt) =
∂ ln θt+1
∂Yt
=
∂ ln It
∂Yt
∂ ln θt+1
∂ ln It
,
∆t+1,t(Ωt) is the product of the marginal change in parental investment and the
marginal change in skill production. With our parametrization, this is given by
∆t+1,t(Ωt) =
α4,t
Yt
(γ2,t + γ3,t ln θt).
This short-term effect is heterogeneous by the level of family income and the existing
stock of the child’s skills. The marginal increase in investment is decreasing in the
current level of income, as would be expected given the log form of the investment
equation. The key parameter for the heterogeneity of the short-term effect is γ3,t,
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with γ3,t > 0 implying a higher return to investment for children with higher existing
stocks of skills.
The dynamic model of skill development we estimate also allows us to consider
the long-term effect of an income transfer at age t on outcomes beyond the immediate
next period. The expected long-term effect of a marginal increase in income at period
t on children’s skills in period t+ 2 is given by
∆t+2,t(Ωt) =
∂ ln θt+2
∂Yt
= ∆t+1,t(Ωt)
∂ ln θt+2
∂ ln θt+1
(1 +
∂ ln It+1
∂ ln θt+1
)
Note that we are analyzing the long-term effect of a one-time change in income at
period t; income remains at baseline levels for all subsequent periods. With our
parametrization, the long-term effect becomes
∆t+2,t(Ωt) =
α4,t
Yt
(γ2,t + γ3,t ln θt)(γ1,t+1 + γ3,t ln It)(1 + α4,t+1).
The short-term effect (∆t+1,t(Ωt)) and the long-term effect (∆t+2,t(Ωt)) can differ in
general. Our model of skill and investment dynamics allows for the possibility that
either short-term effects are higher than long-term effects (the effect of the policy
“fades-out” as the child ages) or that long-term effects can exceed short-term effects
(early interventions have a kind of “multiplier effect” on later skill development).
Effects on Final Skills
We first consider a simple exercise designed to assess the optimal timing of the income
transfer. In Figure 2.7 we show the average percent change in the level of latent
children’s skills at age 13-14 by the different timing (age) of income transfer:
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100 · E(θ
′
T (a)− θT
θT
)
where θ
′
T (a) is level of skill at age t = T (age 13-14) with an income transfer of $1,000
dollars (in 2012 $) provided to the family at age a, and θT is level of skill at age 13-14 in
the baseline model (no income transfer). The transfer is a one-time transfer and does
not affect the future levels of income. The figure shows that a $1,000 transfer given
at age 5-6 increase the average stock of age 13-14 skills by about 1 percent. Providing
the same transfer later in the childhood period has a smaller average effect. Providing
a $1,000 transfer at age 11-12 would increase the average skill stocks at age 13-14 by
less than 0.4 percent. We estimate that providing transfers early in the development
period would have a long-term effect that exceeds the short-term effect of providing
a transfer in later childhood. This result reflects the high productivity of investment
in the early periods and the high level of productivity of existing stocks of skill in
producing future skills (limited fade-out).
Effects on Completed Schooling
Figure 2.8 displays the results of the same set of policy experiments as in Figure 2.7
but using completed schooling at age 23 as the outcome. In this Figure, we plot
E(S
′
(a) − S), where S ′(a) is the number of months of completed schooling at age
13-14 with an income transfer of $1,000 given at age a, and S is the number of months
of completed schooling at age 13-14 in the baseline model (no income transfer). These
estimates provide a meaningful metric to evaluate the magnitude of the policy effects.
We find that a $1,000 transfer given at age 5-6 would increase the number of average
months of completed schooling by about 1.80 months. Providing the same transfer
at a later period would increase completed schooling by only 0.55 months.
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Comparison with Dahl and Lochner (2012a)
Our estimated effects of a family income transfer on children outcomes are similar to
some previous finding in the literature using different sources of identifying variation.
Using changes in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to instrument for family
income, Dahl and Lochner (2012a) find that a $1,000 dollars increase in family income
implies an increase in PIAT score of about 4.5% of a standard deviation. 20 To
directly compare our estimates to their reported effects, we compute the equivalence
between their PIAT score outcome and years of schooling. We calculate that the
Dahl and Lochner (2012a) estimates imply an average increase of about 0.54 months
of schooling for a $1,000 transfer at age 11-12. 21 This results is quite similar to our
main results (see Figure 2.8).
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
The previous results showed the average effect of policies providing transfers at dif-
ferent stages of the development process. Our modeling framework allows potentially
important sources of heterogeneity by the child’s initial skills, mother’s skills, and
20This result is based on the results reported in the correction dated March 2016 to the previous
results (Table 4). In comparing our results to their results, it should be noted that the policy
considered is different. Dahl and Lochner (2012a) consider a change in the EITC, which affects
after-tax wage rates, parental labor supply, and hence parental time allocation, and we consider
here a pure income transfer (where we do not distinguish between income from labor and other
sources).
21As an outcome, Dahl and Lochner (2012a) use a combined PIAT test score (the average of the
three separately age-standardized tests in Math, Reading Recognition, and Reading Comprehension).
We rescale the PIAT scores in terms of schooling in the same way as we estimate the factor loadings
for different skill measures. Define S to be years of schooling at age 23, ZT to be the PIAT test
score at age 13-14 (period T = 4), and ZT−1 the PIAT test score at age 11-12 (period 3). We write
S = µS + αS ln θT + ηS
ZT = µT + λT ln θT + ǫT
ZT−1 = µT−1 + λT−1 ln θT−1 + ǫT−1
Under the assumption that error terms are uncorrelated, the following ratio of covariances provides
the scaling of adult schooling with respect to the PIAT test score: αSλT =
Cov(S,ZT−1)
Cov(ZT−1,ZT )
.
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initial family income levels; all of which could affect the individual level treatment
effect. The model estimates allow us to directly estimate this heterogeneity in the
policy treatment effects.
Figure 2.9 plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age 5-6 on
completed months of schooling by the percentile of initial (age 5-6) family income.
This figure also plots the average treatment effect (ATE), the average effect over the
income distribution; the same effect as reported above. While the ATE is about 1.8
months, the effect varies considerably depending on the child’s initial level of income.
For the children from poor households in the 9-10th income percentiles, the effect of
the income transfer is to increase completed schooling by around 4 months, and for the
children from the richest households, the effect is near 0. The large heterogeneous
effects by family income stem from the estimated importance of family income in
producing child investments and the estimated positive correlation of income with
maternal skills and the child’s initial skills. This heterogeneity in the effects by income
mirrors the heterogeneity in income effects found in previous papers using alternative
sources of identification (see Dahl and Lochner, 2012a; Loken et al., 2012). Using
the varied effects of the Norwegian oil boom to instrument for family income, Loken
et al. (2012) report estimates on completed schooling which are smaller in magnitude
than those reported here, but similar qualitatively in finding that the effects are
substantially larger for low income Norwegian families
Figure 2.10 plots the heterogeneous effect of the same policy but by the level of
the child’s initial (age 5-6) skill. The ATE plotted in this Figure is the same as in the
previous figure as it is simply the effect averaged over the initial skill distribution.
In this Figure, we also find evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects with low
initial skill children benefiting more (about 7 months of additional schooling) from the
policy intervention than high initial skill children (near 0 effect). But the importance
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of heterogeneity by initial skill is substantially less than by family income. This
suggest that it is better to target the policy to low income households than low skill
households, but of course it cannot be worse to target based on both criteria.
2.7.4 Comparing Model Predictions: Quantifying the Importance of Model
Generality and Measurement Error
Our results presented thus far have been focused on our preferred model estimates:
estimates of the general unrestricted technology (Model 1) with measurement error
correction. We next briefly discuss how the estimates of the primitive production
technology would differ if we were to instead estimate the restricted model (Model
2) or ignore the measurement error issues. This analysis allows us to quantify how
important measurement error and model generality are to our findings, using policy
predictions on adult schooling as a meaningful metric for comparison.
Table 2.6 presents estimates for four versions of the model: Models 1 and 2, using
both measurement error corrected and not corrected estimators. For each model
and estimator, we re-estimate all parts of the model: the investment and technology
process equations at each age and the final adult outcome equation. The estimates
of the primitive parameters for these equations can be found in the Appendix; we
present here only the implied policy effects.
In Panel A of Table 2.6, we present the average treatment effects (ATE) on adult
schooling of the $1,000 income transfer at various ages. The first row repeats the
estimates from the preferred model: using the unrestricted Model 1 and correcting
for measurement error, we estimate that $1,000 income transfer at age 5-6 would
increase average schooling by about 1.8 additional month. In comparison, using the
restricted Model 2 (assuming constant returns to scale and no TFP dynamics) would
imply an estimated increase in average schooling of about one-quarter this effect, at
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0.40 additional months. This shows that restricting the model and ignoring possible
TFP dynamics and non-constant returns to scale would severely bias downward the
implied effects of income transfers on children’s skill development.
The next panel of Table 2.6 presents the estimated ATE using the same models but
not correcting for measurement error. Using these uncorrected estimates, we estimate
policy effects less than half the size of the preferred measurement error corrected
estimates of the most general model, Model 1. These substantially lower estimates of
the effect of an income transfer are consistent with the standard attenuation bias in
standard linear models, where classical measurement error biases coefficient estimates
toward 0. Our models are dynamic, non-linear, and consist of inter-related multiple
equations, so there is no clear theoretical prediction about the sign of the measurement
error bias. But we estimate in this case that ignoring measurement error would
substantially bias downward the estimates of the ATE of the income transfer policy.
Panel B of Table 2.6 repeats the analysis but focusing on the heterogeneity in
the treatment effect at different parts of the family income distribution. Similar
conclusions are evident here: restricting the model to have constant returns to scale
and no TFP dynamics or ignoring measurement error would substantially reduce the
estimated policy effect of the income transfer. We see that ignoring measurement
error would bias the estimated policy effect on low income families at the 9-10th
percentile from an effect size of about 4 months to only 1.4 - 1.8 months.
2.7.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis
We have thus far shown that the estimated model implies that a policy intervention
of providing income transfers to family would produce modest but positive gains in
children’s skills, with larger effects for poorer households. Would these gains be
justified given the cost? We next present a simple cost-benefit analysis to answer this
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question.
Table 2.7 shows the effects of the income transfer policy, by children’s age, on
the present value of earnings. The Table also provides the associated cost of that
policy, including the cost of additional schooling. In this analysis, we consider a
median earner worker. The expected present value of her lifetime earnings when
she is age 5-6 is calculated to be approximately $ 260,000 (in 2012 dollars). 22 The
benefit of this policy is the comparison between the present value of worker’s earnings
with and without that policy during the childhood. In other words, we compute
the counterfactual present value of earnings if the worker’s family had received the
income transfer when the worker was a child. The effect of the family income transfer
to the growth in children earnings are computed using estimates in Table 2.5 under
the assumption that the change in the growth rate due to the policy intervention is
constant over the life-cycle. Table 2.7 suggests that, considering both the cost of the
income transfer and the cost of additional education, the net benefit of the policy
is positive for any age, and the effect is largest when implemented at age 5-6. The
additional present value for the policy intervention at age 5-6 is slightly more than $
5,500 and the net benefit is around $ 2,700.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper develops new identification concepts and associated estimators for the
process of skill development in children. One of the key empirical challenges in this
context is that the various measures of children’s skills are in general imperfect and
arbitrarily located and scaled. We introduce the concept of known location and scale
production technologies, which are the type of technologies actually estimated in
22The baseline present value of earnings is computed using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) for the fourth quarter of 2012 with a discount rate of 4 %.
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many previous papers, and show that for these technologies, standard measurement
assumptions non-parametrically identify the production technology, up to the nor-
malization of initial period skills. Importantly, we show non-parametric identification
for these cases without re-normalizing latent skills each period which can bias the
production technology. For production functions which do not have a known location
or scale, additional assumptions are necessary, and we provide empirically grounded
assumptions which are sufficient for identification of these more general technologies.
Our paper provides the first analysis of these crucial identification tradeoffs, and
hopefully will serve as a useful guide for future work.
Based on our identification results, we develop a robust method of moments es-
timator and show that it can be implemented using a sequential algorithm. Our
estimator does not require strong assumptions about the marginal distribution of
measurement errors or the latent factors. We estimate the skill production process
using data for the United States and a flexible parametric model of skill develop-
ment allowing for non-constant returns to scale, dynamics in TFP, and for parental
investment to endogenously depend on unobserved children’s skills.
Our empirical results show a pattern of rapid skill development from age 5 to 14.
We find that as children age, not only does their mean skill level increase, but the level
of skill inequality also increases. Our parameter estimates reveal that investments
are more productive at early ages and in particular for disadvantaged children. Our
findings of a positive return to income transfers at early ages, especially for poorer
households, is largely consistent with prior evidence of a positive effect of income on
a number of child outcomes (see Dahl and Lochner, 2012a; Loken et al., 2012) using
different sources of identification. Our results suggest that family income is a better
“target” than initial children’s skills for children’s skills. Lastly, our finding that that
the estimated policy effects would be substantially smaller if one estimated a restricted
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technology or ignored measurement error demonstrates the critical importance of
allowing for general technologies and correcting estimates for measurement error.
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Figure 2.1: Estimates of Skill Production Elasticity with Respect to Investment at
Age 5-6 (Model 1)
Notes: This figure shows the measurement error corrected estimates of the elasticity of children’s
skills at age 7-8 (θ1) with respect to parental investments at age 5-6 (I0) for Model 1:
∂ ln θ1
∂ ln I0
=
γ2,0 + γ3,0 ln θ0.
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Figure 2.2: Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Estimates (Model 1)
Notes: This figure shows the estimated log TFP (correcting for measurement error) for Model 1
(see Section 2.6.2). The x-axis shows children age. Child age of 5 is age 5-6, 7 is age 7-8, and so on.
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Mean of Log Latent Skills (Model 1)
Notes: This figure provides the mean log latent skills (E(ln θt)) predicted by the estimated Model
1 (see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error) . The x-axis shows children age. Child age
of 5 is age 5-6, 7 is age 7-8, and so on. Log latent skills at age 5-6 are normalized to be mean 0.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated Distribution of Log Cognitive Latent Skills at Age 5-6 and Age
13-14 (Model 1)
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of log latent skills at age 5-6 and at age 13-14 simulated
from the estimated Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error. Log latent skills
at age 5-6 are normalized to be mean 0.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated Dynamics in the Latent Skills Distribution (Model 1)
Notes: This figure shows the dynamics in the distribution of the log latent skill distribution for the
estimated Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error. Log latent skills at age
5-6 are normalized to be mean 0.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated Distribution of Log Investments at Age 5-6 and Age 13-14
(Model 1)
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of log latent investments at age 5-6 and at age 13-14
simulated from the estimated Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error.
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Figure 2.7: Average Effect of Income Transfer by Age of Transfer (Outcome: Final
Period θT Skills)
Notes: This figure shows the average percent change in the level of latent children’s skills at age
13-14 by the different timing (age) of income transfer for the estimated Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2),
controlling for measurement error. The transfer is $1,000 in family income at some age t. We report
100 ·E( θ
′
T (a)−θT
θT
), where θ
′
T (a) is level of skill at age 13-14 with an income transfer of $1,000 dollars
provide to the family at age a and θT is level of skill at age 13-14 in the baseline model (no income
transfer).
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Figure 2.8: Average Effect of an Income Transfer by Age of Transfer (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23)
Notes: This figure shows the average change in the number of months of completed schooling at
age 23 by different timing (age) of income transfer for the estimated Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2),
controlling for measurement error. We report E
[
S
′
(a)− S
]
, where S
′
(a) is the number of months
of completed schooling at age 23 with an income transfer of $1,000 given at age a while S is the
number of months of completed schooling in baseline model (no income transfer). This figure reports
the results of the same policy experiment as Figure 2.7 but with a different outcome measure.
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Figure 2.9: Heterogeneity in Policy Effects by Age 5-6 Household Income (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23)
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age 5-6 on completed
months of schooling by the percentile of initial (age 5-6) family income for the estimated Model 1
(see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error. Each income category is defined as the people
contained between nth and the n − 1th of the percentiles of the income distribution. For example,
Income category 10 in the graph means the people who belong between the 9th and 10th percentile
of the income distribution. In the estimated income distribution for our sample, income categories
10, 50, and 90 contain families with about $14,000, $45,000, and $145,000 of annual family income.
This figure also plots the average effect over the income distribution.
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Figure 2.10: Heterogeneity in Policy Effects by Age 5-6 Children’s Skills (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23)
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age 5-6 on completed
months of schooling by the percentile of the child’s initial (age 5-6) skill for the estimated Model
1 (see Section 2.6.2), controlling for measurement error. Each initial skills category includes the
children contained between nth and the n − 1th of the percentiles of the skills distribution. For
example, skill category 10 is the children between the 9th and 10th percentile of the initial skills
distribution. This figure also plots the average effect over the initial skill distribution.
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Table 2.1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std
N Obs 19,070
N of Mothers 3,199
N of Children 4,941
% Male Children 51.32
% Female Children 48.68
% Hispanic Children 21.44
% Black Children 30.44
% Other races 48.12
Mom Education 12.59 2.63
Family Income 61,657.88 47,527.85
Children Final Years of Education 13.30 2.36
Notes: This table shows the main descriptive statistics of the CNLSY79 sample we use to estimate
the model. Children’s Completed Education is the child’s completed years of education at age
23. The variable ”other races” represents all children which are not black neither Hispanic (i.e. it
includes white, non-Hispanic children). Income is in $2012 USD.
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Table 2.2: Estimates for Initial Conditions
Log Child Skills Log Mother Log Mother Log Family
at age 5 Cognitive Skills Noncognitive Skills Income
Variance-Covariance Matrix
Log Child Skills 4.947 6.254 0.122 0.668
at age 5 ( 0.471) ( 0.479) ( 0.031) ( 0.065)
Log Mother 6.254 30.190 0.593 2.588
Cognitive Skills ( 0.479) ( 1.032) ( 0.137) ( 0.099)
Log Mother 0.122 0.593 0.046 0.058
Noncognitive Skills ( 0.031) ( 0.137) ( 0.017) ( 0.012)
Log Family 0.668 2.588 0.058 0.780
Income ( 0.065) ( 0.099) ( 0.012) ( 0.018)
Correlation Matrix
Log Child Skills 1.000 0.512 0.256 0.340
at age 5 (-) ( 0.026) ( 0.029) ( 0.027)
Log Mother 0.512 1.000 0.504 0.533
Cognitive Skills ( 0.026) (-) ( 0.025) ( 0.015)
Log Mother 0.256 0.504 1.000 0.307
Noncognitive Skills ( 0.029) ( 0.025) (-) ( 0.022)
Log Family 0.340 0.533 0.307 1.000
Income ( 0.027) ( 0.015) ( 0.022) (-)
Notes: This table shows the estimated variance-covariance matrix (ΣΩ) and associate correlation
matrix of the initial conditions at age 5-6. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a
cluster bootstrap.
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Table 2.3: Estimates for Investment (Model 1)
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 0.230 0.027 0.020 0.018
( 0.059) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.009)
[ 0.14, 0.33] [ 0.01, 0.04] [ 0.01, 0.04] [ 0.01, 0.03]
Log Mother Cognitive Skills 0.071 0.004 0.012 -0.005
( 0.022) ( 0.009) ( 0.015) ( 0.013)
[ 0.04, 0.12] [-0.01, 0.02] [-0.01, 0.04] [-0.02, 0.02]
Log Mother Noncognitive Skills 0.359 0.742 0.694 0.712
( 0.131) ( 0.060) ( 0.084) ( 0.088)
[ 0.11, 0.54] [ 0.64, 0.82] [ 0.52, 0.81] [ 0.54, 0.82]
Log Family Income 0.341 0.227 0.274 0.275
( 0.076) ( 0.056) ( 0.076) ( 0.087)
[ 0.25, 0.48] [ 0.15, 0.33] [ 0.17, 0.43] [ 0.17, 0.44]
Variance Shocks 1.186 1.019 0.868 1.087
( 0.232) ( 0.148) ( 0.236) ( 0.296)
[ 0.96, 1.53] [ 0.83, 1.29] [ 0.66, 1.33] [ 0.82, 1.64]
Notes: This table shows the measurement error corrected estimates for the investment equation for
Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2). Each column shows the coefficients of the investment equation at the
given ages. The dependent variable is investment in period t which is determined by the covariates
at time t . For example, the first column shows the coefficients at age 5-6 for both contemporaneous
parental investments and contemporaneous child’s skill and contemporaneous family income. Both
standard errors in parenthesis and the 90% confidence interval in square brackets are computed
using a cluster bootstrap.
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Table 2.4: Estimates for Skill Technology (Model 1 and Model 2)
Model 1 Model 2 Free Return to Scale Technology
and TFP Dynamics

 Restricted Return to Scale Technology
and No TFP Dynamics

Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 1.966 1.086 0.897 1.065 0.739 0.816 0.833 0.910
( 0.153) ( 0.036) ( 0.027) ( 0.029) ( 0.087) ( 0.072) ( 0.105) ( 0.096)
[ 1.69, 2.21] [ 1.03, 1.15] [ 0.84, 0.93] [ 1.01, 1.11] [ 0.61, 0.88] [ 0.69, 0.93] [ 0.71, 1.02] [ 0.76, 1.07]
Log Investment 0.799 0.695 0.713 0.252 0.300 0.187 0.170 0.087
( 0.262) ( 0.339) ( 0.404) ( 0.541) ( 0.077) ( 0.069) ( 0.097) ( 0.095)
[ 0.41, 1.23] [ 0.15, 1.24] [-0.10, 1.25] [-0.53, 1.20] [ 0.18, 0.42] [ 0.08, 0.32] [-0.01, 0.30] [-0.07, 0.23]
( Log Skills * -0.105 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.040 -0.004 -0.003 0.003
Log Investment ) ( 0.066) ( 0.019) ( 0.013) ( 0.010) ( 0.026) ( 0.015) ( 0.014) ( 0.009)
[-0.22,-0.03] [-0.04, 0.03] [-0.02, 0.02] [-0.02, 0.02] [-0.09,-0.01] [-0.03, 0.02] [-0.03, 0.02] [-0.02, 0.01]
Return to scale 2.660 1.776 1.606 1.320 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
( 0.225) ( 0.317) ( 0.398) ( 0.535) (-) (-) (-) (-)
[ 2.30, 3.02] [ 1.25, 2.31] [ 0.79, 2.14] [ 0.58, 2.25] [-,-] [-,-] [-,-] [-,-]
Variance shocks 5.612 4.519 3.585 4.019 2.110 1.279 0.944 0.903
( 0.174) ( 0.184) ( 0.181) ( 0.247) ( 0.178) ( 0.144) ( 0.163) ( 0.165)
[ 5.37, 5.93] [ 4.27, 4.89] [ 3.27, 3.88] [ 3.70, 4.46] [ 1.88, 2.44] [ 1.09, 1.57] [ 0.78, 1.32] [ 0.74, 1.33]
Log TFP 13.067 14.747 11.881 2.927 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.295) ( 0.367) ( 0.541) ( 0.957) (-) (-) (-) (-)
[12.67,13.61] [14.22,15.47] [11.17,13.00] [ 1.38, 4.65] [-,-] [-,-] [-,-] [-,-]
Notes: This table shows the measurement error corrected estimates for the technology of skills
formation for both Model 1 and Model 2 (see Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.2) . Each column shows the
coefficients of the technology of skills formations at the given age. The dependent variable is log
skills in the next period t + 1, and the covariates (inputs) are at time t. For example, the first
column shows the coefficients for the skills inputs at age 5-6 which lead to log skills at age 7-8. Both
standard errors in parenthesis and the 90% confidence interval in square brackets are computed
using a cluster bootstrap.
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Table 2.5: Estimates for Adult Outcome Equation (Model 1)
Schooling Log Wage
Constant 7.088 9.444
( 0.399) ( 0.121)
[ 6.56, 7.71] [ 9.26, 9.64]
Log Children Skills 0.151 0.021
at age 13-14 ( 0.010) ( 0.003)
[ 0.14, 0.16] [ 0.02, 0.03]
Variance Shock 4.333 0.246
( 0.143) ( 0.012)
[ 4.07, 4.56] [ 0.22, 0.26]
Notes: This table shows the estimates for two adult outcome equation specifications: schooling and
log earnings. In both cases the estimates are for Model 1 (see Section 2.6.2) and they are corrected
for measurement error. The dependent variable is either the years of completed education for the
child at age 23 or log earnings at age 29. Both standard errors in parenthesis and the 90% confidence
interval in square brackets are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
85
Table 2.6: Estimated Policy Effects under Different Modeling Assumptions
Panel A: ATE by Age of Income Transfer
Measurement Error Corrected
Age of Income Transfer ($ 1000)
Model Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Model 1 1.818 0.799 1.025 0.574
[ 0.93, 2.56] [ 0.29, 1.33] [-0.05, 2.15] [-0.39, 1.74]
Model 2 0.404 0.179 0.229 0.128
[ 0.22, 0.64] [ 0.07, 0.32] [-0.02, 0.42] [-0.10, 0.36]
Not Corrected for Measurement Error
Age of Income Transfer ($ 1000)
Model Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Model 1 0.687 0.220 0.210 0.251
[ 0.48, 0.90] [ 0.09, 0.36] [ 0.07, 0.34] [ 0.06, 0.47]
Model 2 0.846 0.271 0.259 0.309
[ 0.62, 1.06] [ 0.12, 0.44] [ 0.09, 0.41] [ 0.08, 0.55]
Panel B: ATE at age 5-6 by Family Income
Measurement Error Corrected
Low Income Families High Income Families
(10th Income Percentile) (90th Income Percentile)
Model 1 4.11 Model 1 0.313
Model 2 0.91 Model 2 0.070
Not Corrected for Measurement Error
Low Income Families High Income Families
(10th Income Percentile) (90th Income Percentile)
Model 1 1.465 Model 1 0.158
Model 2 1.806 Model 2 0.194
Notes: Panel A shows the average treatment effects on additional months of completed education by age of policy intervention ($ 1000
income transfer) for different model specifications (Model 1 vs Model 2, see Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.2) and different estimators (controlling
for measurement error or not). The 90% confidence interval in square brackets are computed using a cluster bootstrap. Panel B shows
the ATE respect to family income for the different model specifications and different estimators.
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Table 2.7: Average Effect of an Income Transfer by Age of Transfer (Outcome: PV
of Earnings)
Panel A: Benefit-Cost Analysis by Age
Age of Benefit on Direct Cost Cost of Education Net Benefit
Intervention PV Earnings (Income Transfer)
($) ($) ($) ($)
Age 5-6 5549 1000 1818 2730
Age 7-8 2437 1000 799 638
Age 9-10 3128 1000 1025 1103
Age 11-12 1750 1000 574 177
Notes: This table shows the benefit-cost analysis for a 1000 dollars transfer to family of a future
median earner workers with 12 years of completed education. The benefit on the PV of earnings
is the difference between the present value of earnings with and without that transfer when worker
was age 5-6. The effect of family income transfer on earning growth is computed adjusting for the
increased earning growth implied by estimates in Table 2.5. The cost of that policy takes into account
both the direct transfer and the discounted cost of additional education that the policy induces. We
use a yearly cost of school of 12,000 dollars as approximately estimated from the National Center
for Education Statistics.
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Chapter 3
SKILLS, PARENTAL INVESTMENTS AND PEER EFFECTS
3.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the effect of social interactions on skill formation in children.
In particular, I build and estimate a model of child development, where children grow
up in different environments, which are defined by: peers’ composition, neighborhood
quality and school quality. The dynamics of skills is governed by a technology of skill
formation, which depends upon parental investments, the current child’s skills and
the environment-specific inputs. In this framework, I shed light on the importance
of the dynamic effects of children’s endogenous social interactions and the parental
investment decisions in explaining developmental differences between different en-
vironments. A growing consensus in the literature emphasizes the importance of
neighborhoods in shaping children’s opportunities later in life (Chetty and Hendren,
2016a,b; Chetty et al., 2016a,b). However, despite extensive research, the mechanisms
behind these results remain unexplained. This paper reconciles the previous findings
of childhood exposure to neighborhood with the role of children’s social interactions
in child development.
This project advances the current literature of child development by building and
estimating a dynamic equilibrium model of children’s skill formation with two inno-
vative empirically grounded features. First, within different environments, children
endogenously select their peer groups based on their preferences for their peers’ char-
acteristics. Social interactions can exhibit the tendency of children to become friends
with others who share similar characteristics: a phenomenon called homophily bias.
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Second, parental investments respond to changes in peer groups. Decisions regarding
parental investments depend upon a child’s current peers, as well as on expectations
about future peer groups. Equilibrium effects arise from the socially determined
aspects of parental investments. In this framework, parental investments not only
directly affect a child’s skills, but also affect the development of the child’s peers
through social interactions. Consequently, the individual return on investing in chil-
dren is affected by the equilibrium parental engagement within each environment.
Skills are formed dynamically through a technology of skill formation, which de-
fines the complementarities between parental investments and the other inputs of
child development in producing a child’s skills: the current endowment of skills, the
skills of peers, the school quality and the neighborhood quality. In this framework,
there are two main channels through which peers affect parental behavior. First,
contemporaneous changes in current peers and parental investments are related to
the static complementarity between the two inputs. Second, permanent changes in
peer composition affect parental behavior through the dynamic complementarity in
skill formation. In other words, a permanent change in peer composition affect the
return of parental investments through the dynamic aspect of skill formation.
The model is estimated using data on U.S. adolescents from the National Longi-
tudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). Add Health provides information
about friendships within each school, which is key for analyzing the formation of peer
groups. Moreover, information about child achievements and parental investments
are available.
The identification of the model comes with two main challenges: (i) unobserved
heterogeneity in how peer groups are endogenously formed; and (ii) children’s skills
and parental investments are unobserved. Ignoring these issues by using correlational
relationships would cause the model’s estimates and subsequent quantitative analysis
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to be biased.
The first challenge presents itself from the fact that peer groups may be formed
based on additional unobserved heterogeneity, which can cause correlation between
peer groups’ realization and the residual unexplained variation in skill formation. To
address this concern, I implement a standard instrumental variable (IV) approach in
the literature. This identification strategy exploits random variations in cohort com-
position within school / across cohorts. The idea behind this identification strategy
is simple: random changes in cohort compositions affect the opportunities for friend-
ships between children. These shifts in the formation of peer groups affect the return
of parental investments and the subsequent parental decisions. 1
In addressing the second challenge, Cunha et al. (2010) illustrate that even the
classical measurement error in measuring a child’s skills can cause important biases
in estimating the technology of children’s skill formation. Following the approach
in Cunha et al. (2010) and Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a), I implement a dynamic
latent factor model, which allows me to identify the joint distribution of latent skills
and investments by exploiting multiple measurements in the data.
I estimate the model via simulated method of moments (SMM). I find that parental
investments and peers are substitute inputs in producing children’s skills. At the
same time, I find a strong dynamic complementarity between parental investments
and future expected peers. As a result of these two findings, a permanent change in
peer composition has two opposing effects on parental investments. On one hand,
“better” peers generate contemporaneous substitution effects in investment decisions
due to the high substitutability in the production function. On the other hand, higher
1For previous use of similar source of identifying variation, see Hoxby (2000); Hanushek et al.
(2003); Ammermueller and Pischke (2009); Lavy and Schlosser (2011); Lavy et al. (2012); Bifulco
et al. (2011); Burke and Sass (2013); Card and Giuliano (2016); Carrell et al. (2016); Olivetti et al.
(2016); Patacchini and Zenou (2016)
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expected future skills for peers produce an “income” effect through the dynamic
complementarity of skill formation. Parents have the incentive to invest more in their
children because a higher-skilled child benefits more from higher-skilled peers in the
future.
Furthermore, my estimates suggest that the formation of peer groups displays an
extensive degree of homophily bias. I show evidence of homophily bias with respect
to a child’s race and level of latent skills. A child who is in the lower quartile of the
skill distribution and belongs to a minority group is four times more likely to befriend
a same-race child than a different-race child. In addition, the same child is two times
more likely to befriend a same-skill and same-race child than a same-race child in the
upper quartile of skill distribution.
I first use the estimated model to analyze the extent to which growing up in
different environments accounts for the variation in children’s outcomes. I find sizable
effects for children moving to better environments. The effects are in proportion to
the exposure time. The earlier children are moved, the higher the effect. A child
who is moved at age 12 to an environment where children have 1 percentile higher
skills at age 16 exhibits, on average, an improvement in her skills rank at age 16 by
0.63 percentiles. The average effect is 0.48 percentiles if the child is moved at age
15. As model validation, I show that my findings track (out-of-sample) the quasi-
experimental findings of childhood exposure effects of neighborhoods for the U.S.
from Chetty and Hendren (2016a). In addition, my model allows me to decompose
these effects. I find that peers account for more than half of the exposure effects.
The relative importance of peers for the exposure effects underlines the role of
policies that change peers’ composition and promote socioeconomic integration in en-
vironments, as a way to improve outcomes for disadvantaged children. I find that by
moving the most disadvantaged children (in the lower quartile of skill distribution)
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from a low-income environment to a high-income environment generates important
dynamic equilibrium effects, with heterogeneous treatment effects for both the moved
and receiving children. I first consider a large-scale policy, i.e. a policy that moves
a sizable fraction of disadvantaged children into a higher-income environment (ap-
proximately 5% of the population of the receiving cohort). I find that the policy
increases the skills of the moved population of 16-year-old children, on average, by
approximately 0.40 standard deviations. On average, I do not find any adverse ef-
fect for receiving children. On the contrary, when the fraction of moved population
increases to 30%, I find that the policy generates winners and losers. First, I find
that the policy increases the skills of the moved population of 16-year-old children on
average by 0.22 standard deviations. In contrast, there is an adverse effect for receiv-
ing children, with the skills of 16-year-old children decreasing, on average, by 0.15
standard deviations. Additionally, I find that children who remained in the sending
environment benefit from the outflow of the most disadvantaged companions, with
an average increase in skills at age 16 of 0.17 standard deviations.
I find that large-scale changes in peers’ composition generate important equilib-
rium feedback effects, and as a result amplify the policy effects. Ignoring equilibrium
effects would lead to large biases in counterfactual policy predictions for children’s
final skills. In the case of the larger policy, I find that the policy predictions for the
children’s skills in the receiving environment would be approximately seven times
smaller. Part of the bias is due to the dynamic-equilibrium feedback effects on
parental investments. In fact, in the absence of dynamic-equilibrium feedback ef-
fects, the static complementarity between parents and peers dominates the dynamic
effects of the policy.
I find that policy effects for receiving and remaining children reduce in magnitude
as the fraction of moved children decreases. An increase of inflow of the most disad-
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vantaged children from the low-income environment to the high-income environment
increases the probability of the receiving children becoming friends with the new com-
panions. For the same reason, an increase of the outflow of the moved population
benefits children who remain in the sending environment. For children who were
moved, the opposite is true. The higher the outflow of disadvantaged companions,
the higher the chances that the moved children remain friends with each other in the
new environment.
My structural model allows me to analyze the distributional policy effects. I find
that large-scale changes in peers’ composition exhibit heterogeneous treatment effects
as a result of the endogenous formation of new peer groups. Children with lower skills
(in the first quartile of the skills distribution in each subpopulation): (i) benefit the
most in leaving disadvantaged social environments; (ii) benefit the most amongst the
children who remained in the sending environment; (iii) are the ones who are more
adversely affected in receiving the new peers. Furthermore, I find stronger policy
effects for minorities, with detrimental effects in black and Hispanic children living
in the receiving environment. This is explained by the fact that most of the moved
children are minorities, and as a result, the minority children from the receiving
environment are more likely to interact with the new companions because of the race
effects in the endogenous formation of peer groups. In line with this result, previous
empirical studies pointed out that peer effects seem to be stronger intra-race and for
minorities (see Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Imberman et al., 2012)
The paper will be presented as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the related liter-
ature. In Section 3.3, I present the data used for the empirical work and preliminary
empirical results. In Section 3.4 and 3.5, I present the model. In Section 3.6, I de-
scribe the identification strategy. Section 3.7 contains a discussion of the structural
estimation and results. Section 3.8 and Section 3.9 discuss the quantitative analysis
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and the model validation. Section 3.10 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
This paper builds upon two important areas of the literature: child development
and social interaction. There is extensive evidence in the literature on parental and
public investment in children that highlights the important role of play inside and
outside the household on the development of children’s skills (see Todd and Wolpin,
2003, 2007; Del Boca et al., 2014b). Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al.
(2010) estimate a dynamic latent factor model of cognitive and non-cognitive skill
formation, allowing for unobservability of both inputs and outputs, endogeneity of
inputs and unobserved child-specific heterogeneity. They find that investments made
early in life are more effective in remediations for low-skilled children. Agostinelli and
Wiswall (2016a) follow the framework considered in Cunha et al. (2010) and develop
a new identification strategy for the technology of skill formation with unknown total
factor productivity and unknown return to scale. Their empirical results show a
pattern of rapid skill development from age 5 to 14. They find that as children age,
skill inequality increases. Estimates reveal that investments are more productive at
early ages and in particular for disadvantaged children. This paper is the first work
in the literature that sheds light upon the dynamic equilibrium effects of children’s
social interactions and the parental investment decisions in explaining developmental
differences in children.
A wide set of previous work analyzed peer effects in various outcomes. Manski
(1993) points out the challenges in identifying peer effects by considering three observ-
able equivalent specifications in a model of social interactions: peer effects (endoge-
nous effects), selection into peer groups (correlated effects) and common exogenous
(contextual) effects. One part of the literature tried to overcome this challenge in
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identification of peer effects by exploiting exogenous variation in peer-group compo-
sition. 2 For example, in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014), the identification of peer
effects at school is based on test-score discontinuity in admission criteria. In the con-
text of college students, De Giorgi et al. (2010) and Sacerdote (2001), respectively,
exploited random assignments of peers at college. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) develop
a new algorithm for estimating peer effects using panel data and which controls for
peer selection and unobserved heterogeneity using University of Maryland transcript
data. Finally, Sacerdote (2001) highlights that the literature’s findings on peer ef-
fects are quantitatively and statistically larger when considering non-linear models
of peer effects. However, results are often context specific, a potential limitation for
policy analysis. This paper is exploiting quasi-experimental variation in cohort com-
position within school / across cohorts, to identify the degree of complementarity
between parental investments and peers in the technology of skill formation. The set
of policy-invariant parameters of the model are used to evaluate policies that have
not previously been implemented.
A parallel literature started to consider identification and estimation of peer ef-
fects within micro-funded models of behavior and social interactions (see Brock and
Durlauf, 2001b,a, 2007; Blume et al., 2011, 2015). Calvo´-Armengol et al. (2009) esti-
mate a model of adolescent effort choice within a social network. The authors define
peers as the set of nominated children in Add Health data. However, the authors do
not consider any model of network formation and peer selection, while they control for
peer selection through network-specific fixed effects. This is equivalent to assuming
that peers select themselves into groups but friendship formation within each group
is independent of observable and unobservable characteristics of people in the group.
2For a complete literature review on the identification of peer effects through experiments, see
Sacerdote (2014)
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They find that the level of an adolescent’s connectivity (position within the network
measured by Katz–Bonacich centrality) is an important predictor for their school per-
formance. Finally, Fu and Mehat (2016) estimate a model of student achievements
and a class-tracking regime with endogenous parental effort using ECLS-K. They find
that accounting for endogenous parental responses to class-quality changes is key to
evaluating class-tracking policies. These works explicitly focus on the contempora-
neous peer effects on children’s outcomes. My paper contributes in this literature
by building a new structural model of child development and peer effects, and by
highlighting the importance of dynamic peer effects in shaping the developmental
trajectories of children.
Analysis of endogenous network formation became popular among both theoretical
(see for example Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Dutta et al.,
2005; Mele, 2010) and econometric studies (see Christakis et al., 2010; Sheng, 2014;
Auerbach, 2016; Graham, 2016, 2017). Carrell et al. (2013) estimates peer effects on
academic performance at the United States Air Force Academy. Using an assignment
algorithm designed to foster the academic achievement of the lowest-ability students,
the authors find a negative treatment effect for the targeted group. The authors
provide evidence that this finding is the result of endogenous peer-group formation,
which displays the tendency of students to generate homogeneous subgroups. This
result underlines the importance of accounting for endogenous peer-group formation
once considering policies that manipulate peer composition.
Important progress has been made in Badev (2016), where the author develops a
model of individual behavior and endogenous peer selection. He estimates the model
using Add Health data on smoking decisions and friendship nominations. He finds
that neglecting the endogeneity of the networks leads to important biases on policy
evaluations. However, Badev (2016) focuses on the contemporaneous effects of peers,
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and through this paper, I will emphasize how the dynamic aspect of peer effects is key
in understanding the role of social interactions in child development. Additionally,
the empirical analysis in Badev (2016) looks at a specific outcome for adolescents
(smoking decisions), while my empirical analysis will be based on a dynamic latent
factor model. This allows me to consistently study peer effects on children’s skills
and to avoid relying on arbitrary variables as measures for children’s outcomes.
Finally, my work sheds light on the mechanisms behind the recent research on the
effects of neighborhood exposure on children. Chetty and Hendren (2016a) find sizable
childhood exposure effects of neighborhood. Their results show that the return for
children’s outcomes of moving to a better neighborhood is in proportion to the amount
of time spent in that neighborhood, with a rate of 4% decline for each additional
year of exposure to the origin area. In a companion paper, Chetty and Hendren
(2016b) find strong correlation between the childhood exposure effects and specific
characteristics of neighborhoods, like racial segregation, income inequality, school
quality, and social capital. My estimated model replicates (out-of-sample) the findings
in Chetty and Hendren (2016a), and it decomposes the causal effects of neighborhoods
in different policy-relevant mechanisms, like the effect of peer composition, school
quality and neighborhood quality in child development.
3.3 Data and Empirical Evidence
3.3.1 The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add
Health)
This paper uses the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health
(Add Health). 3 The Add Health original sample comprises students among 132
3For additional information about the dataset, see Appendix B.1 or visit
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth
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representative schools in the United States. There are 90,118 students, ranging be-
tween grade 7 and grade 12 in the 1994–1995 school year (Wave I). A subsample of
students (20,745) is selected for having an additional home interview (in-home). The
home interview includes new questions for the children and a questionnaire for one
of their parents. The dataset includes specific information on family background,
students’ school grades and their scores in the Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test
(AHPVT – a revised version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test [PPVT]) , as
well as information about children’s peers.
A main source of information that makes the Add Health dataset particularly
attractive for achieving the objective of this project is the friendship nomination.
During the first two waves, children were asked, both during the in-home and in-
school interviews, to nominate their best five male and best five female friends. This
detailed information helps me to reconstruct the structure of friendship for every child
in the sample by simply matching their identifier. Additionally, during the in-home
interview, children are asked about their relationship with their parents. Respondents
provide information regarding whether, during the last four weeks, they were involved
in specific activities with their parents. The activities include: going shopping, sport
activities, going to a movie/museum/concert or sport event, talking about personal
problems or school, or working on a project for school. I use all the activities as
measures of parental investments.
One important challenge in the empirical analysis of peer effects using Add Health
comes from the fact that children are able to nominate up to five friends for each
gender. This feature of the data can lead to a potential censoring and mismeasurement
of peer groups (see for example Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2016; Griffith, 2017). In
the sample I use for my empirical analysis approximately 11% of children showing
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a full list of 10 best friends within the school roster. 4 To address this concern, I
construct the peer-group information for each child from both the individual child’s
list of friends as well as from the unilateral friendship nominations coming from the
other children who are not nominated. In other words, if child i does not nominate
child j as a friend, but child j nominates child i, then I consider them as friends in the
data. In a case where child i’s list of friends is binding, I am able to recover additional
friends in his peer group, alleviating the truncation problem. Furthermore, through
my empirical analysis of parental investments and peer effects, I implement an IV
estimation analysis to deal with the endogeneity of the network formation. Given
that my instrument is unrelated to the network structure of friends, this approach is
also effective in dealing with mismeasurement of peer effects. 5
3.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample I use in the estimation of the
model. The average age is 15.65. In terms of racial composition, 16% of the children
are black and 17% are Hispanic, while the remaining 67% are white (or other races).
On average, children report 4.48 friends out of the maximum number of 10 possible
nominations. 6 The average PPVT raw score is 64.26, while the average grades for
4By gender, respectively, 28% of male and 32% of female children report a list of five best same-
gender friends within the school roster
5A common instrument in the analysis of peer effects is constructed with exogenous characteris-
tics of the friends of friends (see for example Bramoulle´ et al., 2009; Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2009;
Patacchini and Zenou, 2012). The validity of this instrument requires the correct measurement of
the network structure, at least until the second degree of separation between links.
6Here, I report the average number of nominated friends. Later, in the empirical section, I will
consider the total number of friends, which is constructed by also including the unilateral friendship
nominations of other children. The average number of friends is approximately seven.
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English, math, history and science vary from 2.72 to 2.86. 7 , 8 The average family
income is $42,884 (in 1994), while the average number of years of schooling for the
child’s mother is 13.13. 9
Table 3.1 also provides descriptive statistics on measures of a parent’s (mother’s)
level of engagement, which I use to identify latent parental investments in my empir-
ical analysis. The most frequent activities performed by children with their mothers
in the four weeks preceding the in-home interview are: shopping (72%), talking about
school work (63%) and school activities (54%). On average, from one-third to approx-
imatively a half of children had a conversation about personal issues or an argument
with their mothers (47% of them talked with their mothers about someone they are
dating or about a party they attended, 39% talked about a personal problem and 33%
had a serious argument). A quarter of children went with their mother at least once
to a movie theater, museum, concert or sport events, while 38% went to a religious
service. Finally, approximately 10% of children either played a sport or worked on a
school project with their mother.
3.3.3 Empirical Findings on the Endogeneity of Network Formation
In this section, I provide some empirical evidence that friendships are not formed
at random, but instead children display the tendency to become friends with others
who are similar to themselves: a phenomenon called homophily bias. One impor-
tant concern in any empirical analysis of peer effects is related to the endogeneity of
the network formation (see Carrell et al., 2013). In particular, the tendency of chil-
7The national GPA in 1994 for U.S. high schools was 2.44 in math, 2.50 in science and 2.63 in
English. Source: the National Center for Education Statistics, The Nation’s Report Card
8Only 34 out of 19,713 children achieved the maximum PPVT score. Only five children scored
the minimum.
9 Using the Current Population Survey, I find that mothers of children with similar age, as in
Add Health, have an average family income for 1994 of $42,759. Their average number of years of
education is 12.63.
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dren with a similar background (both observable and unobservable characteristics)
to socialize together can be an important challenge for identification. Furthermore,
evaluation of many policies which can change cohort composition in specific social
environments (e.g. school vouchers, housing vouchers, classroom tracking, etc.) is
required to predict new policy-induced children’s networks to account for social in-
teractions and to predict the effects on the dynamics of children’s skills.
Following the method in Currarini et al. (2010), I test for homophily bias in the
formation of peer groups by looking at the homophily bias index (hereafter referred
to as HBI) developed in Coleman (1958). The intuition behind the HBI is straight-
forward: the index captures the tendency of friendships to be biased towards other
children of the same type, adjusting for the relative frequency of that specific type in
the overall population. In detail, letting fx,s be the average fraction of friends who
are of the same type x at school s, and qx,s being the total fraction of children of type
x in a given school s, then we have:
HBIx,s =
fx,s
qx,s
(3.1)
A value of one for the HBI index in (3.1) suggests that friendships are formed at
random, preserving the frequencies of school composition in peer-group composition.
On the other hand, the homophily bias in network formation generates an HBI index
greater than one: the fraction of same-type friends consistently exceeding the fraction
of that type of children at school. Figure 3.1 shows graphically the HBI for race. The
x-axis represents the values for the fraction of same-race children in the school (qx,s).
The y-axis displays the fraction of same-race friends (fx,s). Each point in Figure 3.1
represents the average fraction of friends of the same race for individuals of a specific
race in a specific school. Figure 3.1 shows that children of different races tend to
form friendships with same-race children at a higher frequency than the frequencies
101
of racial composition at school. Figure 3.2 is the analogue of the previous figure
with respect to a child’s skills. Each of the sub-figures in Figure 3.2 uses a different
criterion for defining “same-skills children” relative to the standard deviation of the
skills distribution. Each of the four specifications exhibits the tendency of children
to become friends with other children with the same level of skills. 10
3.3.4 Empirical Findings on Parental Investments and Peers’ Skills
In this section, I show the extent to which changes in peers’ skills induce changes
in parental investment behavior. The results provide the support for the framework
of my model of child development and peer effects described in the next section. In
addition, these empirical findings are used in the structural estimation of my model as
identifying moments. Consider the following empirical model of investment decision:
Ii,s,t = β0 + β1 lnhi,s,t + β2 lnH i,s,t +X
′
iβ3 + βs + ui,s,t , (3.2)
where Ii,s,t is the parental investment (as a fraction of time) for parent of child i, in
school s when she is t years old, which is recovered through a latent factor model (see
Section 3.5.1) using data on parental engagement described in the previous section.
The child’s skills are defined as hi,s,t , while H i,s,t is the mean of her peers’ skills. Xi is
a vector of the child’s and parents’ exogenous characteristics and βs is the school fixed
effects. The coefficient β2 represents the effect of peers’ skills on investment decisions.
The equation in (3.2) is similar to the investment decision function estimated in the
previous literature, where I additionally include peers’ skills as an explanatory variable
(see Cunha et al., 2010; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016a; Attanasio et al., 2017a,b,c).
I first estimate the model in (3.2) using school fixed effects. Column (1) of Table
10The null hypothesis of random formation of peer groups with respect to race and skills is rejected
in both cases at a 1% significance level.
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3.2 shows the results. 11 The effect of peers on parental investment is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimate of -1.44 indicates that doubling
peers’ skills is associated with a decrease in investments of 1.44 percentage points. On
the other hand, the effect of a child’s skills on parental investment behavior is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The point estimate of +2.66 suggests that
doubling a child’s skills induces parental investments to increase by 2.66 percentage
points. Overall, the school fixed effects estimates suggest that parental investments
respond in opposite direction to changes in their own child’s skills in comparison to
changes in skills of their child’s peers.
Following the analysis of endogenous network formation in the previous section, I
address the endogeneity of peers’ skills in (3.2), implementing a within-school instru-
mental variable (IV) estimator. I use variation in the racial compositions of different
cohorts within the same school to analyze the effect of changes in peers’ skills on
parental investments, where cohorts are defined by children’s ages (for previous use
of a similar source of within-school/across-cohorts identifying variation for peer ef-
fects, see Hoxby, 2000; Hanushek et al., 2003; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2009; Lavy
and Schlosser, 2011; Lavy et al., 2012; Bifulco et al., 2011; Burke and Sass, 2013; Card
and Giuliano, 2016; Carrell et al., 2016; Olivetti et al., 2016; Patacchini and Zenou,
2016). The idea behind this identification strategy is simple: the differences in cohort
composition define the choice set for the children’s network formations, shifting the
peer-group realizations and identifying the causal effect of peers’ skills on investment
decisions. 12
Evidence of homophily bias in friendships in Section 3.3.3 underlines that the
11All results in Table 3.2 are adjusted for measurement error through the latent factor model
explained in Section 3.5.1.
12This identification strategy does not require that friendships are only formed within a unique
cohort. It only requires that changes in cohort composition alter the peer-choice set between cohorts.
Empirically, most of the friendship nominations are within the same cohort.
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heterogeneous effects in the formation of peer groups in children depend on the in-
dividual characteristics of the child. Differences in the fraction of children from a
minority group between cohorts would asymmetrically impact the friendship realiza-
tions that depend on race. Likewise, differences in the fraction of low-skilled children
between cohorts would predict dissimilar changes in peers’ skills for low-skilled versus
high-skilled children. For this reason, I implement an IV specification which allows
for different effects of cohort racial composition based on the individual child’s own
race and skills.
I construct two different instrumental variables for whether the child is part of
a minority group or not. In the case of white children, the instrument corresponds
to the interactions between the individual child’s log-skills (lnhi,t) and the fraction
of white children in that cohort. In the case of children from a minority group, the
children’s skills are interacted with the fraction of black children in that cohort. 13
Allowing for the heterogeneous effects of cohort compositions is important in terms of
predicting power on the formation of peer groups, and consequently for the relevance
of the instrumental variables.
The validity of the instruments relies on (i) the conditional independence and
(ii) the exclusion restriction. The first condition requires that differences in racial
composition between cohorts be uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity in
investment decisions. This assumption would be consistent with a sorting model
of neighborhood/school choice through which parents decide where to permanently
move according to their expectations about the school’s composition. Random differ-
ences between the ex-ante expectations and the actual realization of the new cohort’s
composition would generate exogenous shifts in the set of potential peers. Addition-
13The regression is estimated with a within-school IV estimator, and the instrumental variables
are all transformed with a within-school transformation.
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ally, conditional independence is valid under the assumption that the latent factor
model fully captures the child-specific unobserved heterogeneity, which is a common
assumption in studies that estimate the technologies of skill formation (see Cunha
and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al., 2010; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016a). 14
The exclusion restriction requires that the differences in racial composition between
cohorts within the same school affect parental investment decisions only through the
peer-effects channel, and not directly in any other way.
Figure 3.3 shows graphically the first-stage coefficients of the two instruments. In
the background of the two figures is a histogram that shows the distribution of the
two instruments (after controlling for the explanatory variables in (3.2)), revealing the
identifying sources of the variation. Figures 3.3a-3.3b show the different predictions
for peers’ skills due to changes in compositional effects by race: an increase in the
fraction of children with the same race within the same cohort predicts a decrease in
the expected level of peers’ skills in the case of a child from a minority group, while
it predicts an increase in the expected level of peers’ skills for a white child in that
cohort. Specifically, for the average child, an increase of 20% of same-race children
within the same cohort induces an increase of peers’ skills of approximately 1.7% if
the child is white, while it induces a decline of peers’ skills of 2.2% if the child belongs
to a minority group 15 . Results are stronger for the high-skilled children. For children
in the 95th percentile of the skills distribution, a 20% increase of same-race children
within the same cohort induces an increase of peers’ skills of approximately 6% if the
child is white, while it induces a decline of peers’ skills of 7% if the child belongs to
14An exception to this can be found in Cunha et al. (2010), where the authors consider additional
model specifications that allow the factors to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in in-
vestment decisions. However, in order to identify the model, the authors need additional exclusion
restrictions. One possible exclusion restriction is that during the first period of development, skills
are uncorrelated with the unobserved heterogeneity.
15The average for children’s skills is approximately 1.1
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a minority group. Moreover, I formally test the relevance of the two instrumental
variables in Panel B of Table 3.2. I find that the two instruments are relevant, with
an F-statistic of the test of joint significance equal to 11.78. 16
Column (2) in Table 3.2 reports the IV estimates. Peer effects on parental in-
vestments are both statistically and quantitatively different from the estimate of the
school fixed effects estimator. In fact, using shifts induced from within-school/across-
cohort changes in cohort composition, I find that the causal effect of peers’ skills on
parental investment is positive. The estimate suggests that doubling the average of
skills of a child’s peers is associated with an increase of parental investment of 0.72
percentage points.
Anticipating the next discussions regarding the identification of the model of in-
vestment decisions and the formation of peer groups, there are three main findings
from the above estimates which are extremely informative for identification of the
model: (i) point estimates of fixed effect estimator; (ii) the permanent nature of
shift-induced changes in peers by the instrumental variables and the associated causal
findings; (iii) The relative bias of the school fixed effects estimates relative to the IV
estimates. Through the lens of the structural model, these three pieces of informa-
tion from the empirical analysis will directly map into three specific features of the
model of investment decisions and formation of peer groups: (i) static complemen-
tarity between parents and peers in producing skills; (ii) dynamic complementarity
between parents and peers in producing skills; (iii) endogenous network formation
and selection into peer groups on unobservables.
16Stock and Yogo provide critical values to test weak IV conditions based on the F-stat of excluded
instruments. Those critical values can be interpreted as a test, with a 5 % significance level, of the
hypothesis that the maximum relative bias (with respect to the OLS estimates) is 10% or at least
15%. In this case, Stock and Yogo’s critical values for the F-stat of the excluded instruments are
19.93 (10%) and 11.59 (15%)
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3.4 An Equilibrium Model of Parental Investments and Endogenous Network
Formation
The social environment in which children live predicts their success later in life,
defining important room for policy interventions in fostering children’s skills. How-
ever, analysis of any policy which changes the composition of a specific social context
(e.g. school vouchers, housing vouchers, classroom tracking, etc.) requires knowledge
of the endogenous policy-induced changes in parental investments and peer groups
in order to predict the overall policy effects. This is particularly relevant considering
the empirical evidence on endogenous network formation and peer effects on parental
investments shown in the previous section. For this reason, in this section, I develop
the model that serves as the basis of my empirical and quantitative analysis.
This model represents a network economy populated by a finite number of families,
each formed by one parent (mother) and one child. There are several environments
e ∈ {1, . . . , E}, each populated by Ne number of families. Children can form social
networks only within each environment e. Children from different environments are
isolated from each other and they cannot socially interact. The model has four periods
(T= 4), each consisting of one year. The first period (t = 1) is when children are
13 years old, while the last period (t = T ) is when children are 16 years old. Since
I observe a negligible percentage of people changing school during the considered
period (probably because children are enrolled in high school), I simplify the model
by assuming that the parent cannot decide to change their environment during the
model’s period of study.
Parents and children solve different problems. Mothers altruistically invest time
to foster children’s skills. Children endogenously decide their peers according to
their skills and other exogenous characteristics, forming a potentially large social
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tChild’s skills (hi,t)
realized
Child’s Friendships
Decision
Peer groups
realized
Parental Investment
Decision
t+1
Child’s skills (hi,t+1
realized
network within the environment. Potential skills spillovers for child development
take place between peers within a children’s social network. Peers’ skills spillovers
affect parental investment productivity. In equilibrium, parental investments form
the within-environment children’s skills distribution, determining the children’s social
interactions. This mechanism generates an equilibrium-feedback effect on parental
behavior caused by peer effects through the formed social network.
3.4.1 The initial conditions
The initial period of the model (t = 1) is fixed when children are 13 years old. At
the beginning of this period, I assume each family i draws the vector of individual
initial conditions composed of the initial skills for both mother and child (mi, hi,1),
its exogenous characteristics Xi, and the neighborhood quality d and school quality
s. The peers’ composition is defined by the set of children who share the same
neighborhood quality and school quality. The combination of peers’ composition,
neighborhood quality and school quality defines the environments where children
live. I do not allow mobility of a family between different environments during the
period of consideration (when the child is between 13 and 16 years old). In Add
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Health, I observe a negligible percentage of people changing school neighborhood
during the considered period. This finding is probably related to the fact that parents
do not tend to move once their child is already enrolled in high school. Hence, I use
this assumption in the model since it significantly simplifies the model. However,
different realizations of initial conditions generate the sorting of people into different
environments in terms of parents’ skills, income and child’s skills, which is a key
mechanism to analyze children’s social interactions and the consequences of social
isolation in generating inequality in children’s outcomes. Perhaps, in an economy
where selection into environments is based on a family’s skills and income, children
raised in high-skilled and high-income families will tend to interact with peers also
raised in high-skilled and high-income families. The characterization of these social-
interaction patterns are due to the sorting into environments.
3.4.2 Skill Formation
At each period t, children’s skills (hi,t) evolve dynamically through a technology
of skill formation. The children’s skills in the next period are produced by the cur-
rent stock of children’s skills, parental investment, peer effects, school quality and
neighborhood quality. The first two inputs are generally considered in the literature
of child development (see for example Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al.,
2010; Heckman and Masterov, 2007; Del Boca et al., 2014b, 2016). Here, peer effects
(H i,t) are captured by the average of peers’ skills:
H i,t =
1∑
j ∈Ne
Li,j,t
∑
j ∈Ne
Li,j,t · hj,t , (3.3)
where Li,j,t is an indicator function, which equals one if child i and child j are friends,
and zero otherwise. The formation of peer groups is endogenous in the model and is
defined by the decision of children (see next section).
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The choice of the average effect of peers’ skills approach is in line with previous
literature on peer effects and social networks, where the mean effect (unweighted or
weighted average) is considered a first-order approximation of the peers’ externality
(see Brock and Durlauf, 2001b,a, 2007; Blume et al., 2011, 2015; Calvo´-Armengol
et al., 2009; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012; Patacchini et al., 2012). However, in this
framework, peer effects can be potentially highly non-linear, depending on the tech-
nology specification. 17 I allow the dynamics of children’s skills to be affected also by
the parental investments (Ii,t), some individual specific neighborhood/school effects
(Ai,d,s,t) and total factor productivity (TFP). The technology of skill formation which
defines children’s skills in the next period looks as follows:
hi,t+1 = hi,t
α1 · [α2 (Ii,t) α3 + (1− α2) (H i,t) α3]α4α3 · Ai,d,s,t · exp(ξi,t+1) , (3.4)
where I assume that (α1,α2,α4) ∈ (0, 1) and α4 ∈ (−∞, 1]. The stochastic com-
ponent ξi,t+1 represents the production function shocks. It is unrealized at time t
and it affects children’s skill dynamics. It represents the variation of skills dynamics
unexplained by the specified technology in (3.4). I allow ξi,t+1 to be correlated with
the unobservable heterogeneity in the formation of peer groups process νi,j,t, which
represents the unexplained variation in friendship realizations between children from
the model in (3.5). Specifically, I define the shock for the formation of peer groups
to be νi,j,t = ν˜i,j,t + ζi,j,t, where ζi,j,t ∼ N(0, σ2ζ ), and it is potentially correlated with
the production shock ξi,t+1. The correlation between production function shock ξi,t+1
and friendship shock νi,j,t effectively allow the possibility of selection into peer groups
on unobservables.
The specification in (3.4) allows parents and peers to vary from being perfect
17See Sacerdote (2001) for the importance of non-linearity in empirical analysis of peer effects
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complements to being perfect substitute inputs. Additionally, technology in (3.4) is
consistent with the idea of dynamic complementarity of skills evolution, where higher
skills today induce higher skills tomorrow (see Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Equation
(3.4) allows me to have a flexible specification for the analysis of peer effects in
children’s skills accumulation. The level of static complementarity/substitutability
between parents and peers is defined by α3, while the dynamic complementarity
between investment and future peers comes from the self-productivity of skills to
beget skills, i.e. the complementarity of future peers with future skills.
3.4.3 The Child’s Problem
At the beginning of every period t, each child i decides to become friends with
another child j, independently of their parents. I define the process of children’s net-
work formation as a function of the children’s skills, their exogenous characteristics
(Xi, Xj) and a vector of environment-specific characteristics (Oe) such as race compo-
sition and population size 18 The network-formation process takes place only within
the same environment, generating social isolation between children of different areas.
Empirically, this is consistent with the fact that I observe friendships only within the
same school. At the same time, within the same environment, the children’s meeting
process is “frictionless”, meaning that each child meets the other children in that
social context. However, friendships are endogenously formed by the joint decision of
children.
Following a similar specification as in Christakis et al. (2010), Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens (2013) or Graham (2017), child i’s utility to become friends with child j
at time t is:
18Figure B.1 shows that the probability of forming a friendship is a function of the population
size of the school.
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uCi,j,t = δ1+δ2 lnhj,t + δ3Xj + δ4 ✶(Xi = Xj) + δ5 (lnhi,t − lnhj,t)2+δ6Oe+δ7 t− νi,j,t ,
(3.5)
where νi,j,t is a utility shock for the formation of peer groups and δs are the
parameters associated with each variable affecting the friendship decision. This utility
function has a similar representation to the one used in the demand for products in
the literature of industrial organization, where individuals may have direct preferences
over the attributes of the potential partners. This part is captured by δ2 and δ3. The
difference from that literature comes from the other component of the utility function
δ4 ✶(Xi = Xj) + δ5 (lnhi,t − lnhj,t)2, which captures the propensity of children to
interact with children who are alike both in terms of skills and other individual
characteristics. This phenomenon is called homophily bias in the network literature
(see Jackson, 2008; Christakis and Fowler, 2009). A specific age (t) effect in the
formation of peer groups is captured by δ7. Hence, each child i solves the following
problem for each potential future peer j at each period t:
V C(hi,t, Xi, hj,t, Xj, Oe) = max
{
0 , uCi,j,t
}
(3.6)
where I normalize to zero the value to have no friend. 19 Child i and child j become
friends if both children find the friendship beneficial, i.e.:
L∗i,j,t =

1 if uCi,j,t > 0 & u
C
j,i,t > 0
0 otherwise
. (3.7)
The model in (3.6) does not consider a potential decrease of marginal returns to
additional friendships as the number of friends increases. Perhaps an alternative way
19The underlying assumption is that the outside option is common for different types of children
and for different meetings.
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of modeling friendship formation could consider children with a limited endowment of
time who optimally allocate their time in interacting with other children. In this case,
the social interactions would be limited by this time constraint and children would
have to coordinate relative to their own time constraints. While the latter model
seems more realistic, the lack of data on time allocation between peers as well as
the additional computational burden in the model directed me to the model in (3.6).
Model (3.6) represents a simple and flexible way of capturing the endogeneity of peer
groups and the main driving forces affecting friendship formation. For convenience,
let us define W as the set of variables of the utility function in equation (3.5):
Wi,t =
[
1, hj,t, Xj, ✶(Xi = Xj), (lnhi,t − lnhj,t)2 , Oe, t
]
.
The conditional probability for child i and child j to become friends, under the
independence assumption between utility shocks is then:
Pr(L∗i,j,t = 1) ≡ Pi,j,t (hi,t, Xi, hj,t, Xj, Oe) = Pr(νi,j,t ≤ W ′i,tδ) · Pr(νj,i,t ≤ W ′j,tδ)
(3.8)
where the probability of two children connecting together can be higher (lower) in
a case where the two children have the same characteristics (δ4). Also, if δ5 is negative,
a higher difference in skills will reduce the probability of the two children deciding to
connect, while a positive coefficient will increase it. In other words, the sign of the
coefficient will reflect a positive or negative assortative matching between children
with respect to their skill development. All children compute the utility of forming a
friendship with other children within the social network, and the entire social network
graph is determined. The set of probabilities between different children as in (3.8)
forms the probabilities of the possible networks in each environment e.
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In this framework, children do not directly make investments in themselves (e.g. a
study effort decision problem), which perhaps could depend on their own skills as well
as the effort their peers make. This hypothetical modeling choice would consider a
specific aspect of social interactions either emerging from a conformity effect or from
strategic complementarities in skill formation between children (see Blume et al.,
2015). In the next section, I will describe the technology of skill formation and
how children’s skills evolve over time. The dynamics of skills depend on both a
child’s own level of skills as well as the level of peers’ skills, capturing the potential
effects of studying effort, allowing for other more general peer effects and reducing
the computational burden of the model.
3.4.4 The Parenting Problem
Preferences
I assume that each parent in family i at any period t has preferences over their own
consumption (ci,t) and over the skills of their children (hi,t), while they do not receive
any direct utility from time spent with their children (Ii,t). I additionally assume
that preferences are stable over time. Parental investments are made dynamically to
foster children’s skills over time. This specification is in line with the recent literature
in child development (see Cunha, 2013b; Del Boca et al., 2014b, 2016; Mullins, 2016;
Gayle et al., 2015, 2016; Caucutt and Lochner, 2017). There is only one decision maker
regarding parental investments, as I assume that the mother–father interactions occur
at a prior stage . At any period, each parent is endowed with τ units of time and
decides how to allocate this endowment between working (τ−Ii,t) and parenting (Ii,t).
Finally, I assume that the utility function for parents i at period t is as follows:
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uP (ci,t, hi,t) =
c1−γ1i,t − 1
1− γ1 + γ2
h1−γ3i,t − 1
1− γ3 , (3.9)
where γ2 ¿ 0.
20 The specification in (3.9) underlines the main parent’s trade-off:
the benefit of higher children’s skills at the cost of their own foregone consumption.
Another model choice I could use would be to define parental investments in terms
of the effort parents need to make in order to invest in their children’s skills, and the
associated utility cost of that effort. In this case, the trade-off would be between the
altruistic benefit of fostering children’s skills and the disutility of the required effort.
The two specifications are isomorphic. 21 Finally, family income is defined by the
mother’s labor and non-labor income. I assume that both the mother’s hourly wage
(wi,t) and non-labor income (yi,t) are a function of her skills (mi). The exact wage and
non-labor income specifications are described in Section 3.5, where the relationship
between a mother’s skills and her non-labor income aims to capture the potential
effect of her skills in assortative mating and family formation.
Terminal value
I assume that the parent’ s problem ends when children reach 16 years of age. This
assumption can be read as the fact that children leave the household at 16 years old or
that after that age parental investments become unproductive. I think of the child’s
final skills at 16 as an initial condition of another developmental process which I am
20Preferences over consumption or a child’s outcomes are logarithmic functions if, respectively, γ1
= 1 or γ3 = 1.
21 In this specification, I abstract from the labor–leisure decision margin. The main reasons are
related to the lack of data on Add Health about parent’s leisure choices, which would allow me
to identify the elasticity of leisure choice with respect to changes in peers’ skills. Additionally,
adding another endogenous variable to the model would increment its computational burden. For
this reason, my policy counterfactual experiments will only focus on policy-induced change in peers’
skills and the associated change in the return of parenting, while I will abstract from any welfare
analysis and/or changes in family resources, which would need additional important predictions on
the family time allocation between working, leisure and parenting
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not modeling here, such as finishing high school, starting a job or going to college.
Hence, I allow a possible change in parental preferences over the skills of the final
childhood period. I am defining the terminal value for the parent i with respect to
children’s skills as follows:
V P4 (hi,4) = γ4 ·
h1−γ5i,4 − 1
1− γ5 , (3.10)
where both γ3 and γ4 are free parameters that potentially differ from the altruistic
parameter specified in (3.9).
The recursive representation of the parent’s problem
The two endogenous-state variables of the problem are, respectively, the child’s skills
(hi,t, individual-state variable) and peers’ skills (H i,t, aggregate-state variable). The
dynamics of the network state within each environment are taken as given from the
parent’ s perspective. Parents form expectations with respect to the next period’s
average skills of peers. Different types of peers in the next period affect the return of
investment in their offspring today through the dynamics of the child’s skills. Antic-
ipating the discussion on the equilibrium in Section 3.4.5, the consistency condition
in this economy is that the expectations about the next period’s peers’ skills will
be consistent with the transition probabilities generated by the endogenous network
formation from the child’s problem (see Section 3.4.3). 22 The parent’s problem can
be represented as follows:
V Pt (hi,t, H i,t) = max
Ii,t∈[0 , τ ]
uP (ci,t, hi,t) + β E
[
V Pt+1(hi,t+1, H i,t+1)
∣∣∣ hi,t] (3.11)
22The consistency condition between the individual behavior of parents and the aggregate distri-
bution of skills in the network is the analogue of the consistency condition used to solve recursive
competitive equilibrium in macroeconomic models with aggregate externalities.
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s.t. ci,t = (τ − Ii,t) · wi,t + yi,t
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, while the consumption ci,t is a function of
earnings (through the labor supply τ − Ii,t) and the non-labor income yi,t. Parents
are uncertain about the production shock as well as their child’s peer group in the
next period, which will affect their future investment productivity. The law of motion
for the next period’s child’s skills (or technology) is defined in (3.4), while the law of
motion for peer effects (H i,t+1) is as follows:
Pr
(
H i,t+1 =
1∑
j ∈Ne
Li,j,t+1
∑
j ∈Ne
Li,j,t+1 · hj,t+1
)
=
Ne∏
i=1
π
Li,j,t+1
i,j,t+1 (1− πi,j,t+1)1−Li,j,t+1
(3.12)
where Li,j,t is an indicator function equal to one if child i and child j are friends,
and zero otherwise. Given the conditional independence assumption about the for-
mation of peer groups, the stochastic law of motion in (3.12) represents the proba-
bility distribution of Ne independently and differently distributed Bernoulli random
variables (friendships), where πi,j,t+1 is the relative probability of that friendship hap-
pening.
3.4.5 Equilibrium of the Network Economy
In this section, I describe the equilibrium of the economy. For computational
reasons, I restrict my attention only to the (short-memory) Markovian equilibrium,
where the parent’s and child’s policy functions depend only on the current realization
of state variables during each period. Nevertheless, a desirable property of the Marko-
vian equilibrium is that, in this framework, it generates non-ergodic skill dynamics
(i.e. the property of skill formation depending on the history of developmental inputs
throughout childhood), a key mechanism in explaining diverging patterns in outcome
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inequality in children. In fact, as I will explain later in the policy analysis, moving
children at age 13 to a different environment predicts persistent effects in the dynam-
ics of children’s skills. Skills beget skills through many mechanisms: self-production,
better peers and higher investments.
Alternative classes of equilibrium concepts consist of longer-memory equilibria
where parents’ and children’s behavior is explained both by the realization of the
current states as well as by the equilibrium path history that led to that state. This
would lead to even stronger dynamic equilibrium spillover effects of skills, because it
would strengthen the role of social interactions in explaining children’s developmental
differences through the determinants of the equilibrium path of a child’s development.
Parents and children have two different and separate problems. In particular,
parents observe the current realization of their offspring’s peer groups and then form
expectations about the next period’s peer groups when deciding on today’s invest-
ment. Parents take as a given both the dynamics of network structure as well as
the distribution of children’s skills within the social network. At any point in time,
children decide about their friends, generating the network of friendships. Then, par-
ents decide how much time to invest in their offspring, forming expectations with
respect to the next period’s distribution of peers’ skills. Given that the next period’s
distribution of peers’ skills is an endogenous object in the model, the equilibrium
characterization will take into account the consistency condition between parents’
expectations and both skills and network equilibrium realizations.
Definition 3 A Markovian equilibrium of the network economy is a set of functions
{It(·), ✶t(·)}16t=13 such that:
1. 1∗(·) solves the child’s problem in (3.6), for every period t,
2. I ∗t (·) solves the parent’s problem in (3.11) , for every period t,
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3. The probability for the formation of peer groups is consistent with the skills
dynamics generated by the parental optimal behavior:
πi,j,t+1 = Pi,j,t+1 (h
∗
i,t+1, Xi, h
∗
j,t+1, Xj, Oe) for all i, j, t
where
h∗i,t+1 =
h∗i,t
α1 ·
[
α2 (I
∗
i,t(·)) α3 + (1− α2)
(
1∑
j ∈Ne
L∗i,j,t
∑
j ∈Ne
L∗i,j,t · h∗j,t
) α3]α4α3
·
Ai,d,s,t · exp(ξi,t+1),
for any production shock realization ξi,t+1.
23
Definition 3.4.5 provides that both parents and children maximize their utility
at each point in time. The last equilibrium condition, the consistency condition,
closes the model. In fact, condition (3) implies that the endogenous stochastic net-
work structure, which depends on the skill dynamics, is determined simultaneously
in equilibrium from both the parents’ and the children’s optimal behavior.
Theorem 4 In this economy, a Markovian equilibrium exists.
See proof in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 4 formalizes the existence of equilibrium of the model and is the theo-
retical base of the algorithm used in my simulation-based estimation procedure.
A common feature of any model of social interactions and spillover effects is the
potential existence of multiple equilibria. Multiplicity can arise from the presence of
23The same condition can be rewritten in terms of expected next period child’s skills
πi,j,t+1 =
∫
Pi,j,t+1 (h
∗
i,t+1, Xi, h
∗
j,t+1(ξi,t+1), Xj , Oe)dF (ξi,t+1) for all i, j, t ,
where F (ξi,t+1) is the distribution of the production shocks.
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“strong” peer externalities. In this framework, this translates into a strong comple-
mentarity between parental investments and peers’ skills, which is reflected directly
in a low value for the CES complementarity parameter α3. The possibility of multiple
equilibria creates a challenge for the use of standard econometric methods through
the presence of an indeterminacy condition in the map from the observed data to the
structural parameters. In this case, the estimation procedure would require imple-
menting additional steps to recover the parameters of the model.
Three possible solutions can be considered. First, a common approach in the
literature is to assume that the data is generated from a specific equilibrium selection.
Generally, the equilibrium selection rule considers the equilibrium with the highest
welfare amongst all the possible equilibria (see for example Lazzati, 2015; Fu and
Gregory, 2017).
A second approach consists of partially identifying the model. In this case, the
econometrician does not need to make any assumptions about the equilibrium selec-
tion. A set of moment inequalities arises from the different equilibria and can be used
to create bounds on the structural parameters of the model (using, for example, the
moment inequalities estimator in Chernozhukov et al., 2007; Andrews and Soares,
2010; Pakes et al., 2015)
A third approach, which is the one I use here, is to determine (if possible) which
specific parameter (or set of parameters) is responsible for the presence of multiple
equilibria, and for what specific threshold value of that parameter multiplicity arises.
In my model, the key parameter which determines whether the model generates
multiple equilibria is the CES parameter of complementarity between parental in-
vestments and peers’ skills (α3). A high level of complementarity between parents
and peers can generate multiplicity: within each environment, the parental decisions
of other parents affect the individual decisions of everybody else, creating possible
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extreme equilibria where no parents invest at all or all the parents invest the majority
of their time in child development. This statement on how peer externalities affect
parental investment decisions is a testable prediction. This means that the previous
empirical results in Section 3.3 can be considered as a pre-test for multiplicity in
this model. Specifically, the fact that by using within-school cross-sectional varia-
tion in peers’ skills I find a negative effect in parental investment decisions suggests
that the two inputs cannot be too complementary; to let the model reproduce that
cross-sectional negative relationship between investments and peers’ skills, the com-
plementarity between parents and peers should be less than in the Cobb–Douglas
case (so the CES parameter α3 should be bigger than 0).
24 Given this low level
of complementarity, I am going to implement a “guess and verify” method, in which
I assume that the equilibrium is locally unique for values of α3 ∈ (0, 1], and will
then computationally verify if the assumption is correct by implementing a monotone
method for equilibria computations. This method requires calculation of the two pos-
sible extremal equilibria of this economy using the algorithm in Topkis (1979), and
then simply comparing them. For the data-driven model’s parametrization of α3 ∈
(0, 1], I find no evidence of multiple equilibria.
3.5 Econometric Specification
3.5.1 The Latent Factor Models
In line with the recent literature on child development (see Cunha et al., 2010;
Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016a; Attanasio et al., 2017a,b,c), I implement a dynamic
latent factor model to map the key unobserved variables of the model into data. The
24A recent work of Datta et al. (2017) shows that in a similar environment, a macro growth model
with externalities, the unique equilibrium is proved in a case where externality is not big, like in the
case of constant return to scale in the production technologies.
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factor model overcomes the main problem in the analysis of skill formation: mis-
measurement of skills and the arbitrariness of test-score scales relative to the scale
of skills. For both mothers’ and children’s skills, I follow the latent factor model
implemented in Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) as follows:
Zhi,t,k = µ
h
t,k + λ
h
t,k · lnhi,t + ǫhi,t,k
Zmi,k = µ
m
t,k + λ
m
k · lnmi + ǫmi,k (3.13)
The index k is for indexing each of the multiple measurements (proxies) Z for each
latent factor. Because the location and scale of skills can differ from the arbitrary
location and scale of the proxies I use, I implement the factor model in (3.13) with free
measurement parameters (µ and λ). Finally, the noises in (3.13) have a mean of zero in
any period and for any measure. 25 I assume the common independence conditions
about the measurement error to hold. These conditions include the independence
of measurement noises with both a child’s and mother’s latent skills and between
different measures of skills, as well as between different children and over time (for
more details, see Appendix B.3).
Mapping data to the distribution of latent investment is challenging due to the
nature of the proxies included in Add Health. Add Health asks children whether they
have been engaged in specific activities with their mothers in the last four weeks.
Examples of activities are “gone shopping,” “played a sport,” “gone to a movie,
play, museum, concert, or sports event” or “had a talk about a personal problem.”
Each question requires a “yes” or “no” answer, generating a set of binary proxies
for investments defined by ZIi,k ∈ {0, 1}, where i and k indexes are relative to the
child and the specific question. These measures can be considered indicators as to
25Given the intercept µt,m, the assumption of a mean of zero ǫt,m errors is without loss of generality.
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whether parents spent some time with their children or not. Hence, each measure of
investment can be thought of as a Bernoulli random variable with probability pk(Ii,t),
a function of the latent investment. I adopt a similar approach as in Del Boca et al.
(2014b), and I consider a specific parametric distribution for pk(Ii,t), which is a Beta
distribution with parameters Beta(α + ZIi,t,k , 1 + β - Z
I
i,t,k).
26 I can now draw
pk from this distribution to recover, for each measure k, the latent distribution of
parental investments Fk(Ii,t). Let p̂i,t,k be the draw from the parametric distribution
for some observation i at time t, and I can impute the level of investment by inverting
the probability function at p̂i,t,k (assuming the inverse exists):
Iki,t = p
−1
k (p̂i,t,k). (3.14)
where α and β define the location and scale for the latent investments. 27 To
assure that imputed levels of investments are constrained between 0 and τ (the max
time in the model), I map each specific probability into the fraction of time spent
with children (
Ii,t
τ
). Each probability of observing a measure of investment equal to
one increases with respect to the fraction of parental investments (higher parental
investments lead to a higher probability of observing, in data, children involved in
activity “k” with their parents). Moreover, a desirable property for the probability
function is that limIi,t→0 pk(Ii,t) = 0, limIi,t→τ pk(Ii,t) = 1. This means that once the
fraction of invested time goes to zero or to one, the probability of observing a parent
involved in that specific activity goes to zero or to one. For all these reasons, I choose
the following simple functional form, which respects all the required properties:
26Del Boca et al. (2014b) use the same approach to address the issue of measuring continuous
skills with a discrete test score as well as the possibility of measurement error of the measured score.
Additionally, this method overcomes the problem of a measurement floor and ceiling of test scores
27In contrast to the skills case, latent time investments have a well-known location and scale,
which is in terms of time units or fractions of total time. I will measure this information by looking
at the time allocation of parents on the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
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pk(Ii,t) =
(
Ii,t
τ
)λI
t,k
λIt,k > 0, (3.15)
where the parameter λIt,k is the loading factor for each activity m.
3.5.2 Parametric Assumptions of the Model
In this section, I illustrate the assumptions I am making in order to parametrically
estimate the model. I consider three different types of neighborhood quality according
to the income distribution in the data. For each school I have in Add Health, I
compute the within-school mean family income and then assign each family to the
low-, medium- or high-income neighborhood type according to the median school
income. 28 This distinction is made based on the terciles of income-distribution
(33th percentiles, between the 33th and 66th percentile and above the 66th percentile).
29 Families first draw their race (I allow race to be either black, Hispanic or other)
and their neighborhood type from a joint distribution P(d,r), which I directly estimate
from the data. 30 After race and neighborhood are drawn, I assume that the initial
distribution of a family’s log-skills (mother and child) are drawn from a conditional
bivariate distribution:
(lnhi,1, lnmi) ∼ N(ηr,d, Σr,d) (3.16)
where I allow mean and variance of latent skills to vary by race and neighbor-
hood. The specification allows me to have a flexible framework to capture potential
sorting of families within specific environments. Taking into consideration this kind
28The results do not change if I consider the median family income within the Census Tract where
families live
29For further details on the descriptive statistics for each of the neighborhood types, see Table
B.1.
30This empirical distribution represents the probability for each of the nine possible combinations
of race and neighborhoods and is directly observed and estimable from the data
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of assortative pattern is fundamental in order to properly identify the peer effects in
child development.
I also make some parametric assumptions about the measurement error equations
in (3.13). I assume that the measurement noises for each measure are mean-zero
normally distributed ǫk ∼ N(0,σ2ǫ,k) for any measure k at any age t.
The TFP term in the technology of skill formation is composed of two parts:
neighborhood-quality effects and school-quality effects. For each neighborhood type
d, I assume there is a distribution of school-quality families drawn together with their
neighborhood realization: As ∼ N(ηs,d,σ2s,d). To generalize the school effects in skill
dynamics, the parametric functional form for the technology of skill formation I bring
to data is:
hi,t+1 = hi,t
α1 · [α2 (Ii,t) α3 + (1− α2) (H i,t) α3 + α5 Aα3s ]α4α3 · Ad,t · exp(ξi,t+1) ,
(3.17)
where the share parameter of As (α5) is normalized to 1 given that the variance
of the latent school fixed effects is a free parameter estimated directly in the data
(σ2s,d). Technology in (3.17) generalizes the school effects to have individual specific
elasticities of skill production with respect to school quality. The environment-specific
TFP term is assumed to be a function of the neighborhood quality and child’s age as
follow: Ad,t = exp(γ0,tfp + γ1,tfp · d + γ2,tfp · t ). Additionally, I am assuming some
parametric form for both shocks of skill production and preference for children’s peer
groups. Production shocks are assumed to be mean-zero normally distributed ξi,t+1
∼ N(0,σ2ξ ), while a child’s preference shocks for friendships, defined in eq. (3.5), are
distributed as a standard logistic . This implies that the probability that child i and
child j become friends at any time t is:
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Pi,j,t ≡ Pr(L∗i,j,t = 1) =
exp(W ′i,tδ)
1 + exp(W ′i,tδ)
· exp(W
′
j,tδ)
1 + exp(W ′j,tδ)
(3.18)
where Wi,t and Wj,t are the set of variables affecting the decision and are defined in
eq. (3.4.3), while δ are the common utility parameters.
Finally, I assume that both the mother’s hourly wage (wi,t) and non-labor income
(yi,t), at any period t, are defined as a function of the mother’s skills in a linear
fashion, as in the classic Mincer wage equation (see Mincer, 1958):
 lnwi,t
ln yi,t
 =
 κ1,0
κ2,0
 + lnmi ·
 κ1,1
κ2,1
 +
 ǫwi,t
ǫyi,t

where ǫwi,t and ǫ
y
i,t are measurement noises.
3.6 Identification of the Model
As explained above, both mother’s and child’s skills as well as parental investments
are assumed to be unobserved. With this in mind, the goal is to identify peer effects
on parental investment decisions and skill formation, dealing with the endogeneity of
the peers network formation. In this section I describe how I approach this task. The
identification of the wage and non-labor income process is standard: in both cases,
once the scale and location for the latent mother’s skills are identified (see Section
3.6.1), it is a simple linear errors-in-variables models. In the next sections, I focus
more on the more challenging part of the model for identification. I am following the
logical order from the model: (i) initial conditions; (ii) network formation process;
(iii) static and dynamic complementarity between parents and peers.
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3.6.1 Identification of the Initial Conditions
The main challenge in the identification of the family skills distribution comes from
the fact that skills are unobserved and they have not a natural scale and location.
Recalling that the initial conditions are assumed to be normally distributed,
(lnhi,1, lnmi) ∼ N ( ηr,d, Σr,d) ,
where ηr,d =
 ηhr,d
ηmr,d
 and Σr,d =
 σhr,d2 σh,mr,d
σh,mr,d σ
m
r,d
2
 are, respectively, the vector of
means and the variance–covariance matrix for skills for a specific neighborhood type
(d) and race (r). I normalize the scale and location of skills for a subgroup of the
population. Without loss of generality, I normalize the distribution of skills for white
(r=w) families living in the lowest-income neighborhood (d = 1) as follows:
Normalization 2 Initial period normalization:
• ηw,1 =
 0
0

• Σw,1 =
 1 σh,mw,1
σh,mw,1 1

Under normalization 2, I am able to identify the remaining measurement equation
parameters and the initial joint distribution of skills for each race and each neighbor-
hood type. The initial period loading factors (λ) and the location parameters (µ) are
identified as follows:
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[λh1,k, λ
m
k ] =
[
Cov(Zhi,1,k, Z
h
i,1,j)
Cov(Zhi,1,j, Z
h
i,1,1)
,
Cov(Zmi,k, Z
m
i,j)
Cov(Zmi,j, Z
m
i,1)
]
for k 6= j and for k, j 6= 1
(3.19)
[µh1,k, µ
m
1,k] =
[
E[Zhi,1,k|r = w, d = 1], E[Zmi,k|r = w, d = 1]
]
for all k. (3.20)
Using both (3.19) and (3.20), it is possible to identify the means and the variance-
covariance matrix of the latent skills for all the rest of race and neighborhood type
combinations in the following way:
ηr,d =
[
E[Zhi,1,k|r, d]− µh1,k
λh1,k
,
E[Zmi,k|r, d]− µmk
λmk
]
for all (r, d) 6= (w, 1) (3.21)
Σr,d =

Cov(Zhi,1,k , Z
h
i,1,j |r, d)
λh1,k λ
h
1,j
Cov(Zhi,1,k , Z
m
i,j |r, d)
λh1,k λ
m
j
Cov(Zhi,1,k , Z
m
i,j |r, d)
λh1,k λ
m
j
Cov(Zmi,k , Z
m
i,j |r, d)
λmk λ
m
j
 for all (r, d). (3.22)
Repeating the identification of mean and variance–covariance matrix for all the
neighborhood types, and for each race, I am able to identify the distribution of initial
conditions in the economy. 31 Finally, I identify the variance of the measurement
errors for each measure:
σ2ǫm,k = V ar(Z
m
i,k)− (λmk )2V ar(lnmi)
σ2ǫh,t,k = V ar(Z
h
i,t,k)− (λht,k)2V ar(lnhi,t) for all t (3.23)
where each variable on the right-hand side of the equations in (3.23) is already
identified. The repeated cross-sectional dimension of the Add Health data allows
31Notice that the identifying assumption here is that the measurement parameters are common
for all the children. This assumption is common in the literature of latent factor models.
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me to observe the same test score administered to children at different ages. Hence,
following the approach in Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a), I assume the PPVT to be
an age-invariant measure – that is, the latent skills load into the PPVT in the same
manner through the ages of consideration (13 to 16). 32 As shown in Agostinelli
and Wiswall (2016a), this assumption is sufficient to identify an unknown TFP term
and an unknown return to scale in the CES technology case. 33
3.6.2 Identification of the Formation of Peer Groups
Using the measurement system defined in (3.13), I can rescale the observed mea-
sures for skills to be:
Z˜hi,t,k ≡
Zhi,t,k − µht,k
λht,k
= lnhi,t +
ǫhi,t,k
λht,k
(3.24)
where Z˜hi,t,k represents a monotone transformation of raw test scores that permit
consideration of the data on a comparable scale as the latent skills. Each transformed
measure is composed by two elements: the factor and the noise. For this reason, in
order to use this information to identify the peer-group formations, we need to deal
with the presence of this measurement error. In particular, I exploit the identified
parametric distribution of the measurement errors to integrate out the noise from the
data.
Following the notation in (3.4.3), let us define W to be the set of variables of the
utility function of child i to become friends with child j as in equation (3.5) and W˜
to be the analogue measured in the data:
32Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016a) defines an age-invariant measure to be a repeated achievement
test, the assessment of which would not depend on a child’s age, but on their cognitive development
33 It also allows me to identify the measurement parameters for all remaining proxies for skills
through all the periods of the model
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Wi =
[
1, hj,t, rj, ✶(ri = rj), (hi,t − hj,t)2 , Oe, t
]
,
W˜i(ǫ
h
i,t,k, ǫ
h
j,t,k) =
1, (Z˜hj,t,k − ǫhj,t,kλhk ), rj, ✶(ri = rj),
(
(Z˜hi,t,k −
ǫhi,t,k
λhk
)− (Z˜hj,t,k −
ǫhj,t,k
λhk
)
)2
, Oe, t
 .
(3.25)
The conditional probability of child i and child j becoming friends, given their
skills and race, is as follows:
Pi,j,t = Pr(νi,j,t ≤ W ′iδ) · Pr(νj,i,t ≤ W ′jδ)
=
∫
Pr
(
νi,j,t ≤ W˜i(ǫhi,t,k, ǫhj,t,k)′δ
)
· Pr
(
νj,i,t ≤ W˜j(ǫhj,t,k, ǫhi,t,k)′δ
)
dΦ(ǫhi,t,k, ǫ
h
j,t,k; Σǫ,t)
(3.26)
where Φ(·; Σǫ,t) is the bivariate normal CDF of the measurement errors with zero
mean and a variance–covariance matrix Σǫ,t =
 σ2ǫh,t,k 0
0 σ2
ǫh,t,k
, which is already
identified in (3.23).
Equation (3.26) shows that I can identify the parameters of the model of peer-
group formation by mapping the noisy measures of children’s skills available in data to
information about the children’s latent skills and their effects on children’s friendship
decisions.
3.6.3 Identifying Peer Effects in Child Development
Given the complexity of the above dynamic equilibrium model, it is important to
develop an easy intuition behind the source of variation which will lead to identifying
peer effects on child development. In particular, one helpful source of identifying
variation comes from the endogenous response of parental investments to peer quality,
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allowing us to infer the degrees of both static and dynamic complementarity between
parents and peers in producing a child’s skills. These parent response elasticities are
key for identification because they map directly into the deep structural parameters
of the technology of skill formation and are the key margin of interest for policy
predictions. The main object of interest for identification is the full joint distribution
of inputs of development Ψ(Ω)=
{{
I∗i,t, hi,t, H
∗
i,t
}
i
}
t
, where Ω is the set of structural
parameters left to identify, the peers’ skills spillover determined in the equilibrium
social network is defined as H
∗
i,t, and the star defines the equilibrium realization.
Static Complementarity
A useful set of moments to identify the static complementarity between parents and
peers in skill formation is the partial correlations of parental investments and peers’
skills. In fact, an intuitive prediction of my model is a positive (negative) cross-
sectional relationship between parental investments and peers in the presence of a
high degree of static complementarity (substitutability) between parents and peers
in child development. Once peer quality increases, the return on investing in child
development increases as well, making parents more productive in parenting. On
the other hand, parents have an incentive to decrease their costly investments once
an alternative substitute input (peers) increases. Hence, the static complementar-
ity/substitutability between parents and peers is identified by the cross-sectional
variation between investments and peers’ skills.
A specific but helpful representation of these moments is given by the linear re-
gression in (3.2), which provides useful information about the variation of investment
decisions with respect to the type of peers. Specifically, the coefficient β2, which
represents the effect of peers’ skills on investment decisions, is informative about the
degree of static complementarity/substitutability (α3) between parental investment
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and peers in the production of children’s skills.
Dynamic Complementarity
The dynamic complementarity between parents and peers is identified by looking
at the variation in parental investments induced by changed expectations for future
peers’ skills. For example, as a thought experiment, consider two children (and their
relative families) who are alike in all dimensions including their peer groups, but only
one of them is assigned permanently (treatment) to a different (better) peer group,
while the other child (control) has no change in peer composition. Given the perma-
nent nature of the experiment, the two parents now observe today’s peers and have
different expectations about tomorrow’s peers. Again, the model’s prediction is help-
ful in fixing ideas: an increased expectation of tomorrow’s peers’ skills would change
the return on today’s investments. Current investments would foster the child’s skills
of tomorrow, thus benefiting more from better future peers. Hence, the higher the dy-
namic complementarity, the higher the difference in parental investments induced by
the policy between the control and the treatment of children: the treatment induces
higher investments because of the effects of expectations of future peers.
My empirical identification strategy is based on the instrumental variable approach
explained in Section 3.3.4, which represents the quasi-experimental analogue of the
identifying variation considered in the above thought experiment. Specifically, in or-
der to estimate the causal effects of permanent peers changing investment decisions,
I use the random realization of different cohort composition of children within the
same school to analyze how permanent changes in peers affect parental investments.
The idea behind this identification strategy is simple. The cohort realization perma-
nently defines the choice set for the children’s network formation. Hence, different
cohort compositions shift parents’ expectations about future peer groups, allowing
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us to identify the causal effect of a permanent change in peer groups on investment
decisions (β2) and, consequently, the dynamic complementarity of investments and
peers. 34
3.7 Estimation
I implement a two-step estimation algorithm to alleviate the estimation burden of
this model. In the first step, I estimate the initial conditions, the wage and the family
income process, as well as the distribution of school quality for low/medium/high
neighborhood types. 35 , 36 The second step of estimation is focused on the rest of
the model: preferences, technology and parameters of the network formation. I use a
simulation-based estimation technique which allows me to simulate the distributions
of investments and skills over the entire childhood and replicate the statistics (M) I
observe in Add Health data. In greater detail, I simulate the equilibrium dynamics of
investments, skills and networks and use the realized simulated data set to compute
the analogous statistics (MS) observed in the data. Hence, the second-step estimator
is a simulated method of moments (SMM) estimator:
Ω̂ = argmin
Ω
(M −MS(Ω))W (M −MS(Ω)) (3.27)
where Ω is the set of structural parameters previously described andW represents
34This identification strategy does not require that friendships are only formed within a unique
cohort. It only requires that changes in cohort composition also change the peer-choice set between
cohorts. Empirically, most of the friendship nominations are within the same cohort.
35The school quality distributions are identified estimating the school fixed-effects distribution
from a value-added model of child development. This method is simple and alleviates the computa-
tional burden of estimating different school quality parameters in the second step of the estimation.
See Appendix B.5 for further details.
36Identification of latent skills requires at least three proxies for each latent variable. In the case
of a mother’s skills, Add Health provides only information about a mother’s years of education. I
use the NLSY79 sample to recover the loading factor and location parameter for this proxy.
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the weighting matrix. 37 In the estimation procedure, I set the weighting matrix to
be the inverse of the diagonal variance–covariance matrix of moments computed by
bootstrapping the data. The selected moments include: (i) first- and second-order
moments for the conditional distribution of skills by race and neighborhood type; (ii)
the set of auxiliary coefficients from the two auxiliary regressions in (3.2), as well
as auxiliary coefficients for the technology of skill formation (in an indirect inference
fashion); (iii) the set of moments about network formation, including the homophily
bias index for skills and race for each neighborhood type, which I described during
the previous empirical analysis in Section 3.3.3.
3.7.1 Structural Estimates
Network formation parameters
Table 3.3 shows estimates for the formation of peer groups. The unconditional effects
of age, race or skill level on the formation of peer groups are negligible (the uncon-
ditional numbers of friends by race and by skills are similar). Race and skills play a
role through homophily bias in friendship formation, affecting the composition (not
the quantity) of friends. Qualitatively, coefficients in Table 3.3 are consistent with
the empirical evidence of homophily bias both in race and in skills. Specifically, I find
that for any race, the fact that the other child is of the same race is highly predictive
about the friendship realization between the two children. The coefficients associated
with being of the same race are, respectively, 0.76, 0.70 and 0.60 for black, Hispanic
37The choice of the simulated method of moments with respect to a likelihood-based method is due
to three reasons: first of all, the SMM approach overcomes the additional source of computational
burden which arises from the multi-dimension integration problem associated with the maximum-
likelihood estimator of this model. Secondly, because of the data structure, I observe each child only
for two consecutive waves (with a temporal distance of one year) in Add Health, making the SMM
a more flexible estimator in combining the information of skills dynamics from the dataset. Finally,
the SMM does not require any assumption about the cross-sectional distribution of the children’s
skills over childhood.
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and white children. The higher coefficient is for black children. The probability for
the formation of peer groups depends on whether children have similar skills. In
particular, the higher the difference in children’s skills, the lower the probability of
the two children becoming friends, with a coefficient of -0.038. These homophily bias
effects get bigger in context with a lower fraction of minorities, which is shown by how
the two coefficients of homophily bias interact with the total fraction of black and
white children (0.042 and -0.063, respectively). I find that the correlation of unob-
servable heterogeneity in the formation of peer groups with the production shocks is
-0.40, while its standard deviation is 0.11. I do not find relevant effects of the specific
race or skills level in the probability level (only through homophily bias).
To better interpret the estimates, I plot the marginal probabilities of two children
becoming friends over the spectrum of children’s skills and for different races of chil-
dren living in the poorest environment (see Figure 3.4). For a black low-skilled child
(within the first quintile of skills distribution), the probability of becoming friends
with white children is four times lower than with a same-race counterpart. At the
same time, it is two times more likely for the same child to become friends with chil-
dren having similar skills than for children in the top decile of skills distribution. For
a white low-skilled child (within the first quintile of skills distribution), the racial gap
is lower (around 2.5 times), while the effect of skills is similar.
Technology parameters
Table 3.4 shows estimates for the technology of skill formation. I find a high degree of
static substitutability between parents and peers, with a complementarity parameter
(α3) of approximately 0.95 (and associated elasticity of substitution of
1
1−0.95
= 20). I
find a degree of self-productivity (α1), i.e. the ability of skills to beget skills, of 0.75.
This means that a 1% increase in current skills would predict an average of 0.75%
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. This result is qualitatively in line with the previous research on the estimation
of technology of skill formation (Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al.,
2010; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016a). The magnitudes of the share parameters are
meaningless due to the different scale between peers’ skills (normalized at age 13
to have unit variance) and investments (in yearly hours). However, I find that the
estimated value of 0.009 implies that to completely offset a change of one standard
deviation in peers’ skills, parental investments need to change by approximately four
hours per week (for the mean parent). The return to scale of the combined parents–
peers inputs (α4) is 0.77, suggesting non-linear peer effects in skills dynamics even
when parents and peers are approximately perfect substitutes (linear). I find that
the total factor productivity is an increasing function of the neighborhood quality
(γ1,tfp=0.008) and of the age of children (γ2,tfp=0.030). The coefficients for school
quality represent each neighborhood-type mean and standard deviation of the school
fixed effects. I find that average school quality is increased by neighborhood type
(from -0.03 for low-income neighborhoods to 0.04 for high-income neighborhoods),
while the standard deviation is decreased (from 0.26 for low-income neighborhoods
to 0.18 for high-income neighborhoods). Finally, I find production shocks to be
important in explaining the total variation in skills dynamics, with a coefficient for
the standard deviation of shocks (σξ) of 0.70.
Preferences Parameters
Panel A in Table 3.5 shows estimates for preference parameters. I find both utility
for consumption and a child’s skills to be relatively concave, with a higher degree of
curvature for consumption relative to a child’s skills. I find a relatively high degree
of parental altruism towards a child’s skills: parents care about their child’s skills
through ages 13 to 15 almost as much as their own consumption, while they care
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twice as much about the final continuation value for their child relative to their own
current consumption. The last result underlines the importance of allowing for a
different parameterization for the final period preference, which, as explained above,
can capture a different developmental process for children, such as finishing high
school, starting a job or going to college.
Wage-Income Process and Initial Conditions
Panel B in Table 3.5 shows estimates for the wage and non-labor income process.
A mother’s skills are very predictive of both, suggesting an elasticity of 0.44 and
1.03 for wages and non-labor. Table 3.6 shows estimates for the initial conditions
by neighborhood type (low/medium/high family income). The normalized mean and
variance for a mother’s skills and a child’s initial skills are for white families living in
a low-income neighborhood (neighborhood 1). The other subpopulations’ means and
variances are relative to the normalized ones. I find that children from minorities start
with a lower mean of initial skills relative to their reference white children. White
children living in a higher family income neighborhood (neighborhoods 2 or 3) have
higher mean initial skills relative to white children in lower-income neighborhoods. I
find similar patterns in terms of mother’s skills.
3.7.2 Sample Fit
Table B.2 and Table B.3 report the sample fit for the auxiliary regressions of
investments and the dynamics of a child’s skills. The model is able to replicate
the empirical findings on parental investments and skill dynamics. Table B.2 also
reports the 95% confidence interval to show that the simulated coefficients are not
statistically different from the fitted coefficients. More importantly, Table B.2 shows
that the model is able to replicate the switch in sign in the peers’ skills, from the
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cross-sectional (negative) to the permanent (positive) variation in peers, through the
different degrees of static versus dynamic complementarity of parental investments
and peers’ skills in skill formation.
Table B.3 shows that the estimated model is able to fit the auxiliary coefficients
for the dynamic aspect of skill formation, suggesting that the estimated technology
of skill formation provides the proper marginal productivity for the developmental
inputs. The reported 95% confidence intervals suggest that the data and simulated
coefficients are not statistically different.
In terms of neighborhood effects on child development, the estimated model is able
to fit the differential patterns of skill formation between different neighborhoods and
for different races. Figures B.2-B.7 show the sample fit for the mean and standard
deviation of skills by age, race and for each of the three types of neighborhood I
consider (low/medium/high income).
Figures B.8-B.9 show the sample fit for the homophily bias index for skills and
race in different neighborhoods (low/medium/high income). Figure B.8 shows that
the model tracks the findings on the skills homophily bias in friendship formation.
The model replicates the fact that high-skilled children display a higher bias toward
children with similar skills.
Figure B.9 shows that the model is able to replicate the findings of homophily bias
by race in different neighborhoods. However, within the high-income neighborhood,
while the data indicate a fall in the homophily bias index for Hispanic children relative
to black children, the model indicates a common tendency of homophily bias between
the two races.
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3.8 The Exposure Effects of Environments on Child Development
In this section, I analyze the extent to which environments explain differences
in children’s final achievements. In order to calculate the treatment effect of better
environments, I simulate the counterfactual dynamics of skills as the outcome of being
moved to a different environment. I compute the treatment effect by simulating each
child in each different environment and school and at any age I consider in the model.
Within the estimated model, I can now calculate the treatment effect of moving
from any considered environment to any of the others. Specifically, consider the case
where a child i is permanently moved from a environment e to a environment e’ at
age m. The individual treatment effect in this case is:
TEi(e, e’,m) = y
∗
i (e, e’,m)− y∗i (e) (3.28)
where y∗i (e) represents the baseline child percentile in the skill distribution at age
16, while y∗i (e, e’,m) represents the child percentile in the skill distribution at age 16 if
the child is moved from her original environment e to a new environment e’ at age m.
To simplify the analysis and to have a comparable setting with the previous literature,
I first characterize environments by their mean percentiles of skills of permanently
based children at age 16 (ye). Second, I consider a specific parametric relationship
between a child’s outcome and the associated mean percentiles of children’s skills at
age 16 in each environment (ye):
y∗i = ψ0 + ψ1,m ye + ǫi (3.29)
where ye represents the associated mean percentile of children’s skills in environ-
ment e. In this case, ψ1,m represents the average treatment effect of being permanently
moved at age m from a environment e to a new environment e’ which has a mean of
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children’s skills at age 16 that is one percentile higher.
Finally, I can compute the exposure effects of environments, which represent the
effects on skill formation of an additional year in a environment with a mean of
children’s skills at age 16 that is one percentile higher. Following equation (3.29), the
exposure effects are simply ψ1,m - ψ1,m+1.
Figure 3.5 shows that environments have sizable effects on skill formation. Moving
a child at age 12 into a environment with a mean of children’s skills at age 16 that is
one percentile higher causes an increase of her skills by approximately 0.65 percentiles.
This effect declines by age. I find an exposure effect of 0.048, which means that the
outcomes of moved children converge to the outcomes of receiving children at a rate
of 4.8% per year of exposure. In other words, moving a child to a better environment
at 14 rather than at 13 years old causes the child to lose almost 5% of the benefit of
moving. The exposure effects imply approximately a 15% higher benefit from moving
to the same environment at 12 rather than at 15 years old. 38
3.8.1 Model Validation: Comparison with Exposure Effects in Chetty and Hendren
(2016a)
The specification in (3.29) allows me to compare my results with those in Chetty
and Hendren (2016a). The authors implement the same specification to analyze the
childhood exposure effects of environments for the United States. The authors con-
sider individual income percentiles at age 24 as their variables of interest. Still, my
results are comparable with those in Chetty and Hendren (2016a) under the reason-
able assumption that expected individual income is defined by any monotone rank-
38My model starts at age 13 when children draw their skills after the realization of the environment
where they live. In this exercise, when I move children at age 12, it means that I allow children to be
in the environment before they draw their skills. In contrast, when I move them at age 13, I let them
first draw their skills in the original environment and then move them into the new environment.
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preserving function of children’s skills (higher skills imply average higher individual
income). 39
Figure 3.5 shows that my model tracks the findings in Chetty and Hendren
(2016a), who find that an additional year of exposure to a environment with a mean
income of one percentile higher for permanently moved children increases a child’s
income later in life by approximately 0.04 percentiles. The authors also find exposure
effects to be stronger for families above the median income distribution. Table 3.7
shows the comparison of model predictions and their estimates with respect to family
income. The model’s predictions are in line with the heterogeneous exposure effects.
It is still an open question, however, as to which factors drive the exposure effects.
In the next section, I decompose the overall exposure effects into three classes of
environment-specific amenities: peers, school quality and environment quality.
3.8.2 Decomposition of Childhood Exposure Effects
One advantage of my structural model is that I can now decompose the previous
findings of exposure effects with respect to each of the components which characterized
an environment in my model: peers, school quality and environment quality.
With the estimated model, I can replicate the previous simulated experiment
of moving children within different scenarios to isolate the effects of each of the
previous inputs. I first move children and compute the treatment effect of moving
to different environments at different ages due exclusively to the associated change
of peers (keeping the previous level of both school and environment quality fixed).
Secondly, I compute the effect of moving children when the associated treatment is
39 I could also estimate a relationship between individual income at age 24 and children’s skills at
age 16 and then use this estimated function to predict individual income for the simulation exercise.
Any monotone relationship between these two variables would give me the same results in terms of
rank effects.
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composed by both changes in peers and the new school quality (keeping the previous
level of environment quality fixed). Finally, I calculate the overall treatment effect of
moving at different ages associated with the new peers, the new school and the new
environment quality. In this way, I can ascertain the contribution of each component
to the overall effects of childhood exposure to environments.
Table 3.8 shows the decomposition of the overall effect. Peers alone account for
more than half of the childhood exposure effects, while school and environment qual-
ity account for the rest. This means that more than half of the effect of an additional
year in a environment with mean skills one percentile higher for permanently moved
children is caused by the child’s social interactions. Whether a child leaves a disad-
vantaged environment affects the quality of the child’s social interactions (in terms
of peers’ skills). The dynamic complementarity of skill formation causes this effect
to have a higher return earlier than later throughout adolescence. Each additional
year of adolescence spent in an environment with mean skills one percentile lower for
permanently moved children worsens the child’s skills at age 16 by 0.027 percentiles,
exclusively through social interactions. The exposure to the same social interactions
from age 12 to age 15 would cause a reduction of skills by approximately 0.08 per-
centiles.
The overall exposure effects are bigger for disadvantaged children, and in this
case, peer effects account for almost two-thirds. Children who have a low endowment
of skills and are from lower-income families are more likely to live in low-income
environments, where they have higher chances of interacting with low-skilled peers due
to the homophily bias effects in peer-group formation. This channel explains why this
group of children experiences the greatest benefit from leaving these disadvantaged
environments. The exposure effect in this case is approximately 0.05, and peers alone
account for up to 60% of this finding. For this specific subgroup of children from low-
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income families, each additional year of adolescence spent in an environment with
mean skills of one percentile lower for permanently moved children worsens a child’s
skills by around 0.034 percentiles at age 16, exclusively through social interactions.
Figure 3.6 shows graphically the same result for lower-skilled children.
These results suggest the importance of social interactions alone in explaining
the differences in developmental trajectories in children from different environments.
In the next section, I analyze the effects of policies that target disadvantaged chil-
dren and change the peers’ composition between different environments, for example,
policy that promote socioeconomic integration between environments or schools.
3.9 Policy Analysis
The decomposition of the exposure effects of environments suggests that more
than half of the effects come from peers and social interaction. This result calls for
policies which focus on changes in peers’ composition between different environments
to overcome the negative effects of growing up in disadvantaged environments. I
analyze how this kind of policy, if implemented on a large scale (i.e. when a siz-
able fraction of children are moved into a new environment), can generate important
equilibrium effects in skill dynamics through the changes in social interactions.
3.9.1 Large Scale Changes in Peers’ Composition
The estimated model reveals that skills dynamics depend on a peers’ composition
and associated children’s social interactions. In this section, I analyze the quanti-
tative equilibrium effects, created by policies that change cohort compositions into
different social contexts, on the dynamics of skills. Specifically, I want to understand
the implications of changes in cohort compositions within both receiving and sending
environments. In order to answer this question, I perform a simulated counterfactual
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analysis where I move disadvantaged children (and their parents), i.e. children with
low skill endowment at age 13 and living in a poor environment, into a high-income
environment. This policy has diverse effects on three subgroups of people: (i) par-
ents and children who are moved; (ii) parents and children who live in the receiving
(high-income) environment; (iii) parents and children who remain in the low-income
environment.
The simulated policy targets a specific group of disadvantaged children: children
who are within the first quartile of skills distribution at age 13 in the low-income
environment. More than 70% of these children are from a racial minority and their
initial (age 13) skills are, on average, about a standard deviation below the population
mean of log-skills at age 13. On the other hand, the racial composition of the receiving
environment is different: the racial minority makes up only 18% of the population.
On average, receiving children are 0.12 standard deviations above the population
mean of children’s log-skills at age 13. I consider the policy effects when the moved
children group is about 5% and 30% of the receiving cohort. These sizable changes
in cohort composition allows me to analyze the equilibrium effects of the policy. In
the last part of this section, I will discuss more in detail how the effects change as a
function of the fraction of moved children.
Table 3.9 shows the effects of the policy that moves the smaller fraction of chil-
dren (5% of the receiving population). Panel A reports the effects of the policy on
children’s skills for both the moved and receiving children. For each group, I report
the baseline as well as the counterfactual skill dynamics. To assess the importance
of equilibrium effects, I also report the counterfactual results without any dynamic
equilibrium effects (column called “No Equilibrium”). In this case, I just solve the
parent’s behavioral problem without considering any equilibrium feedback effects from
the endogenous response of other parents’ behavior after the policy change. The first
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finding is that this policy has small effects for the receiving children, with a minimal
decrease in skills at age 16 of 3%. On the other hand, I find that moved children
increase their skills at age 16, on average, by 55% (0.4 of a standard deviation of
children’s skills at age 16). 40
Panel B in Table 3.10 shows the effects of the policy change on parental investment
decisions. I find that parents of moved children increase their investments overall,
fostering the effects of the policy on their own child’s skills dynamics. On the other
hand, parents of receiving children do not respond to changes in peer composition.
Table 3.10 displays the effects for the larger policy. Panel A in Table 3.10 reports
the effects of the policy on children’s skills also for the remained children. In this case,
the policy creates winners and losers: an average increase in skills at age 16 of 31%
and 23%, respectively, for moved and remaining children is associated with an average
decline of 15% in receiving children. An alternative interpretation of the results
is in terms of the standard deviation of skills distribution: I find that moved and
remaining children increase their log-skills on average by 0.22 and 0.17, respectively,
of a standard deviation of children’s log-skills at age 16, while, on average, log-skills
for receiving children decrease approximately by 0.10 of a standard deviation. The
results suggest that children who remained in the sending environment benefit from
the outflow of the most disadvantaged companions.
Panel B in Table 3.10 shows the effects of the policy change on parental investment
decisions. I find that parents of receiving children reduce their engagement with
children due to a lower expected level of peers’ skills. On the contrary, parents of
moved and remaining children increase their investments due to the policy (positive)
change in the expected future peers. Indeed, as suggested by the instrumental variable
results, a positive (negative) permanent change in peer composition induces a positive
40The national population’s standard deviation of children’s log-skills at age 16 is 1.37
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(negative) change in investments due to the dynamic complementarity. Figure 3.7
illustrates how the policy change has affected the equilibrium endogenous distribution
of peers’ skills and the relative parents’ expectations, causing parents with better
(worse) expectations to increase (decrease) their investments.
Finally, Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 underline the importance of accounting for equi-
librium effects in this type of policy analysis. I find that equilibrium feedback effects
tend to amplify the policy effects, and ignoring those would lead to biased policy
predictions for children’s final skills of approximately seven times smaller. Part of
this gap is due to the erroneous predictions for investment decisions: in the absence
of dynamic-equilibrium feedback effects, the static complementarity between parents
and peers dominates the dynamic effects of the policy. In this case, a positive (nega-
tive) change in peer composition induces a negative (positive) change in investments.
Heterogenous Effects
In this section, I analyze whether the larger counterfactual policy (when the moved
children group is 30% of the receiving cohort) generates heterogeneous effects between
children due to the new counterfactual social network. I focus my attention to the
two sources of potential homophily bias: skills and race. Figure 3.8 shows the return
of policy (treatment effect) in % of skills at age 16 for different children in terms
of their initial endowment of skills at age 13. The x-axis displays the percentiles of
initial skill endowment for each subgroup. I find that children with lower skills at
age 13 benefit the most when moved to a better environment. The treatment effect
for children in the first decile of skills within the group of moved children is between
32%-35% in skills at age 16 (approximately 0.25 of a standard deviation for log-skills
at age 16). This result is clear evidence of the role of segregated social interactions
in child development: in the absence of context-specific network formation, the CES
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technology in (3.4) would predict that return of policy would increase in a child’s
endowment. 41 However, a discontinuous policy-induced change in peers creates
higher benefits for children who are moved away from adverse social interactions. The
policy induces a lower return for children with better initial skills, with the bottom of
the effects of approximately 24% for children above the median of the moved group.
The heterogeneous effects in Figure 3.8 for receiving children reveal the importance
of the counterfactual endogenous network formation. I find that children in the lower
part of the skills distribution have the most sizable adverse effects within the group of
receiving children. The treatment effect in this case is -0.14 of a standard deviation
of log-skills at age 16. In fact, this group of children is the most exposed to social
interactions with the new potential peers. For the same reason as the counterfactual
change in social interactions, Figure 3.8 suggests that the policy return for children
in the sending (low-income) environment are higher for low-skilled children, with a
policy effect of approximately 0.20 of a standard deviation of log-skills at age 16 for
children in the first skill decile, in contrast with 0.13 of a standard deviation for
children in the highest decile.
Evidence from previous empirical studies indicates a potential racial difference in
peer effects in children, pointing out that peer effects seem to be stronger intra-race
and for minorities (see for example Hoxby, 2000; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Imberman
et al., 2012). 42 My quantitative exercise confirms the previous literature’s results.
Table 3.11 shows the decomposed results for receiving children by race. Children
from minority groups are most adversely affected by the policy, with a reduction of
41This is because of the assumed complementarity between a child’s endowment and other inputs:
∂2θt+1
∂θt∂Hi,t
≥ 0.
42Imberman et al. (2012) exploit the Katrina natural experiment to evaluate peer effects in receiv-
ing schools in Louisiana and Houston. The authors find negative peer effects on school attendance,
disciplinary infractions and math scores for black children, although the last effect is statistically
imprecise
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approximately 42% and 35% (-0.30 and -0.25 of a standard deviation) of log-skills
at age 16 for black and Hispanic children, respectively. On the other hand, I find
that the effects on white children are smaller, with a reduction of log-skills at age
16, on average, of approximately 11% (0.08 of a standard deviation). 43 Panel B
in Table 3.11 shows the counterfactual parental investment behavior. Again, groups
that are more exposed to the permanent change in cohort composition (through
homophily bias in social interactions) sizably reduce their parental involvement due
to the dynamic complementarity between their current choice and the expected future
peers.
The Scale Effects of Policy
During the previous policy analysis, I analyzed the effects of moving two different frac-
tions of disadvantaged children into a high-income environment: 5% and 30% of the
receiving population. Equilibrium effects on both receiving and sending environments
were quantitatively different. In this section, I analyze the different implications for
the same counterfactual policy as a function of different fractions of moved children.
Specifically defining the original moved group as the eligible children, I now compute
the equilibrium effects of the policy relative to the fraction of eligible children who
are actually moved.
Figure 3.9 reports the average effects on children’s log-skills at age 16 in the
counterfactual economy as a function of the fraction of eligible moved children (x-
axis) for the three subgroups of interest (moved, receiving and remaining children).
The first result is that both the moved and receiving children are better off if the
policy provides a relatively small group of moved children. For moved children, the
43The heterogeneous treatment effects by race for the smaller policy are qualitatively similar, see
Table B.4
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return of the policy rapidly drops as the fraction of eligible children rises in the new
environment. Moving 3% or 30% of children creates a difference of approximately 20%
in the final skills for moved children. This suggests that the probability of children
from the same original environment continuing to interact with each other in the new
social context is still high. For the receiving children, the decline is more gradual.
The total change between moving nobody versus moving 30% of eligible children
is approximately 15%, and it monotonically declines as more eligible children are
moved into the environment. The second result is that the remaining children gain
increasingly more out of the policy if the fraction of disadvantaged children who
are moved out from that environment increases. A gain of 40% is guaranteed for
remaining children if 30% of children are moved out from that environment. An
increased outflow of the most disadvantaged children from the sending environment
benefits children who remain, which is a result of the positive effects of the new peers’
skills.
3.9.2 The Persistent Effects of Social Environments on Skills Dynamics
The last quantitative analysis focuses on underlining the persistent effects on skill
dynamics of growing up in disadvantaged environments. To answer this question,
I perform a simulated counterfactual policy which targets the same disadvantaged
group of children as before, but now I boost their initial endowment at age 13 while
keeping them living in the low-income environment. I compare their dynamics of
skills throughout childhood with children with similar initial skills but living in better
environments.
Table 3.12 reports the counterfactual results. I find that living in different social
contexts permanently shapes the developmental trajectories of children. In partic-
ular, after starting from the same initial endowment, the dynamics of skills in the
149
disadvantaged environment fail to keep up with the skills dynamics of children from
the high-income environment. The growth rate of skills is approximately 60% higher
for children in the higher-income environment during the age of 13–14 years, while
at the end, the two groups’ growth rates in skill converge. This leads to a total
difference, at age 16, of approximately 57% in final skills.
Social interactions and children’s skills composition play an important role in
explaining this result. First, children living in the low-income environment have,
on average, lower-skilled peers than children living in the high-income environment.
Secondly, the two different social contexts determine parents’ different expectations
about their child’s social interactions with peers, thus affecting their investment be-
havior.
Panel B in Table 3.12 shows that parents increase engagements with their off-
spring as the result of a higher initial skill endowment of their child. However, they
are far from the parental investment levels of parents in high-income environments.
The difference is approximately between 4 and 6 percentage points in terms of time
allocated to child development. Figure 3.10 shows that part of this investment gap
is due to differences in the expected peer effects throughout childhood. Hence, social
influences determine patterns of skill inequality and, again, one key mechanism is the
dynamic complementarity between parents and expected peers.
3.10 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of children’s social interactions in the dynamics of
children’s skills. I estimate a tractable dynamic equilibrium model of parental in-
vestment and endogenous formation of peer groups. The model is estimated using
information about friendships, children’s test scores and parental investments in the
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). I exploit within
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school / across cohort variations in peers’ composition to identify the degree of com-
plementarity between parents and peers in producing a child’s skills. I find that
parents and peers are static substitutes and dynamic complementary inputs in child
development. After validating my estimated model using findings in Chetty and Hen-
dren (2016a) on environment exposure effects in children, I assess the importance of
social interactions in skills dynamics with various policies.
This article underlines three main points: (i) social interactions and social context
permanently shape the developmental trajectories of children; (ii) changing cohort
composition and the relative social interactions generates winners and losers and
the heterogeneous effects are due to the endogenous formation of new peers; (iii)
neglecting the dynamic equilibrium effects of skill formation and social interactions
would lead to biased predicted effects of policies.
I want to conclude this paper by considering an extension of this work. Specifically,
one potential type of parental investment can be the choice of neighborhood where the
family lives. In this case, parents have alternative margins in response to changes in
peer composition, and to a certain extent, they can also decide to change where they
live as a response to the previously considered policy. Modeling this second channel
is challenging, because now the environment composition is also endogenous, and it
becomes part of the equilibrium solution of the model. However, understanding the
extent to which neighborhood decisions are influenced by children’s social interactions
is an important question in considering the effects of socioeconomic segregation on
intergenerational mobility. Therefore, future work is needed.
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Table 3.1: Sample Statistics
Mean Standard
Deviation
(1) (2)
Child’s Age 15.65 1.74
Fraction black 0.16 0.37
Fraction hispanic 0.17 0.38
Fraction white 0.67 0.47
N of reported friends (In-School) 4.48 3.58
Measures for skills:
PPVT 64.26 11.14
English 2.83 0.98
Math 2.72 1.03
History 2.86 1.01
Science 2.82 1.01
Family’s characteristics:
Income ($ 1994) 42,844 27,724
Mother’s education 13.13 2.35
Measures for parental investments :
(activities in the last 4 weeks with mother)
Gone shopping 0.72 0.44
Played a sport 0.08 0.28
Gone to a religious service 0.38 0.49
Talked about someone you are dating 0.47 0.50
(or a party you went to )
Gone to a movie, play, museum, concert, or sports event 0.25 0.44
Had a talk about a personal problem you were having 0.39 0.49
Had a serious argument about your behavior 0.33 0.47
Talked about your school work or grades 0.63 0.48
Worked on a project for school 0.13 0.34
Talked about other things you are doing in school 0.54 0.50
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample I use in the estimation of
the model. The number of reported friends is the number of nominated friends during the
survey. The measures for parental investments are binary variables, which take value one if
the activity was done, zero otherwise.
Data source: National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
152
Table 3.2: Parental Investments, Child’s and Peers’ Skills
Dependent Variable
Fraction (%) of Invested Parental Time
(1) (2)
Measurement Error Adjusted Measurement Error Adjusted
and
Instrumental Variables (IV)
Child Skills (Log) 2.660 2.120
(0.316) (0.668)
Peers’ Skills (Log) -1.441 0.720
(0.650) (0.354)
N of Children 14,267 14,267
Age Fixed Effects X X
School’s Fixed Effects X X
Panel B: First Stage
Z1,i,t (Minorities Children) -0.104
(0.052)
Z2,i,t (White Children) 0.082
(0.037)
F-Stat Excl. Instruments 11.78
P-value 0.000
Notes: This table shows estimates for both model 3.2 (column 1) and 3.2 (column 2). The dependent variable
is the fraction of invested parental time at age t and the covariates (log skills and log peers’ skills) are at
also at time t. All models also include controls for children’s race, mother’s skills and lagged family income.
Standard errors in parenthesis are computing using a cluster bootstrap. The first stage statistics in column
2 shows the coefficients (and standard errors in parenthesis) of both excluded instruments for the first stage
as well as the F-statistic of the joint null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero. Stock and Yogo provide
critical values to test weak IV condition based on the F-stat of excluded instruments. Those critical values
can be interpreted as a test with a 5 % significance level, of the hypothesis that the maximum relative bias
(with respect to the OLS estimates) is 10% or at least 15%. In this case, the Stock and Yogo critical values
for the F-stat of the excluded instruments are 19.93 (10%) and 11.59 (15%).
Data source: National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
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Table 3.3: Estimates for the Network Formation Model
Parameter Estimate S.E.
Constant (δ1) -0.246 0.0172
Child‘s Log-Skills (δ2) 0.088 0.0048
Black (δ3,1) 0.075 0.0023
Hispanic (δ3,2) -0.005 0.0001
Both Black (δ4,1) 0.763 0.0317
Both Hispanic (δ4,2) 0.701 0.0298
Both White (δ4,3) 0.559 0.0475
Distance in Children‘s Skills (δ5) -0.038 0.0014
N of Children (Hundreds, δ6,1) -0.890 0.0003
N of Children Squared (Hundreds, δ6,2) 0.001 0.0000
Distance in Children‘s Skills · %White (δ6,3) - 0.063 0.0032
Distance in Children‘s Skills · %Black (δ6,4) 0.042 0.0025
Age (δ7) -0.050 0.0010
Additional Unobserved Heterogeneity (ζi,j,t)
Correlation with Skill Shocks -0.404 0.0212
Standard Deviation 0.110 0.0095
Notes: This table shows the structural estimates for the child’s utility for
friendships in Equation (3.5). The child’s utility shock is defined as νi,j,t =
ν˜i,j,t + ζi,j,t, where ζi,j,t and is correlated with the production function shock
(ξi,t). The last part of the table shows the estimated correlation and standard
deviation σζ . The standard errors are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
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Table 3.4: Estimates for the Technology of Skill Formation
Parameter Estimate S.E.
Child‘s Skills (α1) 0.744 0.0682
Investments (Yearly Hours, α2) 0.009 0.0014
Elasticity Investment vs Peers (α3) 0.944 0.0270
Return to Scale (α4) 0.767 0.0283
Std of Shocks (σξ) 0.700 0.0461
Panel B: TFP
Constant (γ0,tfp) -1.329 0.1256
Neighborhood Quality (γ1,tfp) 0.008 0.0003
Age Trend (γ2,tfp) 0.030 0.0008
Panel C: School-Quality Effects
Low Income Neighborhood
Mean (ηs,1) -0.033 0.0350
Standard Deviation (σs,1) 0.262 0.0264
Medium Income Neighborhood
Mean (ηs,2) 0.006 0.0277
Standard Deviation (σs,2) 0.244 0.0278
High Income Neighborhood
Mean (ηs,3) 0.041 0.0318
Standard Deviation (σs,3) 0.188 0.0249
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the technology of children
skill formation in Equation (3.17). Panel B reports the parameter
estimates for the neighborhood-specific TFP defined in Section 3.5.2.
Panel C reports the mean and standard deviation of school-quality
for each neighborhood type. The standard errors are computed using
a cluster bootstrap.
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Table 3.5: Estimates for the Preferences and Income Variables
Parameter Estimate S.E.
Panel A: Auxiliary Coefficients for Investments
Curvature on consumption (γ1) 0.786 0.0046
Weight on Child‘s Skills (γ2) 0.901 0.0030
Weight on Final Child‘s Skills (γ4) 2.475 0.2455
Curvature on Child‘s Skills (γ3) 0.562 0.0256
Curvature on Final Child‘s Skills (γ5) 0.465 0.0011
Panel B: Parameters of Labor and Non-Labor Income
Constant (Wage, κ1,0) 2.750 0.0067
Mother‘s Skills (Wage, κ1,1) 0.438 0.0048
Constant (Non-Labor Income, κ2,0) 9.992 0.0174
Mother‘s Skills (Non-Labor Income, κ2,1) 1.033 0.0113
Notes: Panel A shows the estimates for the utility parameters in Equation
(3.9). Panel B reports the estimates for the wage and income process de-
scribed in Section 3.5.2. The standard errors are computed using a cluster
bootstrap.
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Table 3.6: Estimates for Initial Conditions
Panel A: Mean Initial Child‘s and Mother‘s Skills
Neighborhood 1 Neighborhood 2 Neighborhood 3
Child Mother Child Mother Child Mother
Black -0.47 -0.07 -0.40 0.36 -0.30 0.44
(0.08) (0.15) (0.27) (0.25) (0.29) (0.20)
Hispanic -0.49 -0.93 -0.48 -0.77 -0.34 -0.36
(0.11) (0.19) (0.26) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19)
White 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.26 0.22 0.58
(-) (-) (0.24) (0.18) (0.24) (0.19)
Panel B: Variance-Covariance Initial Child‘s and Mother‘s Skills
Neighborhood 1 Neighborhood 2 Neighborhood 3
Child Mother Child Mother Child Mother
0.65 0.87 0.89
(0.05) (0.08) (0.15)
Black 0.20 0.61 0.31 0.67 0.30 0.64
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14)
0.84 1.10 0.78
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
Hispanic 0.22 1.59 0.26 1.58 0.28 1.33
(0.08) (0.32) (0.08) (0.35) (0.10) (0.34)
1.00 1.09 0.99
(-) (0.09) (0.13)
White 0.48 1.00 0.37 0.74 0.36 0.78
(0.07) (-) (0.04) (0.19) (0.06) (0.17)
Notes: This table shows the estimates of initial conditions parameters by neighborhood-
quality type (low-medium-high income) and race as described in Equation (3.16). The
standard errors are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
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Table 3.7: Model Validation from Exposure Effects in Children from Chetty and
Hendren (2016a)
Panel A: Exposure Effects
Baseline
Chetty-Hendren Model
Neighborhood Exposure Effect 0.044 0.048
(0.008)
Panel B: Exposure Effects by Parental Income
Below Above
Median Median
Income Income
Chetty-Hendren Model Chetty-Hendren Model
Neighborhood Exposure Effect 0.031 0.023 0.047 0.047
(0.003) (0.003)
Notes: This table shows the comparison between model’s predictions and findings in Chetty and
Hendren (2016a) about the childhood exposure effects (baseline and heterogeneous effects by family
income).
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Table 3.8: Decomposition of Exposure Effects: Peers, School Quality and Neighbor-
hood Quality
Panel A: Baseline Decomposition
Baseline Decomposition
Overall Peers Peers + Peers +
School Quality School Quality +
Neighborhood Quality
Exposure Effect 0.048 0.027 0.038 0.048
(Percent) (+55.58%) (+23.81%) (+20.60%)
Panel B: Decomposition for Disadvantaged Children
Baseline Decomposition
Overall Peers Peers + Peers +
School Quality School Quality +
Neighborhood Quality
Low Family Income 0.056 0.034 0.046 0.056
(Percent) (+61.49%) (+20.13%) (+18.38%)
Low Skills 0.054 0.030 0.042 0.054
(Percent) (+56.40%) (+22.54%) (+21.05%)
Notes: This table shows the decomposition of childhood exposure effects in Chetty and Hendren (2016a)
by: peers, school and neighborhood quality. Panel B shows the decomposition for disadvantaged children
(both in terms of family income and child’s skills).
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Table 3.9: Counterfactual Effects on Skills and Investments (moved children are 5%
of the receiving cohort)
Panel A: Effects on Children‘s Log-Skills (Mean)
Moved Children Receiving Children
Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium)
Age 13 -0.94 -0.94 -0.94 Age 13 0.12 0.12 0.12
Age 14 -0.43 -0.23 -0.38 Age 14 0.87 0.85 0.87
Age 15 0.12 0.48 0.23 Age 15 1.55 1.52 1.55
Age 16 0.45 1.00 0.76 Age 16 2.12 2.09 2.11
Panel B: Effects on Parent‘s Investment Decision (Mean)
Moved Children Receiving Children
Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium)
Age 13 17.73 22.16 17.22 Age 13 26.75 26.34 26.86
Age 14 17.50 21.32 16.33 Age 14 26.63 26.37 26.97
Age 15 10.83 10.48 9.18 Age 15 22.99 23.07 23.26
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual policy effects for moved and receiving when a fraction of moved children (5%
of the receiving population) are moved into a high-income environment. For each subgroup, I compare the baseline results
with the policy predictions (equilibrium effects). I also compute the predicted policy effects without equilibrium effects. The
latter one is the predicted policy effects if I ignore equilibrium adjustments after the policy implementations. Panel B focus
on the investments decisions for moved and receiving children. For each subgroup, I compare the mean predicted parental
investments in the baseline case with the equilibrium and no-equilibrium effects.
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Table 3.10: Counterfactual Effects on Skills and Investments (moved children are 30% of the receiving cohort)
Panel A: Effects on Children‘s Log-Skills (Mean)
Moved Children Receiving Children Remained Children
Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium)
Age 13 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 Age 13 0.12 0.12 0.12 Age 13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Age 14 -0.37 -0.28 -0.33 Age 14 0.87 0.80 0.87 Age 14 0.42 0.52 0.43
Age 15 0.24 0.40 0.34 Age 15 1.55 1.43 1.55 Age 15 0.87 1.05 0.88
Age 16 0.53 0.84 0.80 Age 16 2.12 1.97 2.11 Age 16 1.26 1.49 1.29
Panel B: Effects on Parent‘s Investment Decision (Mean)
Moved Children Receiving Children Remained Children
Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (No Equilibrium)
Age 13 17.89 19.52 17.89 Age 13 26.75 24.74 27.22 Age 13 18.57 21.00 18.04
Age 14 18.00 18.62 17.15 Age 14 26.63 24.84 27.72 Age 14 18.84 21.16 18.16
Age 15 11.77 11.35 10.98 Age 15 22.99 22.82 23.92 Age 15 18.11 18.69 17.53
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual policy effects for moved and receiving when a fraction of moved children (30% of the receiving population) are moved into a high-income
environment. For each subgroup, I compare the baseline results with the policy predictions (equilibrium effects). I also compute the predicted policy effects without equilibrium effects. The
latter one is the predicted policy effects if I ignore equilibrium adjustments after the policy implementations. Panel B focus on the investments decisions for moved, receiving and remained
children. For each subgroup, I compare the mean predicted parental investments in the baseline case with the equilibrium and no-equilibrium effects.
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Table 3.11: Counterfactual Effects on Receiving Children by Race (moved children
are 30% of the receiving cohort)
Panel A: Effects on Children‘s Log-Skills (Mean)
Black Hispanic White
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (Equilibrium)
Age 13 -0.30 -0.30 Age 13 -0.34 -0.34 Age 13 0.22 0.22
Age 14 0.28 0.08 Age 14 0.45 0.30 Age 14 0.97 0.93
Age 15 0.96 0.61 Age 15 1.08 0.81 Age 15 1.66 1.58
Age 16 1.49 1.07 Age 16 1.59 1.24 Age 16 2.24 2.13
Panel B: Effects on Parent‘s Investment Decision (Mean)
Black Hispanic White
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (Equilibrium)
Age 13 20.09 15.30 Age 13 21.97 17.72 Age 13 27.92 26.41
Age 14 18.85 14.46 Age 14 20.67 16.62 Age 14 28.02 26.72
Age 15 16.32 14.97 Age 15 16.69 14.99 Age 15 24.29 24.40
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual policy effects for receiving children (by race) when a fraction of moved children (30% of the
receiving population) are moved into a high-income environment. For each subgroup, I compare the baseline results in skills and parental
investments (Panel B) with the equilibrium counterfactual predictions.
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Table 3.12: Counterfactual Effects on Skills and Investments of Earlier Interventions
Panel A: Effects on Children‘s Log-Skills (Mean)
Baseline Counterfactual Similar Children in Richer Environment
Age 13 -1.00 0.46 0.46
Age 14 -0.37 0.85 1.09
Age 15 0.24 1.31 1.74
Age 16 0.53 1.73 2.31
Panel B: Effects on Parent‘s Investment Decision (Mean)
Baseline Counterfactual Similar Children in Richer Environment
Age 13 17.89 20.82 26.47
Age 14 18.01 20.76 26.20
Age 15 11.77 20.24 24.85
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual policy effects of fostering initial skills (age 13) in
skill formation and parental investments (Panel B) for disadvantaged children. Column 1 and
2 report the baseline and counterfactual predictions. Column 3 reports the dynamics of skills
and parental investments for children with same mean initial skills at age 13 but who are living
in the high-income environment.
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Figure 3.1: Homophily in Network Formation by Race
Notes: This figure displays analysis on network formation using the homophily index
(see Coleman (1958)). In detail, letting fx,s be the average fraction of friends who
are of the same race x at school s and qx,s to be the total fraction of children of race
x in a given school s, the homophily-bias index looks as HBIx,s =
fx,s
qx,s
.
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Figure 3.2: Homophily in Network Formation by Skills
Notes: This figure displays analysis on network formation using the homophily index (see Coleman (1958)). In detail,
letting fx,s be the average fraction of friends who are of similar skills level x at school s and qx,s to be the total fraction
of similar children with skills level x in a given school s, the homophily-bias index looks as HBIx,s =
fx,s
qx,s
.
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Figure 3.3: First Stage Graphs
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(a) First instrument: Fraction of Minority Children
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(b) Second instrument: Fraction of White Children
Notes: This figure shows graphically the first stage effects of the instrumental variables. Both graphs show the within-school variation
of IV (x-axis) and the peers’ skills (y-axes). Solid lines represents a linear regression of peer’s skills on each of the two instrumental
variables, after controlling for school fixed effects and all the covariates in Table 3.2. Dashed lines show 90% confidence intervals. The
plotted values on the background show the overall variation of both instrumental variables (top and bottom 1% excluded).
166
Figure 3.4: The Probability Two Children Become Friends by Skills and Race
(a) Low Skill (First Quartile) Black Children (b) Low Skill (First Quartile) White Children
This figure displays the probability that two children become friends by children skills and race. Figure (a) shows the marginal probability for
a black child with low skills (in the first quartile of skill distribution at age 14) to become friends with different children over the spectrum of
skills and for different races. Figure (b) shows the same graph but for a white child with low skills (in the first quartile of skill distribution at
age 14).
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Figure 3.5: Model Validation from Exposure Effects in Children from Chetty and
Hendren (2016a)
Notes: This figure displays the comparison between model’s predictions and findings
in Chetty and Hendren (2016a) about childhood exposure effects.
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Figure 3.6: Decomposition Exposure Effects for Disadvantaged Children
Notes: This figure displays the graphical decomposition for disadvantaged children of
childhood exposure effects by: peers, school and neighborhood quality.
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Figure 3.7: Peers’ Skills Distribution (Baseline vs Counterfactual Economy)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium distribution of peers’ skills for moved and receiving children by age, before and after the policy is
implemented. Parent’s expectations about future peers’ skills are based on the above distributions. The policy moved a fraction of disadvantaged
children into a high-income environment (approximately 30% of the population of the receiving cohort).
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Figure 3.8: Treatment Effect by Skills (Moved-Receiving-Remained Children)
Notes: This figure shows the heterogeneous treatment effects on child’s age 16 skills by initial (age 13) child’s skills percentile for moved,
receiving and remained children. The policy moved a fraction of disadvantaged children into a high-income environment (approximately 30%
of the population of the receiving cohort).
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Figure 3.9: Treatment Effect by Fraction of Moved Eligible Children (Moved-Receiving-Remained Children)
Notes: This figure shows the effect of the size of moved children for the policy returns for moved, receiving and remained children. Eligible
children live in low-income environments and are below first quartile of age 13 skill distribution.
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Figure 3.10: Peers’ Skills Distribution (Low-Income vs High-Income)
Notes: This figure shows the equilibrium distribution of peers’ skills for the children who received the initial boost of skills but still live in the
low-income environment and their similar counterpart living in high-income environment. Parent’s expectations about future peers’ skills are
based on the above distributions.
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Chapter 4
CHILD DEVELOPMENT, FAMILY INCOME AND MATERNAL LABOR
SUPPLY (WITH GIUSEPPE SORRENTI)
4.1 Introduction
Poverty represents one of the major threats to child development. In 2015, about
15 million children in the United States (21 percent of all children) were living in fam-
ilies with incomes below the federal poverty threshold (National Center for Children
in Poverty, 2015). What effect does growing up in a disadvantaged family have on
a child’s achievements, and how can living conditions be improved to promote child
development?
Support programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the Food Stamp
Program, and the Child Tax Credit attempt to reduce family poverty and especially
that experienced by children. Many of these programs (e.g. the EITC) provide cash
transfers on the condition that the recipient works (conditional cash transfers). Such
conditions might shape child development by introducing a trade-off between the
income effect, due to a surge in family income, and the substitution effect, due possibly
to parental labor supply responses and a decrease in time parents spend with their
child.
The arising trade-off poses an important question: is the change in family income
more important than time spent with parents in shaping child development? In this
study we answer this question by appraising the contemporaneous effect of changes in
family income and maternal labor supply on cognitive and behavioral development of
children. We implement an instrumental variable (IV) approach exploiting changes
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in the EITC benefits over time and shocks in the local labor demand as instruments
for family income and maternal labor supply. In this sense, we bridge the gap be-
tween the literature dealing with the estimate of the effect of family income on child
development and the literature on the effect of maternal labor supply and child-with-
parents time. Moreover, we provide important insights on what policies can foster
maternal employment and child development contemporaneously.
Family income is an important predictor of a child’s success and future oppor-
tunities. Figure 4.1 shows the wide dispersion in children’s achievements by family
income. Both cognitive (Panel A) and behavioral (Panel B) development measures
exhibit a steep income gradient, with high-achieving children placed in the top deciles
of the after-tax family income distribution. The impact of family income on child de-
velopment has been widely debated by economists. Previous studies such as Duncan
et al. (2011), Levy and Duncan (1999), and Blau (1999) have found a positive relation
between family economic conditions during childhood and child achievements. More
recently, works such as Løken et al. (2012) and Dahl and Lochner (2012b) employ
instrumental variable techniques to confirm this positive effect in Norway and in the
U.S., respectively.
In addition to studies regarding the income effect, a vast body of economic litera-
ture associates maternal labor supply during childhood with possible negative effects
on child development and future opportunities (Baum, 2003; Ruhm, 2004; Bernal,
2008; Carneiro and Rodriguez, 2009; Bernal and Keane, 2011; Hsin and Felfe, 2014;
Carneiro et al., 2015; Del Bono et al., 2016; Fort et al., 2017). As examples, according
to Bernal and Keane (2011) each year of child care (versus maternal time input) be-
fore age 6 decreases test scores by 2.1 percent (0.11 standard deviations). Similarly,
Carneiro et al. (2015) estimate that the probability of dropping out of high school
decreases by 2 percent and wages increase by 5 percent at age 30 with the more time
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mothers spend with their children in the first months of life.
This paper reconciles these strands of the literature. For most families, an increase
in income is due to an increase in maternal labor supply. In this case, a surge
in monetary resources is associated with a potential decline in the time the mother
spends with her offspring. To understand the possible trade-off between family income
and maternal labor supply, we build upon the empirical model in Dahl and Lochner
(2012b) by considering not only the role of family income but also the role of maternal
hours worked in shaping child development. 1 The work by Dahl and Lochner
(2012b) exploits quasi-experimental variation in the EITC to analyze the causal effect
of family income on child achievement. However, the EITC is designed to incentivize
individuals (including mothers) to work. 2 Mothers, and especially single mothers,
are usually the main target group of these welfare programs and are most responsive
to incentives (Meyer, 2002; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Blundell et al., 2016). This
affects the maternal allocation of time between working and parenting, with potential
effects on children’s test scores. More precisely, endogenous labor supply responses
affect child development through two channels. An increase in maternal hours worked
generates an income effect, with additional resources coming from a boost in labor
income. At the same time, changes in maternal hours worked can also generate
a substitution effect, with changes in the time that mothers allocate to child care
(Heckman and Mosso, 2014a; Del Boca et al., 2014a). Moreover, this paper is related
to previous works that consider the effect of time and monetary resources on children
by estimating a structural model of household choices and child development (see Del
1Dahl and Lochner (2017), after the analysis by Lundstrom (2017), adjust for a coding error in
their previous work in the creation of the after-tax total family income. The results of the original
and reviewed studies are similar.
2Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Nichols and Rothstein (2016) summarize theoretical and empirical
findings about the effect of the EITC on maternal labor supply. Blundell et al. (2016) analyze the
case of the U.K. and find substantial elasticities for women’s labor supply (in particular for the
group of single mothers).
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Boca et al., 2014a; Mullins, 2016).
An additional contribution of our study relates to the broad definition used for
child development. While many works (see Dahl and Lochner, 2012b; Del Boca et al.,
2014a) exclusively focus on test scores for cognitive achievements, we extend the anal-
ysis to proxies for child noncognitive development. 3 As stated by Heckman and
Rubinstein (2001), standard test scores only capture some of the multiple skills de-
termining individual success and well-being. Moreover, early childhood interventions
that boost personal traits such as self-discipline or motivation are usually deemed as
extremely effective (Heckman, 2000). Socio-emotional skills are often more predictive
of later-life success than cognitive skills. 4
Our empirical analysis is based on the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979
(NLSY79) data set matched with its Children (NLSY79-C) section. This combined
data set provides longitudinal information about measures of child development, fam-
ily income, and hours worked by the mother. At the same time, the longitudinal
structure allows us to account for individual unobserved heterogeneity through child
fixed effects. Cognitive development is measured through children’s achievements on
the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), a set of tests assessing proficiency
in mathematics and reading. To study noncognitive development, we take advantage
of the Behavior Problems Index (BPI). This comprehensive index is comprised of
several different indicators for behavior such as aggressiveness or hyperactivity that
are likely to shape children’s future life opportunities.
Given the strong interdependence between maternal labor supply and family in-
3We also explore features related to early childhood development (1–7 years old).
4For example, data from the Perry Preschool Program, a high-quality U.S. preschool education
program, suggest that increased academic motivation generates 30 percent of the effects on achieve-
ment and 40 percent on employment for females. Reduced externalizing behavior decreases lifetime
violent crime by 65 percent, lifetime arrests by 40 percent, and unemployment by 20 percent. Visit
heckmanequation.org/resource/early-childhood-education-quality-and-access-pay-off/ for a discus-
sion of these results.
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come, there is no suitable identifying source of variation that is likely to exclusively
affect one variable of interest. Hence, in order to identify the single causal effect of
either family income or maternal labor supply on child development, it is necessary
to allow for the endogeneity of both inputs. To deal with this challenge, we exploit
two instrumental variables. The first instrument is based on the longitudinal changes
in monetary benefits of the EITC, one of the largest U.S. federal income support
programs. This variation provides us with exogenous changes in family resources to
allocate in child development. At the same time, only working people are eligible for
EITC benefits, creating incentives for mothers to work. The second instrument is
constructed by using longitudinal shocks in the local labor market demand. Shifts in
local demand for labor affect equilibrium prices (wages) and, subsequently, the family
income resources and the equilibrium labor quantity. 5
Our instrumental variable analysis suggests different results for cognitive and be-
havioral development. An additional $1,000 in family income improves cognitive
development by 4.4 percent of a standard deviation. 6 The same income change has
no effect on child behavioral development. An additional $1,000 improves behavioral
development by 1.3 percent of a standard deviation, and the result is not statistically
significant.
We find that the income effect is counterbalanced by a negative effect of hours
worked by the mother on child development. An increase in maternal labor supply of
100 hours per year causes a statistically significant decrease in both child cognitive
5We provide evidence throughout the paper that both identifying sources of variation do not con-
found other contemporaneous state-specific factors, like state-specific trends in children’s achieve-
ments or changes in the per-pupil financial resources of schools in different states. Moreover, in the
spirit of Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017), we assess the validity of our labor demand shock instru-
ment by formally testing for any parallel pre-trends between the instrument and child development.
We reject the hypothesis of the existence of any pre-trends.
6This result is in line with the findings of Dahl and Lochner (2012b) and Dahl and Lochner
(2017).
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and behavioral development by approximately -6 percent and -5 percent of a standard
deviation. The strong negative impact of the number of hours worked by the mother,
both in terms of cognitive test scores and behavioral problems, encourages the debate
in a new dimension: how to address concerns about the effect of maternal employment
on child development.
We attempt to answer this question in the last part of our study. By using the
time diary component of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), we illustrate the
mechanism underlying the negative impact of hours worked by the mother on child
development. Similar to Sayer et al. (2004), Guryan et al. (2008), and Fox et al.
(2013), we find that working mothers, conditional on income, invest less time in their
children. As a consequence, labor market conditions play a role in shaping the effect
of labor supply on child development.
We focus on the role of wages and show that, according to our results, an after-
tax hourly wage up to $13.50 makes the substitution effect (less maternal time with
the child) dominant over the income effect (higher earnings). With higher earnings,
families face the option of substituting their decreased time investment with better
and more productive alternatives (e.g. nonparental care, additional schooling, youth
clubs, music activities, etc.).
We look for possible heterogeneous effects in different subgroups in order to high-
light the potential importance of alternative inputs in the child development process.
Behavioral development does not display evidence of heterogeneous impacts of income
or hours worked by the mother. On the contrary, the negative effect of hours worked
by the mother on cognitive development only appears in less educated, low-skilled, or
single mothers. More educated and high-skilled mothers are likely to access to better
nonparental child care options. Moreover, the differences in the labor supply effect
can be reconciled with heterogeneous preferences for child care activities, generating
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different patterns of time allocation between working, child care, and leisure time
(Guryan et al., 2008).
We further investigate these channels by comparing the investment in the child by
maternal employment status and family income. The Child Development Supplement
(CDS) of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) collects detailed information
about a wide set of children’s activities and parental investment for a representative
sample of U.S. families. Results obtained with this data set highlight some evidence
of differential investments as a response to the maternal employment status when
low-income families are compared to high-income families.
Policymakers might obtain several suggestions from our results. First, by showing
the trade-off between the income and substitution effect in terms of child development,
this work speaks to the growing body of literature about the effect of conditional
versus unconditional cash transfers. Many income subsidies worldwide base monetary
transfers on work requirements. In this context, only looking at the effect of income
on child development might lead to biased policy predictions. Our results support
the idea that policies aimed at fostering maternal labor supply can be beneficial to
child development if integrated with specific consideration about a minimum wage
or the taxation of family income. Alternatively, policies that encourage maternal
employment in low-income families should also consider how to guarantee alternative
sources of child care to support child development.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
empirical model and the identification strategy. The data used for the analysis are
presented in Section 4.3, while the results are described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
sheds light on the mechanism underlying the main findings of the work. Section 4.6
concludes.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Empirical Model
Child inputs strongly affect individual development and future opportunities. Our
empirical model aims to capture the impact of family income and maternal hours
worked on child development. We build upon the empirical model considered in Dahl
and Lochner (2012b) by including the hours worked by the mother as an additional
explanatory variable for child achievement. Specifically, our child outcome equation
takes the following form:
yi,t = β0 + α0 t+ α1 Ii,t + α2 Li,t + x
′
i β1,t + x
′
i,t β2 + ηi + ǫi,t , (4.1)
where yi,t represents the child’s outcome in period t.
7 In our empirical analysis,
we focus specifically on both child cognitive and behavioral development. Ii,t and Li,t
reflect the after-tax total family income and the maternal labor supply (hours worked)
at time t. xi and xi,t represent exogenous observed family i fix and time-varying
characteristics. ηi reflects unobserved family specific heterogeneity (which can capture
any permanent unobserved family factor as well as child unobserved ability). We
allow for an age-trend effect in children’s outcomes (α0). Finally, we define ǫi,t as the
additional time-varying unobserved heterogeneity in the child’s outcome, which may
include unobserved child developmental shocks. Taking first differences to eliminate
family fixed effects leads to the following empirical specification:
∆yi,t = α0 + α1∆Ii,t + α2∆Li,t + x
′
iβ1 +∆x
′
i,tβ2 +∆ǫi,t , (4.2)
where β1 = β1,t+1 − β1,t allows us to control for differential growth in children’s out-
comes by observable characteristics (e.g. gender, age, race, etc.). 8 Equation (4.2)
7We consider periods to be the child’s age, and we use these two concepts interchangeably.
8The alternative, more general approach is to allow for a semiparametric model of differential
age effects of observable characteristics on outcome growth by age.
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constitutes the baseline empirical model of this study, while α1 and α2 are the param-
eters identifying the income and maternal labor supply effect on child achievement.
The coefficient α1 expresses the effect of changes in family income on changes in child
achievement, while α2 captures the mother’s labor supply effect on changes in child
achievement.
To recover the parameters in equation (4.2) and to deal with the endogeneity
of both family income and maternal hours worked, we implement an IV estimation
strategy. Children from disadvantaged backgrounds are likely to experience contex-
tual conditions affecting their development in the presence of substantial positive
income shocks. Similarly, changes in maternal labor supply are likely to be linked
to other unobservable characteristics affecting child development. Our IV approach
tackles the endogeneity issues by exploiting two sources of exogenous longitudinal
variation: (i) changes in the EITC benefits, one of the largest federal income support
programs; and (ii) shocks in the local labor market demand.
4.2.2 Instrumental Variables
The identification of equation (4.2) is particularly challenging due to the endogene-
ity of both family income and maternal labor supply. Changes in family resources and
intra-family labor market decisions can be correlated with family-specific unobserved
permanent shocks, which threatens the validity of a standard OLS approach. We deal
with this issue by implementing an IV approach based on two instruments: longitudi-
nal changes in the EITC schedule, and longitudinal variation in labor demand shocks
measured as geographical changes in sectoral compositions of local economies. The
identification of the parameters in our linear specification in equation (4.2) requires
two necessary conditions for the instruments: relevance and exogeneity. Here, we de-
scribe in detail the two instrumental variables. The discussion about the relevance of
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the instruments is postponed to Section 4.4.1, in which the results are presented.
Longitudinal Changes in EITC Benefits
When the EITC was introduced in 1975, it was a modest program that aimed to im-
prove economic and social conditions of low-income families with dependent children.
After its introduction, the EITC was progressively expanded (e.g. in 1986, 1990, 1993,
etc.) to become the largest cash transfer program for low-income families with de-
pendent children (Eissa and Liebman, 1996). In 2013, the total federal EITC reached
$63 billion shared by 27 million individuals. In 2015, the program was responsible for
lifting about 6.5 million people out of poverty, including 3.3 million children (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2016).
The credit is conditioned on three eligibility criteria: (i) the taxpayer needs to
report a positive earned income; (ii) the adjusted gross income and earned income
must be below a certain year-specific threshold; and (iii) the taxpayer needs to have at
least one qualifying child. 9 Therefore, the EITC’s primary incentive is to increase
the labor supply (Nichols and Rothstein, 2016). The provision of work incentives
is typical of many welfare programs, and as shown in Blundell et al. (2016) in the
U.K., mothers, and especially single mothers, are usually the most responsive target
to these incentives.
As shown in Figure 4.2, the EITC income thresholds and benefits have changed
over time. We plot the different amounts of received transfers conditional on after-tax
family income, keeping all the family characteristics (e.g. marital status, number of
dependent children, etc.) fixed. Focusing on a single year, it is possible to observe the
structure of the EITC program and, specifically, the three phases that characterize
the program. In the phase-in, the credit is a pure earnings subsidy. This is followed by
9A few exceptions to the last criterion were introduced in 1994.
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a flat phase after which the credit starts to gradually phase-out. Individual incentives
and behaviors regarding labor supply may differ according to the family structure and
the position on the schedule. In particular, mothers who fall into the phase-out part
of the schedule may have incentive to reduce their hours worked. However, Meyer
(2002) provides evidence, at least for single mothers, that the past expansions in the
EITC schedules did not show this type of response.
Figure 4.2 shows the EITC federal schedule expansions over time. Families with
an after-tax income of around $15,000 received a transfer of around $1,000 in 1987
or 1989. The same families received an amount that was 400 percent higher (around
$4,000) in 1999. We exploit this variation of the EITC schedules over time to predict
changes in family income and changes in maternal labor supply.
We start by showing the premise underlying the EITC’s effects on our variables
of interest. EITC benefits affect family income in two ways: (i) directly through the
tax credit transfer; and (ii) indirectly through labor supply responses. Consider the
following after-tax total family income (Ii,t) decomposition:
Ii,t = wi,t · Li,t(EITCi,t) + I˜i,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ipre−taxi,t
+EITCi,t(I
pre−tax
i,t )− τi,t(Ipre−taxi,t ) , (4.3)
where Ipre−taxi,t represents the pre-tax family income, composed of the mother’s pre-
tax earnings (wi,t · Li,t(·)) and other sources of income (I˜i,t). EITCi,t(·) and τi,t(·)
represent respectively the EITC schedule and income tax schedule as a function of
pre-tax family income.
The IV strategy is based on changes in the EITC schedules over time. However,
directly using changes in received EITC benefits would make the instrument invalid
as a change in the transfer that families receive is a function of both policy changes
in the EITC schedules and the endogenous response in family income. Indeed, family
income endogenously changes in response to several factors such as individual labor
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supply choices, changes in marital status or household structure, etc.
To exploit only policy changes in the EITC schedules, we construct the instru-
mental variable as in Dahl and Lochner (2012b). We calculate the change in EITC
benefits due to changes in the EITC schedules over time based on the predicted fam-
ily income change that would have happened in any case, keeping fixed the family
structure and characteristics to avoid possible endogenous changes in family compo-
sition and characteristics. In this way, our instrumental variable captures only the
longitudinal variation in monetary benefits due to the changes in EITC schedules.
Specifically, our instrument takes the form:
∆EITCIVi,t (I
pre−tax
i,t−1 ) = EITCi,t(Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
]
)− EITCi,t−1(Ipre−taxi,t−1 ) , (4.4)
where Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
]
represents the predicted family income as a function of
lagged pre-tax income. We follow Dahl and Lochner (2012b), and we use a fifth
order polynomial of past income together with an indicator for positive lagged pre-
tax income to predict current pre-tax income. For each family, the predicted changes
over time in the benefits in equation (4.4) are now only a function of changes in
schedules.
However, there is a possible concern underlying the definition of the instrumental
variable in equation (4.4). In a cross-sectional perspective, differences in imputed
changes in EITC benefits are explained by the previous period’s pre-tax family income
(Ipre−taxi,t ), as well as the predicted family income change (Ê
[
∆Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
]
). We
take into account this concern by introducing a control function for family income
(Φ(Ipre−taxi,t−1 )) and augmenting our model specification as follows:
∆yi,t = α0 + α1∆Ii,t + α2∆Li,t + x
′
iβ1 +∆x
′
i,tβ2 + Φ(I
pre−tax
i,t−1 ) + ∆ǫi,t . (4.5)
With the inclusion of the income control function in the model, the validity of our
first instrument relies on the assumption that no unobserved heterogeneity potentially
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correlated with lagged pre-tax family income is left. This condition translates into
the following mean independence condition:
E(∆ǫi,t|∆EITCi,t (Ipre−taxi,t−1 )) = 0 , (4.6)
where ∆ǫi,t represents the error term in equation (4.5). In other words, condition (4.6)
assumes that our control function captures the true relationship between the expected
unobserved heterogeneity and lagged pre-tax income. To fulfill this requirement, we
introduce a generalization of the control function in Dahl and Lochner (2012b) and
we exploit a flexible Taylor expansion of Φ(·) about the point of predicted income for
a fixed EITC schedule change:
Φ(Ipre−taxi,t−1 ) ≈ Φ
(
Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
])
+
k∑
n=1
Φ(n)
(
Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
])
n!
·
(
Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
]− Ipre−taxi,t−1 )n .
(4.7)
The control function in equation (4.7) reconciles with the one implemented in Dahl
and Lochner (2012b) in the limited cases in which they assume the control function
to have the same functional form used to estimate the predicted family income (n = 0
order of approximation and Φ(Ipre−taxi,t−1 ) = Ê
[
Ipre−taxi,t |Ipre−taxi,t−1
]
).
Finally, we discuss a further possible threat related to the use of the EITC in-
strument. EITC changes may induce different responses in maternal labor supply
for particular subpopulations. This can potentially compromise the monotonicity
assumption of the instrument, which allows us to interpret the IV results as the
local average treatment effect (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Monotonicity is an
untestable assumption, but we focus on specific subgroups of our sample that have
potentially different labor supply responses to EITC changes. Specifically, we sepa-
rately focus on heterogeneous responses to the EITC with respect to lagged maternal
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employment status. 10 No evidence of possible nonmonotone responses to EITC
changes arise in our framework, and all the results remain unchanged. At least in
the above-considered dimension, our empirical strategy seems robust to potential
heterogeneous responses in EITC changes.
Labor Demand Shocks
We use as a second instrument the spatial differential effects of long-term aggregate
trends on local labor markets. Different local labor markets are characterized by
different economic sectoral compositions, inducing different expositions to aggregate
structural changes in the economy. Ideally, we would identify differences in exogenous
labor demand changes, unrelated to the supply side, that shift the equilibrium of lo-
cal labor market outcomes. We then could use this variation to predict changes in
family income and mother’s labor supply. Following the approach first developed by
Bartik (1991) and used in many previous empirical works (see for example Blanchard
and Katz, 1992; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Luttmer, 2005; Aizer, 2010; Notowidigdo,
2011; Bertrand et al., 2015; Diamond, 2016; Charles et al., 2015, 2017), we construct
an empirical analogue of the above-mentioned thought experiment by considering the
cross-state differences in industrial composition and aggregate growth in the employ-
ment level.
We exploit heterogeneous labor demand shocks for women by state and educa-
tional attainment. We define a group (or cell) “se” as the aggregation index for
people living in a state s with a level of education e. For each variation unit se,
we create labor demand shocks as national changes in industry-specific employment
rates weighted by the industry female employment share at the baseline year. For our
10Dahl and Lochner (2017) use a similar approach and allow for different effects for EITC changes
relative to the mother’s employment status.
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empirical analysis, we fix the baseline year at 1980, as our empirical analysis focuses
on the period from 1988 to 2000 (see Section 4.3 for more details). 11
Any observation i that belongs to the specific cell se is matched with the following
instrumental variable value:
LabDemShocksIVi,t =
∑
ind
(lnEind,−s,t − lnEind,−s,1980)Eind,se,1980
Ese,1980
, (4.8)
where (lnEind,−s,t − lnEind,−s,1980) is (approximately) the percentage change in the
aggregate employment rate in industry ind relative to 1980. To calculate this statistic
for each state s, we consider all states except state s to avoid possible concerns of
endogeneity (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2017).
Eind,se,1980
Ese,1980
represents the 1980 female
employment share of industry ind for a specific education group e in state s. The
instrumental variable constructed in equation (4.8) can be interpreted as the average
long-term growth in employment rates by state and educational achievement.
Figure 4.3 graphically shows the variation of labor demand we exploit. For the
sake of clarity, we report only the first (1988) and the last year (2000) covered by
our sample and two levels of educational attainment (high school dropout and college
graduate). However, in the empirical analysis, we construct the instrumental variable
for all years of our analysis and for four types of educational levels: high school
dropout, completed high school, some college, and completed college.
Figure 4.3 displays extensive changes in the employment rate over time and be-
tween different states. First, low- and high-educated mothers display opposite dy-
namics in employment rates. High school dropouts experience an overall decline in
employment rate, with an average change of -0.34 percent from 1988 to 2000. On the
contrary, the employment rate for college graduates increased by 0.40 percent from
1988 to 2000. Second, changes in employment rates from 1980 to 2000 are hetero-
11Moreover, we choose the 1980 as the baseline year instead of an earlier decade as the earlier
versions of census data sets are only 1 percent samples instead of 5 percent samples.
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geneous among states, with a standard deviation of 0.55 percent for low educated
and 0.15 percent for highly educated women. The greatest declines in high school
dropouts between 1988 to 2000 are shown in North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Rhode Island, with a decline of -1.96, -1.80, and -1.68 percent, respectively. The
greatest increases in employment rates for college graduate women are displayed in
the District of Columbia, New York, and Massachusetts, with an increase of 1.41,
0.95, and 0.93 percent, respectively.
Conditional Independence. A recent paper by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017) shows
that exploiting the labor demand shocks in equation (4.8) “is equivalent to using local
industry shares as instruments, with variation in the common industry component
of growth only contributing to instrument relevance.” Hence, we can define our
identifying assumption as the mean independence of the change in developmental,
unobserved shocks (∆ǫi,t) from 1988–2000 and the employment shares during 1980
for each state and education level:
E(∆ǫi,t|LabDemShocksIVi,t ) = 0 . (4.9)
The condition in equation (4.9) does not state that cross-sectional differences in
children’s unobserved skills from 1988–2000 are uncorrelated with the state-specific
employment shares in 1980. This last statement would be difficult to defend because
of unobserved specific differences between states, which would directly affect the level
of skills (e.g. school-quality differences) and would be potentially correlated with the
industrial composition of that state. Instead, our conditional independence condition
points toward the dynamic aspect of child development, assuming that the unobserved
changes in children’s skills during 1988–2000 are uncorrelated with the state-specific
industrial compositions in the U.S. in 1980.
To deal with some potential concerns underlying the condition in equation (4.9),
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we introduce an augmented specification of the model in equation (4.1) with potential
state-specific trends in children’s skills formation. In this way, we control for potential
unobserved changes in state-specific factors that can affect the change in children’s
skills and, at the same time, can be confounding with the variation in local labor
demand shocks (i.e. state-specific trends in school quality). All the results remain
unaffected by the inclusion of state trends. 12
Finally, following the suggestion in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017), we assess
whether any parallel pre-trends between our instrumental variable and child de-
velopment could jeopardize the validity of our identification strategy. Specifically,
Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017) recommend testing whether future values of the
instrumental variable are predictive for the current second stage residuals. We do not
find evidence of pre-trends.
Exclusion Restriction. The conditional independence is sufficient to interpret as
causal the reduced form effect of labor demand shocks on child achievement. How-
ever, we need the exclusion restriction to hold in order to interpret our IV estimates
as the causal effect of family income and labor supply. The exclusion restriction re-
quires labor demand shocks to affect children’s outcomes through either changes in
after-tax family income or changes in maternal labor supply, and not directly in any
other way.
One concern potentially undermining the exclusion restriction relates to the fact
that local labor demand shocks might affect employment and the allocated resources
in the education industry. We address this concern in Section 4.4.1 by showing that
baseline results do not change if we augment the model with the change in per-pupil
total revenues and per-pupil total current expenditures by state and over time. This
evidence suggests that our instrument does not affect children’s achievement through
12See Section 4.4.1 for the analysis.
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changes in the education system.
4.2.3 The Two-Stage Least Squares Estimator
We aim to estimate the causal impact of family income and maternal labor supply
on measures for child development (y). We analyze child development by focusing on
proxies for both cognitive and noncognitive development. Specifically, we exploit (i)
individual scores in a combined math-reading standardized test as a proxy for chil-
dren’s cognitive development; and (ii) a standardized index for children’s behavioral
problems. 13 As discussed, we use longitudinal changes in the EITC schedule and
longitudinal variation in labor demand shocks, measured as geographical changes in
sectoral compositions of local economies, as instruments for family income and hours
worked by the mother.
In this framework, for each of the endogenous variables ∆W ∈ {∆I,∆L} (changes
in income or changes in hours worked by the mother), we estimate the following first
stage:
∆Wi,t = γ0+γ1∆EITC
IV
i,t +γ2LabDemShocks
IV
i,t +x
′
iγ3+∆x
′
i,tγ4+Φ(I
pre−tax
i,t−1 )+∆ui,t ,
(4.10)
where i represents the child and t the time period. ∆EITCIVi,t is the change, with
respect to the previous period, in the EITC schedule experienced by children i.
LabDemShocksIVi,t stays for labor demand shocks at time t (with respect to the base-
line year 1980) experienced by children i in state s and with maternal education
background e. To allow for differential growth rates in test scores in children with
different (observable) characteristics, the vector Xit contains variables for children’s
gender, age, race, and number of siblings. The same vector also contains the third
order polynomial control function for income previously discussed in Section 4.2.2.
13We carefully introduce all details about the two outcomes of interest in the next section.
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∆ui,t defines the error term (in difference). The second stage is:
∆yi,t = α0 + α1∆̂Ii,t + α2∆̂Li,t + x
′
iβ1 +∆x
′
i,tβ2 + Φ(I
pre−tax
i,t−1 ) + ∆ǫi,t , (4.11)
where ∆̂Ii,t and ∆̂Li,t are the predicted changes in family after-tax income and hours
worked by the mother obtained through the first stage estimates.
4.3 Data
The baseline empirical analysis exploits three different data sets: the National
Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), the Current Population Survey (CPS),
and the 1980 Census Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). While we
could estimate the model using information only from the NLSY79, two potential
concerns arise. First, the detailed level of heterogeneity in the construction of the
labor demand shocks could suffer from small cell problems with the NLSY79 data.
Second, this sample may not necessarily be informative of labor market conditions
in later years at national or regional levels, as the NLSY79 is representative of U.S.
Americans between 14 and 21 years of age in 1979. Therefore, we use the U.S. 1980
Census Data to calculate the employment share for each industry and group se at
the baseline year (1980) and the longitudinal dimension of the CPS to compute the
industry-specific changes in employment rates.
The National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (and Children). Information about
children and their families is obtained by matching the information of the mothers in
the original National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to the additional
children’s survey (NLSY79-C). This matched data set (C-NLSY) results from a survey
conducted every 2 years from 1986 to 2014. The sample selection rule adopted is
simple; observational units are the children with information about the two main
outcomes of interest, namely cognitive and behavioral development. Because the
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children are surveyed every two years, our empirical analysis of the model in equation
(4.2) is based on 2-year changes (differences). In view of the above, our results should
be interpreted as the effects of biennial changes in family income and maternal labor
supply on biennial changes in children’s cognitive and behavioral development.
Cognitive development is measured through achievements in math and reading
activities. Specifically, we exploit the Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT),
a set of tests assessing proficiency in mathematics (math), oral reading and word
recognition (reading recognition), and the ability to derive meaning from printed
words (reading comprehension). We standardized each of the three test scores to
obtain a measure with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. 14 We repeat
the same procedure to compute an aggregate measure of math-reading achievement
as the average of the three standardized single test scores.
The second outcome of interest is the Behavior Problems Index (BPI) score used as
a proxy for children’s noncognitive development. The BPI was created by Nicholas Zill
and James Peterson to measure the frequency, range, and type of childhood behavior
problems for children age four and older (Peterson and Zill, 1986). In the C-NLSY
data set, five indicators for behavioral problems are collected: antisocial behavior,
anxious behavior, headstrong behavior, hyperactive behavior, and peer conflicts be-
havior. Each index is transformed to obtain a positive scale so that higher values
correspond to fewer behavioral problems. Hence, a higher index score corresponds to
a higher-achieving (in terms of behavior) child. We standardize each single index to
obtain a measure with a mean of zero and a standard deviation equal to 1. 15 We
compute a comprehensive index, which is the mean of the five single indexes.
14This standardization is made on the random sample of test takers. Obviously, for several reasons
based on the sample selection rule adopted in our framework, not all these observations are part of
the estimation sample.
15This standardization is made on the random sample of individuals reporting BPI indexes.
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Information about child achievement and demographics is matched with family
and mothers’ information such as family income, marital status, education level, etc.
We exclude from the analysis children whose mothers changed marital status in two
consecutive periods. We want to avoid exploiting changes in family income that are
due to changes in the presence of a husband in the family. We also restrict the analysis
to the period between 1988 and 2000 for two main reasons: (i) to avoid mixing EITC
changes with large changes in the U.S. tax system such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986
and the two tax cuts of 2001 and 2003; and (ii) to avoid confounding the aggregate
effects of the great recession after 2007.
Finally, we use information about family income and the procedure introduced in
Section 4.2.2 to compute both the after-tax family income and the federal EITC for
each family and period by using the TAXSIM program by Daniel Feenberg and the
National Bureau of Economic Research. 16
The Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS data set is representative of the U.S.
civilian non-institutional population. We use an integrated version of the CPS from
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). This data set allows us to collect
data about the yearly female employment rate for each cell se previously described
in Section 4.2.2.
1980 Census Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). We use the 1980 U.S.
Census data from IPUMS to construct in the most precise way the employment
shares for the baseline year (1980) by industry, state, and education level. Census
data contain enough observations to calculate the mean employment rate for each cell
defined as the combination of industry, state of residence, and education level, and
to deal with possible small cell problems.
16TAXSIM is an ongoing project of Dan Feenberg of the NBER and his collaborators. It allows
one to calculate “federal and state income tax liabilities from survey data.” See Feenberg and Coutts
(1993) for further details.
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Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the two main samples used in the
baseline analysis, one for cognitive development as measured by the combined math-
reading standardized test score, and one for the analysis of the BPI used as a proxy
for noncognitive development. The two samples have similar characteristics.
The average performance on the math test is slightly more than 40 (out of 100)
points, between 44 and 47 (out of 100 points) for the reading recognition test, and
between 40 and 43 (out of 100 points) for reading comprehension. The average BPI is
3.2 for both samples. 17 The average family in the sample reports an after-tax income
of around $38,000 (median=$31,000), while mothers spend on average around 1,200
hours per year working. Children are assessed biennially with PIAT tests and BPI
tests starting at ages 5 and 4, respectively, until they reach the age of 18. Children
in our estimating sample are, on average, approximately 10 years old. The sample is
perfectly balanced in terms of gender, while it overrepresents ethnic minorities such
as blacks (32–34 percent) and Hispanics (20 percent). Only 9 percent of the sample
consists of an only child, 37–38 percent have one sibling, and 53–54 percent have
two or more siblings. About 65 percent of mothers are married in both estimating
samples. Finally, few mothers (8 percent) are college graduates; 71 percent have at
most a high school diploma.
17Table 4.1 also shows the values for the single five components of the BPI score.
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4.4 Baseline Results
4.4.1 The Effect of Family Income and Maternal Labor Supply on Child
Development
First Stage Estimates
Table 4.2 illustrates the first stage results for both the math-reading test score
(columns 1–2) and the BPI score (columns 3–4). 18 All the models, at both the first
and second stages, are estimated by clustering standard errors at the family level to
allow for serial correlation of the error term over time and between siblings.
The diagnostic tests for the first stage (bottom part of the table) suggest that
the instruments work well in our specification for both the math-reading and the
behavioral analysis. Neither under- nor weak identification seem to constitute a
threat to our estimates.
We start by analyzing the first stage for family income. In terms of coefficients
estimates, changes in the EITC schedule generate a positive effect on family income
(columns 1 and 3). A $1,000 change in the schedule induces a $1,026 increase in
after-tax family income when math-reading test score is analyzed and $1,101 when
behavioral problems are considered. Our point estimates for the effect of changes in
the EITC on family income are comparable with respect to those estimated by Dahl
and Lochner (2017) and Lundstrom (2017).
Additionally, shocks in the labor demand positively affect family income. Indeed,
a shift in the labor demand directly affects worker compensation and family resources.
We find that an increase by 1 percent in the employment rate relative to 1980 predicts
an increase of $1,659 (math-reading first stage) or $2,067 (BPI first stage) in after-tax
18For the sake of brevity, we report here only a subset of the first stage coefficients. Table C.1
reports the entire set of first stage coefficients for individual characteristics.
196
family income.
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.2 we present the first stage of hours worked by
the mother. In our sample, the EITC schedule changes induce, on average, positive
shifts in the maternal labor supply. The overall positive effect is generated from
several different effects such as the differential impact on the extensive versus intensive
margin or the differential effect for different subgroups of the population (Eissa and
Liebman, 1996; Hoynes and Essa, 1996). A $1,000 change in the EITC schedule
explains an average increase of around 150 hours worked per year by mothers. The
effect is similar for the math-reading sample (column 2) and the BPI sample (column
4). This effect is aligned with the findings in the EITC literature summarized in
Nichols and Rothstein (2016): while earlier estimates indicated that the main effect
of the EITC on labor supply was in terms of extensive margins, more recent studies
have found evidence of nonzero, although small, intensive margin effects.
The second instrument labor demand shocks induce changes in hours worked. We
find that a 1 percent change in the employment rate relative to 1980 induces a change
of around 32 (24) hours worked per year by the mother. This means that, for the
average mother who works 1,258 hours per year (see Table 4.1), a 1 percent change
in the employment rate in her local labor market causes an increase of approximately
1.83 percent of her labor supply. The evidence from the first stage suggests that,
in our sample, labor demand shocks affect both family income and maternal labor
supply, although in the last case, the coefficient is only weakly significant. 19
Two potential concerns need to be discussed in this framework. First, we neglect
possible labor supply responses by the spouse, in the case of married couples, induced
by EITC changes and shocks in the labor demand. The EITC literature previously
19The coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level in the math-reading sample, while it is
statistically insignificant in the BPI sample.
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estimated small changes for the male labor supply caused by EITC changes (Hotz
and Scholz, 2003; Nichols and Rothstein, 2016). However, equation (4.2) includes
this endogenous reaction as part of the error term, potentially jeopardizing our iden-
tification strategy. We analyze whether the instruments are predictive of changes in
the spouse labor supply to test this hypothesis. We estimate our baseline first stage
specification with changes in the spouse labor supply as dependent variable. Table
C.2 reports the results. Neither changes in the EITC nor labor demand shocks in the
women’s labor market significantly predict changes in the spouse labor supply.
A second hypothetical concern relates to the possible existence of state-specific
trends in children’s skills formation that might constitute a threat to the exclusion
restrictions. The conditional independence of the instrument based on labor demand
shocks requires that unobserved changes in children’s skills from 1988–2000 are not
correlated with the state-specific industrial compositions in the U.S. in 1980. We
estimate a model that augments the baseline with the inclusion of a full set of state
fixed effects to capture state trends over time. 20 First stage diagnostic tests (see
Table C.5) are improved when state fixed effects are also included in the baseline
model. First stage coefficients remain almost unaltered in this new setting. This
suggest that, even controlling for state trends in children’s skill formation, our results
do not change. 21
20The state-specific trends in model (4.1) become state fixed effects in our main specification (4.5).
To see this point, consider our initial specification
yi,t = β0 + α0,s t+ α1 Ii,t + α2 Li,t + x
′
i β1,t + x
′
i,t β2 + ηi + ǫi,t ,
where α0,s is the coefficient for the state-specific trend. Taking the differences, we have
∆yi,t = α0,s + α1∆Ii,t + α2∆Li,t + x
′
iβ1 +∆x
′
i,tβ2 +∆ǫi,t ,
where α0,s is the state fixed effect in the difference model.
21We show below that second stage estimates are also unaffected by the inclusion of state trends
over time.
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Second Stage Estimates
Cognitive Development. We start by analyzing children’s cognitive development as
measured by the math-reading test score. Table 4.3 reports second stage estimates
for the effect of family income and maternal hours worked. 22 Ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimates in column (1) suggest a weak and positive effect (0.1 percent
of a standard deviation) of income on children’s achievement, while the effect of
hours worked is zero. These estimates suffer from various forms of bias. Unobserved
dynamics in the quality of child care and family circumstances can correlate with
the effect of family income and maternal hours worked on children’s development.
Furthermore, measurement error is likely to affect both the measures for income and
for hours worked, generating potential attenuation bias for both estimates. Finally,
Løken et al. (2012) show that, even in the absence of endogeneity, the OLS and IV
estimands can be substantially different due to differential weighting of the marginal
effects.
Instrumental variable estimates in column (2) address these concerns by correct-
ing the endogeneity of family income and maternal hours worked. Family income
positively affects child cognitive achievement. A $1,000 increase in family after-tax
income, ceteris paribus, generates an increase of 4.4 percent of a standard deviation in
the math-reading test score. This result, although a different estimation framework,
is aligned with Dahl and Lochner (2017). 23
Maternal hours worked induce a significant negative effect on children’s perfor-
mance. A 100-hour per year increase in maternal work, ceteris paribus, leads to a 6
percent of a standard deviation decrease in children’s math-reading test score. The
22The full set of coefficients, including those for individual characteristics, is reported in Table
C.3.
23This consideration also applies in the case of OLS estimates.
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size of the effect is comparable with previous findings. Bernal (2008) finds that the
mother’s working full-time and using child care for 1 year is associated with a 1.8
percent reduction in the child’s test score (0.13 standard deviations). Bernal and
Keane (2011) estimate a 2.1 percent decrease in test score as response to one year of
child care instead of (single) mother care.
This finding is important when it comes to analyzing the overall effect of changes
in labor earnings on child development. Indeed, policies that foster maternal labor
supply, like income transfers based on employment-status criteria, generate two op-
posing effects: a positive income effect and a possible substitution effect induced by
parental hours worked. In the next sections, we carefully analyze the drivers of the
negative effect of hours worked on child development. The aim is to provide insights
on how to design policies and interventions that contemporaneously foster maternal
employment and child development. To anticipate the intuition, the effect of hours
worked is driven by changes in parental inputs and in the quality of alternative sources
of child care. Moreover, the wage rate plays a role in determining whether the income
effect dominates the substitution effect of hours worked. Indeed, the wage paid shapes
the marginal contribution of maternal hours worked in fostering family income.
Behavioral Development. Table 4.4 shows the analysis of behavioral development as
measured by the BPI score. 24 OLS estimates display a close-to-zero effect of family
income and a negative (-0.1 percent of a standard deviation), statistically insignificant
effect of hours worked. IV estimates in column (2) suggest that the coefficient for
family income is positive (1.3 percent of a standard deviation), although smaller than
the one for cognitive development, and statistically insignificant. This result seems to
suggest a differential impact of family income on the accumulation process of cognitive
and noncognitive skills. While changes in family income considerably affect cognitive
24Table C.4 shows the full set of coefficients, including the ones for individual characteristics.
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development, noncognitive development appears less sensitive (at least in the short
term) to shocks in family income.
On the other hand, the effect of labor supply on noncognitive development fairly
mimics the one for cognitive development. Maternal hours worked negatively affect
child behavioral development. A 100-hour per year increase of maternal work causes
a 5.2 percent of a standard deviation decrease in behavioral development.
The importance of accounting for the contemporaneous effects of family income
and maternal labor supply on child development emerges with the analysis of the two
factors in isolation. The analysis of family income without consideration of possible
endogenous changes in labor supply creates a risk of underestimating the pure income
effect on child development. At the same time, the analysis of labor supply without
accounting for the induced income effect underestimates the (negative) effect of labor
supply on child development.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the analysis. In column (1), we use our identification
strategy to estimate the effect of family income in isolation on children’s cognitive de-
velopment. The point estimate suggests an income effect of 1.7 percent of a standard
deviation. 25 In terms of comparison with the baseline model of our study (column
3), the lower point estimate for the effect of family income in column (1) is hardly
surprising. The coefficient for family income captures both the positive income effect
on child development and the negative effect induced by one of the main determinants
25Dahl and Lochner (2017) find that the effect of an additional $1,000 of family income induces
children’s cognitive development to increase by 4.1 percent of a standard deviation. We replicate
their empirical model with our estimating sample, and we find a comparable income effect of 2.5
percent of a standard deviation. We interpret the differences in estimates as the result of differences
in the compliers’ groups, as a result of different sample selection criteria. In fact, Dahl and Lochner
(2017) trim the data according to whether families have a relatively large change in after-tax family
income between two years (see the Online Appendix for specific details). These sample selection
criteria are reasonable and well-motivated in the paper, given the authors’ interest in analyzing the
effect of marginal changes in family resources on child development. However, in our case, sizable
changes in family income can be due to changes in the extensive margin of maternal labor supply.
The latter represents a valuable identifying source of variation of the causal effect of maternal hours
worked on child development if the extensive margin shifts are induced by our instrumental variables.
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of positive income shocks, namely increases in individual labor supply. Behavioral
development (columns 4 and 6) displays the same pattern. The coefficient for family
income becomes considerably smaller in size, -0.3 versus 1.3 percent of a standard
deviation, in the model using only family income as the endogenous regressor. The
previous explanation for cognitive development also applies to this case.
Columns (2) and (5) focus on maternal hours worked in isolation. Coefficients
display a smaller effect of maternal labor supply both for cognitive and behavioral
development when compared to the reference baseline models in columns (3) and (6),
respectively. For cognitive development, the effect switches from -2.1 to -6 percent
of a standard deviation. For behavioral development, the change moves from -4 to
-5.2 percent of a standard deviation. These changes confirm that the coefficient for
maternal labor supply, when analyzed in isolation, captures both the labor supply
effect and the positive income effect induced by increases in individual labor supply.
Given the strong interdependence between maternal labor supply and family in-
come, there is no suitable identifying source of variation that is likely to exclusively
affect one variable of interest. Hence, as shown above, in order to identify the single
causal effect of either family income or maternal labor supply on child development,
it is necessary to allow for the endogeneity of both inputs.
We will now discuss some potential threats to our IV framework validity. As in-
troduced, the possible existence of state-specific trends in children’s skill formation
might undermine our exclusion restrictions. We take into account this potential con-
cern by augmenting the model with state-specific trends in children’s skills formation.
Such inclusion does not affect the results. 26 Table C.5 shows that point estimates
for the effect of changes in family income and hours worked are almost unchanged
26See Section 4.4.1 for the first stage analysis of this model with state-specific trends in children’s
skills formation.
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with respect to the models without state fixed effects. The replication of all the other
analyses of the study including state fixed effects does not remarkably alter any of
the results. 27 For this reason, we have decided to report in Table C.5 the baseline
estimates obtained by including state fixed effects in the model, while in the rest of
the work we report results without controlling for state fixed effects.
The exclusion from the set of regressors of variables capturing school financial and
economic resources might bias our results by violating the exclusion restriction for
the labor demand shocks instrument (see discussion in Section 4.2.2). In Table C.6,
we deal with this potential concern by including changes over time of school finances
and economic resources at the state level, therefore testing whether these variables
were part of the error term of the model.
We use data about school resources from the CDD National Public Education
Financial Survey, and we focus attention on two different measures. 28 First,
we collect data on total revenues per pupil, measured as the total revenues from
all sources divided by the fall membership. Second, we collect the total current
expenditure per pupil, defined as the total current expenditure for public elementary
and secondary education divided by the fall membership. We augment the baseline
model by adding both variables expressed in difference with respect to the previous
period.
Results highlight two main patterns. On the one hand, neither changes over time
in revenues nor expenditures are statistically significant predictors of child cognitive
and behavioral development. On the other hand, point estimates for both family
income and hours worked by the mother are unchanged with respect to the specifi-
27Results are available upon request.
28The CDD National Public Education Financial Survey has a primary purpose of making available
to the public an annual state-level collection of revenues and expenditures for public education for
students in prekindergarten through grade 12.
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cations without controls for school financial and economic resources. Also first stage
diagnostic tests, as shown by the tests in the bottom part of the table, are unaffected
in this new model specification.
The work by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017) points out that, in general, la-
bor demand shocks can include pre-trends that can indirectly affect the dependent
variable, which may jeopardize the validity of our identification strategy. To test
this hypothesis, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2017) recommend testing whether future
values of the instrumental variable are predictive for current second stage residuals.
Table C.7 shows the hypothesis testing for the presence of pre-trends. We test for pre-
trends with different specifications with different lagged variables, up to a maximum
of 6 lagged years (3 model-periods as observations are collected every 2 years). We
do not find evidence of pre-trends. In all cases, future labor demand shocks are not
predictive of past child test scores. The only exception appears for the most adjacent
case of the 1-period lag for cognitive measures. However, by extending the analysis
to 2 periods or 3 periods of lagged variables, any relationship between future labor
demand shocks and cognitive test scores arises.
Furthermore, as the instrument for labor demand shocks is state-specific, we ad-
dress the potential concern due to possible endogenous household changes in state of
residence from one period to another. In our sample, a very small fraction of families
change their state of residence in two following periods. 29 To be conservative, we
replicate our baseline analysis and restrict the sample to those households maintain-
ing the same state of residence across two consecutive periods. The analysis in Table
C.8 does not pinpoint any significant effect on results.
29In our estimation samples, there are 581 (math-reading sample) and 690 (BPI sample) cases
of mothers who changed their state of residence during the two-year intervals when test scores and
behavioral indexes are measured. In both cases, it represents approximately 5 percent of the entire
sample.
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Finally, tax reforms may have heterogeneous effects within groups (Hoynes and
Essa, 1996). Because of the structure of the EITC benefits, mothers who are working
and fall into the phase-out section of the schedule may have incentive to reduce their
hours worked, compromising the monotonicity assumption of the EITC instrument.
This assumption is needed to interpret our IV results as the local average treatment
effect (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Even if monotonicity is untestable, we consider
the potential heterogeneous effects induced by the change in the EITC for employed
versus non-employed mothers. 30
Table 4.6 shows the results. First stage estimates do not provide any evidence of
failure of the monotonicity assumption. The effect of changes in the EITC schedule
on family income is positive both for employed and non-employed mothers. Shocks
in the labor demand display a similar coefficient with respect to the one of the base-
line analysis. Changes over time in the EITC benefits also positively affect maternal
labor supply. Second stage results are similar to the ones in the baseline analysis.
The effect of family income on the math-reading test score is positive and strongly
significant, while maternal hours worked negatively affect the child’s cognitive devel-
opment. Additionally, the analysis of behavioral development (column 2) conveys the
same message as the one in the baseline analysis of BPI.
In sum, this analysis shows that, at least in the above-considered dimension, we
cannot reject the monotonicity assumption. Moreover, our results are not affected by
using possible heterogeneous responses to changes in the EITC schedule as possible
instruments for family income and maternal hours worked.
30Information about employment status refers to the previous period to mitigate possible endo-
geneity concerns.
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Decomposition of the Overall Effects
We focus here on the analysis of each single component of our aggregate measures
for cognitive and behavioral development. Such decomposition is important as it
allows us to understand whether the overall effect shown in the baseline analysis is
general or is driven by some specific measures for children’s achievements. Table 4.7
reports the decomposition of the combined math-reading test score in its three single
components: math, reading recognition, and reading comprehension. The three tests
in isolation confirm the existence of a positive and significant effect of family income
on test performance counterbalanced by a negative impact of hours worked by the
mother. The income effect appears slightly smaller in size (2.9 and 3 percent of a
standard deviation) for math and reading comprehension (columns 1 and 3) when
compared to reading recognition (column 2). In terms of hours worked, the effect is
particularly sizable for reading recognition (-7 percent of a standard deviation) and
reading comprehension (-4.9 percent of a standard deviation), while it is smaller for
math (-3.6 percent of a standard deviation).
This evidence is suggestive of possible channels underlying the effect of maternal
hours worked. At least two mechanisms potentially explain the results: (i) an endoge-
nous reallocation of maternal time that values more schooling activities rather than
reading; and (ii) a productivity gap of maternal time between math and reading.
We replicate the same decomposition analysis for indexes for behavioral devel-
opment (Table 4.8). We analyze the following five components: antisocial behavior,
anxious behavior, headstrong behavior, hyperactive behavior, and peer conflicts be-
havior. With the exception of hyperactive behavior (column 4), behavioral problems
are not affected by family income. On the contrary, hours worked display a nega-
tive and significant (with the exception of anxious behavior in column 2) effect on
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behavioral problems, with point estimates bounded between -3.6 and -4.8 percent of
a standard deviation.
The analysis of single behavioral indexes suggests similar insights with respect
to the aggregate BPI index. Family income seems to play a very marginal role in
shaping, at least in the short term, children’s behavioral problems. Concurrently,
the time spent with the mother is a relevant input in terms of children’s behavioral
development.
4.4.2 Early Childhood Development
Until this point we have considered measures for cognitive performance and be-
havioral problems for children older than 5 and 4 years old, respectively. We now
extend the analysis to early childhood development. The C-NLSY data set contains
information about temperament measures collected between ages 1–7. We focus our
attention on three specific measures collected for children in this age range: compli-
ance, insecure attachment, and sociability. 31 As for BPI, these measures are also
expressed on a positive scale, meaning that higher values correspond to fewer tem-
perament problems. We standardize each of the three measures to make an index
with a zero mean and a unitary standard deviation. Because compliance and inse-
cure attachment are collected for children in the same age range, we also construct
an aggregate average index of the two.
Table 4.9 illustrates the analysis of the effect of family income and maternal hours
worked on early childhood development. We estimate each model as in the baseline
analysis. Despite the lower level of precision due to the reduced sample size, point
estimates show a similar pattern to the one identified in the main analysis on older
31The NLSY79 contains other measures for child development in this age range. However, these are
the only measures repeated over time, which therefore allow a dynamic analysis in first differences.
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children.
The coefficient for family income is always positive and similar in size to that of the
baseline model for the math-reading test score. For example, a $1,000 change in family
income explains a (statistically insignificant) increase of 4.6 percent of a standard
deviation in the compliance score (column 1). At the same time, the coefficients for
maternal hours worked are negative, with a range between -1.0 (sociability, column
4) and -5.3 (compliance and insecure attachment, column 3) percent of a standard
deviation. These magnitudes are similar to those found with respect to cognitive and
behavioral development.
The analysis of early childhood provides supportive evidence that at this devel-
opmental stage there might also be a contemporaneous effect of family income and
maternal hours worked on child development. The pattern seems to mimic the one
identified for cognitive and behavioral development. Due to the limited sample size,
the effects on early childhood development are not precise and require further analysis
to infer more conclusive insights.
4.5 Hours Worked and Child Development: To the Roots of the Result
In this section we study the mechanisms behind the negative impact of mater-
nal hours worked on child development. This understanding is crucial for designing
policies that contemporaneously foster maternal employment and child development.
4.5.1 Time Investment in the Child
Parental inputs determine child development (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Cunha
et al., 2010; Del Boca et al., 2014a; Heckman and Mosso, 2014a; Agostinelli and
Wiswall, 2016a). The choice to increase maternal labor supply may generate a dis-
placement effect in terms of maternal investment in the formation of children’s skills.
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It is then important to establish whether maternal hours worked affect parental in-
vestment in the child. 32
Time diary data allow us to observe maternal response in terms of time investment
in the child as a result of her labor supply. We combine data from the American Time
Use Survey (ATUS) and the American Heritage Time Use Survey (AHTUS), which
provide information about the amount of time people spend doing various activities,
such as paid work, child care, volunteering, and socializing. 33 For similarities with
our estimating sample in the C-NLSY, we focus our attention on households with at
least one child in the same age range of the baseline analysis in the period 1985–2003.
34
We collect all the information about family income, hours worked by the mother,
education of the mother, household composition (e.g. single-head household, number
of children, etc.), child’s age, and four measures of parental investment in child de-
velopment. The available measures for parental investment are physical child care,
helping with homework, reading and playing with the child, and a residual category
containing other forms of child care. We also construct an aggregate measure that
is the sum of the four mentioned child care activities. All the measures for time
investment are expressed in hours per week.
Figure 4.4 shows the estimates of the five regressions of each time investment mea-
sure on family income and maternal hours worked plus a set of controls for mother’s
age, household composition, number of siblings, child’s age, and year fixed effects.
Each panel of the figure represents the regression coefficient, together with its 95
32The mother, as a response to an increase of hours worked, may decide to decrease parental inputs
and child investment or to decrease leisure activities to try to keep the amount of time devoted to
the child fixed.
33See www.ipums.org/timeuse.shtml for further details.
34Our sample selection is based on the availability of the surveys. We start with the 1985 AHTUS.
We use the 2003 ATUS to increase the sample size of the analysis.
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percent confidence interval, for maternal hours worked (Panel A) or family income
(Panel B) on each measure for time investment in child care activities. 35
As shown in Panel A, maternal hours worked are negatively correlated with
parental time investment in all five considered activities. As an example, an in-
crease of 1 hour worked per week predicts a 4-minute decline per week in child care
time (total child care). In other words, the result is equivalent to an average decrease
in child care of approximately 2 hours per week if the mother starts working full time
(from 0 to 35 hours per week).
Panel B reports the results for family income obtained from the same models. All
the coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant. In our sample, higher
family income does not correlate with changes in parental time investment in the
child. These results only suggest general insights; they do not deal with factors such
as the quality of time parents spend with their children. Section 4.5.4 discusses that.
4.5.2 Income versus the Substitution Effect: The Role of Wages
We exploit the results of the main analysis to explain the drivers behind the av-
erage negative impact of maternal hours worked on child development. An increase
in maternal hours worked generates an income effect (higher earnings) and a substi-
tution effect (displacement of maternal time) (Heckman and Mosso, 2014a; Del Boca
et al., 2014a).
Given the specification in equation (4.1), the causal effect of maternal hours
worked on child achievement can be deconstructed in these two mechanisms as follows:
∂E [yi,t|Li,t]
∂Li,t
≡ α1 · ∂E [Ii,t|Li,t]
∂Li,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Income Effect
+ α2︸︷︷︸
Substitution Effect
. (4.12)
35It is important to recall that although the effect of maternal hours worked and family income
are displayed in different panels, their coefficients are contemporaneously estimated with the same
regression. Appendix Table C.9 shows the regression results.
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By decomposing the total family income in the mother’s after-tax earnings (wi,t ·
Li,t) where wi,t represents the wage, and any other source of income (I˜i,t), we can
rewrite equation (4.12) as: 36
∂E [yi,t|Li,t]
∂Li,t
≡ α1 ·
wi,t + ∂E
[
I˜i,t|Li,t
]
∂Li,t
+ α2 . (4.13)
Equation (4.13) conveys a clear message: the effect of hours worked on children’s
achievement is ambiguous in sign and heterogeneous within the population. Given a
wage rate wi,t, the total effect in equation (4.13) depends on the relative magnitude
of the income effect (α1) in contrast to the substitution effect (α2). Additionally,
the income effect depends on the specific wage rate wi,t, suggesting heterogeneous
effects of maternal hours worked on children’s outcomes. We investigate heterogeneity
according to mother and child characteristics in the next section, while here we focus
the attention on the role played by wages.
The effect of hours worked by the mother strictly depends on factors such as labor
market conditions. The recognition of sufficiently high wages potentially overcomes
the substitution effect induced by decreased maternal time invested in child develop-
ment. This is likely driven by the fact that the mother might be able to substitute
her own input by purchasing higher quality alternative sources of child care (e.g.
nonparental care, additional school, youth clubs, sport and music activities, etc.).
Figure 4.5 graphically shows the importance of the paid wage by exploiting our
baseline results for the effect of maternal hours worked on child development. 37 The
analysis assumes that other sources of income do not respond to changes in maternal
36This is the case when the mother is already working (Li,t > 0). For the extensive margin case,
the causal effect is
E[yi,t|Li,t]
∂Li,t
= α1 ·
(
w∗i,t +
∂E[I˜i,t|Li,t]
∂Li,t
)
+α2, where w
∗
i,t is the counterfactual wage
she would receive once she works.
37The figure is based on the estimates in Table 4.3, column (2). As we do not find a significant
income effect for behavioral development, we base this analysis exclusively on cognitive development.
211
labor supply, and the income effect is determined only by changes in earnings. The
figure shows the heterogeneous effect of maternal hours worked on children’s cog-
nitive development with respect to maternal hourly wage. The intersection of the
solid line (effect of hours worked) with the dashed horizontal line representing a zero
net income-substitution effect, highlights that up to a corresponded wage of around
$13.50 per hour, the effect induced by the extra labor income (income effect) is not
enough to compensate for the loss in child development induced by decreased mater-
nal input (substitution effect). For wages higher than $13.50 per hour, the income
effect dominates the substitution effect.
In the background of Figure 4.5, we plot the wage distribution for both single and
married mothers in our NLSY79 estimation sample, which provides an intuition on
the determinants of the negative effect of maternal hours worked on child cognitive
development. The biggest fractions of the wage distributions are located below the
wage threshold corresponding to a zero or positive effect of maternal labor supply on
child achievements. These results call for a policy discussion regarding the importance
of labor market conditions and opportunities especially when it comes to women and,
specifically, mothers. Moreover, such findings should spark a discussion on fiscal
reforms and the minimum wage.
4.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects of Maternal Hours Worked
In this section we replicate the baseline analysis by focusing on various subpop-
ulations of interest. The aim is to understand whether the negative effect of hours
worked on child development might be driven by differences in the quality of the
alternative child care inputs used in substitution of maternal inputs or by other child
characteristics such as race or age. Bernal and Keane (2011) show that informal care
(grandparents, siblings, etc.) has adverse effects on child development as measured
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through test scores, and that more than 75 percent of single mothers use informal
care. Mothers with a higher educational level or with higher skills are likely to use
higher quality alternative inputs for their children, therefore possibly mitigating the
negative impact induced by their increase in individual labor supply.
The analysis is based on five different sources of heterogeneity: maternal educa-
tional level, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as a proxy for maternal
skills, maternal marital status, child’s race, and child’s age. 38 We compare mater-
nal educational levels by dividing the sample in two groups: mothers with at most
a completed high school degree (Low education) and mothers with some college ed-
ucation or more (High education). In terms of maternal skills, we separate mothers
according to the median value of the AFQT test by labeling the ones with lower-than-
the-median AFQT as Low AFQT, and those with higher-than-the-median AFQT as
High AFQT. We analyze marital status by comparing married mothers with unmar-
ried mothers. To take into account the possible differential effects of hours worked
for minority populations, we also compare the white population with the black and
Hispanic populations. Finally, the effect induced by maternal labor supply might
be larger when the child is younger and needs more supervision and parental care.
We look at potentially heterogeneous impacts of family income and maternal hours
worked on child development according to child’s age by dividing the sample into
children under and over 12 years old. 39
Table 4.10 reports estimates by subpopulations according to mother’s education
38The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) was derived from the Army General Classification
Test in 1950, and it is widely recognized as a reliable measure of mental ability. The AFQT score
is not available for all the observations in the sample. Therefore, the sample size for this analysis is
slightly reduced with respect to the one in the baseline models.
39To assess the importance of the heterogeneous treatment effects in our estimating sample, we
decompose our predicted exogenous changes in our two endogenous variables in a two-stage least
squares fashion, where we allow the second stage coefficients for income and hours worked to vary
by mother’s level of education, AFQT, marital status, child’s race, and child’s age. We implement
a family-level clustered bootstrap procedure (100 repetitions) to adjust standard errors.
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(Panel A), AFQT score (Panel B), and marital status (Panel C). Column (1) displays
the analysis of the combined math-reading test score. The differential impact of
family income appears negligible. Coefficients are similar across subgroups for all
sources of heterogeneity. 40
The impact of maternal hours worked is indeed characterized by high heterogene-
ity. Considering maternal education as a source of heterogeneity, the negative effect
of hours worked shown in the baseline analysis seems to be driven by the subgroup of
mothers with a low educational level. For this group of mothers, an increase of 100
hours worked per year explains a decrease in standardized test scores by 5.8 percent
of a standard deviation. The effect for the more educated counterpart is zero. The
analysis of maternal skills and marital status unveils similar heterogeneous patterns.
Maternal hours worked do not affect child cognitive development when mothers have
high AFQT, while the effect of hours worked is negative and significant (-6.4 per-
cent of a standard deviation) for low-AFQT mothers. Concerning marital status,
the coefficient for hours worked is significant and negative (-6.9 percent of a stan-
dard deviation) for unmarried mothers, while the effect of maternal labor supply is
statistically insignificant for married mothers.
The presented heterogeneous analysis suggests that parents from more advantaged
backgrounds and with more resources, proxied by education, skills level, and marital
status, might employ high-quality alternative inputs for the child when there is an
increase in individual labor supply. Alternatively, they are able to more productively
substitute the quantity of time with the quality of time devoted to their children.
The heterogeneous impact of maternal labor supply on child development is not
confirmed for behavioral development (Table 4.10, column 2).The effect of family in-
40A small but more pronounced difference appears for marital status, with unmarried mothers
displaying a slightly larger effect than married mothers.
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come and hours worked is similar across groups. More precisely, any differential im-
pact of maternal hours worked across subpopulations is detected neither for mother’s
education (Panel A), nor for mother’s AFQT (Panel B), nor marital status (Panel
C). These results suggest potentially different mechanisms underlying the cognitive
and behavioral skill production functions. In particular, it is easier to substitute for
parental time with activities related to cognitive development but more difficult to
substitute for parental time with activities related to a child’s behavioral development.
Further research on this point is needed.
Table 4.11 extends the analysis to child characteristics. In terms of cognitive de-
velopment (column 1), the analysis by race (Panel A) displays similar effects (around
4.6 percent of standard deviation) of family income across subgroups. We find a neg-
ative effect of maternal hours worked for both the subgroups of white and black or
Hispanic. Although the point estimates across race subgroups are not significantly
different, it is interesting to notice that the point estimate is larger in magnitude (-6.9
percent of a standard deviation) for black or Hispanic children than for white children
(-4.7 percent of a standard deviation). Also the analysis by age (Panel B) highlights
an interesting pattern. While the effect of family income is similar across age groups,
the impact of maternal hours worked is more relevant for younger children (<12 years
old). Relatively younger children report a statistically significant negative effect of
maternal labor supply (-7.6 percent of a standard deviation), while the same coeffi-
cient is statistically insignificant and smaller (-5.3 percent of a standard deviation)
for relatively older children. The evidence of heterogeneous impact by age suggests
that the importance of parental input and investment in shaping child development
is confirmed in all stages of childhood, although it seems to be dominant when the
child is relatively younger.
When behavioral development is considered, child characteristics do not display
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heterogeneous patterns (Table 4.11, column 2). In general, the income effect is always
statistically insignificant and similar across subpopulations. The effect of maternal
hours worked is indeed negative and strongly significant for all the subpopulations of
interest.
4.5.4 Employment, Child’s Activities, and Quality of Child Care
Section 4.5.1 shows that maternal hours worked are negatively correlated with
parental investment in child care. We analyze whether maternal employment status
and family income play a role in explaining differences in the type and quality of
investments. In particular, we investigate to what extent our heterogeneous results of
maternal hours worked in Section 4.5.3 might depend on the quality of alternatives
sources of child care.
We draw on data from the Child Development Supplement (CDS), a research
component of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), to analyze investment in
child development. 41 In 1997, the PSID complemented its main data collection with
additional information on 0-12 years old children and their parents. The aim was to
provide researchers with a comprehensive, nationally representative, and longitudinal
data set of children and their families with which to study the process of early human
capital formation. We focus on the 1997 wave of the CDS (CDS-I) as it contains a
wide set of information about parental investment in the child, child’s activities, and
time diary data for 3,563 children from 2,394 families.
Table 4.12 shows the analysis of a set of proxies for parental investment in child
development. We compare values across four different subgroups of households:
41The PSID is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of U.S. individuals and the families
in which they reside. Since 1968, the PSID has collected data on family composition changes,
housing and food expenditures, marriage and fertility histories, employment, income, time spent
on housework, health, consumption, wealth, and more. See psidonline.isr.umich.edu for further
information about the data set.
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low-income and non-employed mother (LI,NE), low-income and employed mother
(LI,E), high-income and non-employed mother (HI,NE), and high-income and em-
ployed mother (HI,E). This comparison allows us to disentangle: (i) differences in
maternal investment and child’s activities according to family income level, and (ii)
the difference in investment and child’s activities between employed and non-employed
mothers conditional on family income. Low- and high- income families are defined
according to the median value for family income in the CDS-I sample ($35,000).
The employment status refers to the year 1997. The table reports average values
for the four subgroups (columns 1–4), together with the difference between employed
and non-employed mothers conditional on income group (columns 5 and 7), and its
statistical significance (columns 6 and 8). 42
Panel A of the table depicts proxies for parenting styles. Behavior such as encour-
aging child’s hobbies, showing physical affection, attending parenting classes, having
the child cared for by others, or the use of rules to discipline the child display a sim-
ilar pattern. Both low- and high- income families report insignificant changes across
employment status (column 1(3) versus column 2(4)) or the change is similar across
income groups (column 5 versus column 7).
On the other hand, diverging patterns arise in terms of monitoring activities per-
petrated by parents. Low-income families put into practice more monitoring when the
mother is employed. For example, employed mothers report higher levels of control
over child’s companions (+3 percent), activities after school (+6 percent), and home-
work time (+8 percent) when compared to the non-employed counterpart. Mothers
with high incomes behave in the opposite way. In this case, we observe a decrease in
42Unless differently specified (e.g. in the case of a time diary), all variables in the table are
constructed as dummy variables. The questionnaire contemplates “Yes/No” answers (e.g. encourage
hobbies) for some of the investments or activities, while in other cases, a more detailed list of options
is available (e.g. “Very likely”, “Somewhat likely”, “Not sure how likely”, “Somewhat unlikely”, “Not
at all likely”). Appendix C.2 explains variable definitions and construction in detail.
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investment for employed mothers (-11, -13, and -10 percent, respectively).
Panel B focuses on investment in their child’s scholastic performance by parents.
We observe a diverging pattern across income groups when we analyze activities such
as contacting the faculty, keeping a closer eye on the child’s activities, lecturing the
child, encouraging the child to work harder, and helping the child with schoolwork.
Results in column (6) highlight that any significant change is detected for low-income
mothers. These mothers do not react differently to possible poor scholastic perfor-
mance when they are employed as opposed to when they are not employed. Mothers
from high-income families behave differently. They increase contact and discussion
with faculty by around 7 percent (p-val=0.01) relative to non-employed mothers.
They lecture their child more (+6 percent, p-val=0.04), and they prompt the child
to work harder more often (+7 percent, p-val=0.04).
In Panel C, we analyze family environment scales to describe the environment to
which each child is exposed. Scales are obtained as the combination of information
collected in the data set (e.g. parental reaction to child’s behavior, ways of showing
physical affection to the child, etc.). 43 Four different scales are available: the
general home scale, the cognitive stimulation scale, the emotional support scale, and
the parental warmth scale. High-income families outperform low-income families.
Concerning the maternal employment status, we find that the presence of employed
mothers is almost always correlated with an increase in home scales. The increase is
similar across income groups, although slightly larger in size for low-income families.
Finally, in Panel D of the table we use time diary data to study differences in the
daily activities of the child. School attendance is similar across income groups. In
general, children from families with non-employed mothers attend less school (around
43Refer to psidonline.isr.umich.edu and to the CDS-I User Guide Supplement for additional infor-
mation about the construction of family environment scales.
218
12,000 seconds per day) than children with employed mothers (around 16,000 seconds
per day). If the average school quality differs across income groups (e.g. high-income
mothers living in better neighborhoods with high quality schools, etc.) this might
produce a differential effect related to maternal employment.
We then focus on activities usually considered as potentially detrimental for child
development. 44 Time spent watching television highlights an interesting pattern:
in both income groups, children with employed mothers tend, or at least declare, to
watch less television. This is probably due to a lower amount of time spent at home.
However, while the average decrease in television watching in low-income families
is 221 seconds per day, the same decrease is double for children from high-income
families (522 seconds per day). 45 Similarly, maternal employment is correlated with
an increase in the time spent playing electronic games exclusively for the subgroup
of children from low-income families. Indeed, the employed versus non-employed
differential is sizable (+172 seconds per day, p-val=0.10) for children from low-income
families, while it is close to zero and statistically insignificant (+27 seconds per day,
p-val=0.73) for children from high-income families.
Educational activities, such as art and sculpture, highlight an opposite income-
related pattern. Children from high-income families do not display any significant
change due to maternal employment status (-30 seconds per day, p-val=0.56), while a
significant decrease arises for low-income families when employed and non-employed
mothers are compared (-119 seconds per day, p-val=0.01). The change in time devoted
to reading and looking at books is similar across employment statuses for both income
groups. Children from low-income families tend to increase the time devoted to visits
to other persons as a response to maternal employment relatively more than children
44A consistent fraction of individuals in the sample report zero seconds for such activities; this
explains the apparently low average values displayed in the table.
45These values are statistically insignificant for both income groups.
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from high-income families.
The evidence in this section suggests potential differential patterns in the qual-
ity of investment in child development for employed and non-employed mothers
across income groups. Employed, high-income mothers tend to substantially de-
crease their control over their child’s activities (when compared to their high-income,
non-employed counterpart), unless they become aware of their child’s poor academic
performance. Low-income mothers behave in the opposite way by increasing control
as a response to employment (lower trust in the alternative inputs used). Moreover,
children from low-income families seem to engage more with respect to their wealthier
counterparts in activities potentially detrimental for their development as a response
to maternal employment. These results might help explain the overall effect of ma-
ternal hours worked on child development and the stronger impact of labor supply
(on cognitive development) for mothers from low socio-economic backgrounds.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper unveils the contemporaneous effect family income and maternal hours
worked have in shaping child development. We combine the analysis of cognitive and
noncognitive development. We exploit children’s performance on standardized tests
to measure cognitive development. We use indicators of behavioral problems to gauge
noncognitive development.
We find that family income has a sizable and positive effect on cognitive de-
velopment, while the income effect is negligible (although positive) on behavioral
development. The effect of maternal hours worked is the same across outcomes. On
average, hours worked by the mother negatively affect both cognitive and behavioral
development.
We shed light on the mechanism behind the negative effect of maternal hours
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worked on child development. Working mothers invest less time in child care. As
a consequence, the choice of alternative sources of child care becomes crucial; this
choice is likely to be affected by economic factors. We decompose the overall effect of
maternal hours worked on child development into an income effect (higher earnings)
and a substitution effect (less maternal time). We find that the substitution effect
tends to dominate the income effect when the after-tax hourly wage is less than $13.50
per hour. With higher earnings, families are able to substitute their decreased time
investment with better and more productive alternatives. In line with this explana-
tion, we show that the average effect (on cognitive development) is mainly driven by
low-income, less-educated families and that the employment effect on investment in
the child differs according to family income.
Several policy suggestions derive from our results. The trade-off between the in-
come and substitution effect in terms of child development encourages a debate about
the effect of conditional versus unconditional cash transfers. Income subsidies that
provide monetary transfers based on work requirements might produce heterogeneous
impacts in terms of child development. Our analysis confirms that policies aimed at
fostering maternal labor supply benefit child development when considered in con-
junction with well-researched policies concerning the optimal level of family income
taxation or the optimal minimum wage. Alternatively, policies that encourage ma-
ternal employment in low-income families should also guarantee alternative sources
of child care to support child development.
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Figure 4.1: Children’s Outcomes by After-Tax Family Income Deciles
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Notes: This figure shows the average cognitive and behavioral outcomes of children by after-tax family income deciles. For cognitive measures
we consider the average standardized PIAT score between the math, reading recognition, and reading comprehension indexes. The behavioral
measure is the average of the standardized Behavior Problems Index (BPI). The after-tax family income is calculated using the TAXSIM
program. Source: C-NLSY.
222
Figure 4.2: The EITC Expansion
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Notes: This figure shows the changes in the federal EITC schedule for families with two children.
The after-tax family income is in real (2000) dollars. We calculate the EITC benefits over time using
the TAXSIM program.
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Figure 4.3: Labor Demand Shocks
Panel A: High School Dropouts, 1988
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Panel D: College Graduates, 2000
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Notes: This figure shows the variation in labor demand shocks between states and over time for less educated (school dropouts) and highly
educated (college graduates) women. Panels A–B show the variation of labor demand shocks for the less educated group. Panels C–D show
the variation of labor demand shocks for the highly educated group. Sources: CPS and Census 1980.
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Figure 4.4: Time Allocated to Child Care, Mother’s Hours Worked, and Family Income
Physical Child Care
Help with Homework
Read & Play
Other Child Care
Total Child Care
−.08 −.06 −.04 −.02 0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Panel A: Child Care and Mother’s Hours Worked
Physical Child Care
Help with Homework
Read & Play
Other Child Care
Total Child Care
−.02 −.015 −.01 −.005 0 .005 .01 .015 .02
Panel B: Child Care and Family Income
Notes: This figure shows the effect of hours worked and family income on time (hours per week) allocated to child care activities. Panel A
displays the regression coefficients (with a 95% confidence interval) for the effect of hours worked on each measure for time investment in child
care activities. Panel B displays the regression coefficients (with a 95% confidence interval) for the effect of family income on each measure for
time investment in child care activities. See text for further details. Sources: ATUS and AHTUS.
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Figure 4.5: The Effect of Maternal Labor Supply on Child Achievement
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Notes: This figure shows the causal effect of maternal hours worked on child achievement as a
function of mothers’ hourly wage rate (green line). The plotted values in the background show
the empirical distributions of real hourly wages ($2000) for single and married mothers (top 5% ex-
cluded). The solid line represents the overall effect of maternal labor supply (income and substitution
effects) based on our baseline results in Table 4.3, column (2).
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math 43.62 13.55 40.54 15.28
Reading recognition 47.29 16.05 43.98 17.57
Reading comprehension 42.60 13.70 40.02 14.97
Behavior Problems Index 3.22 1.13 3.23 1.13
Antisocial 4.49 1.59 4.50 1.59
Anxious 3.29 1.47 3.32 1.47
Headstrong 2.64 1.67 2.64 1.67
Hyperactive 3.23 1.60 3.20 1.60
Peer conflicts 2.49 0.84 2.49 0.84
Family income 37,775 30,132 38,463 30,701
Hours worked (Y) 1,258 986 1,234 982
Age 10.69 2.31 10.11 2.57
Male 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
White 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50
Black 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
Hispanic 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
No siblings 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
One sibling 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.49
Two or more siblings 0.54 0.50 0.53 0.50
Mother’s marital status:
Married 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.48
Mother’s education:
High school dropout 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.40
High school graduate 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50
Some college 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Graduated college 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28
Observations 12,288 13,777
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of our estimating samples. Columns (1) and (2)
refer to the estimating sample for the analysis of child cognitive development (combined Math-
Reading test score). Columns (3) and (4) consider the estimating sample for the analysis of child
behavioral development (Behavior Problems Index, BPI). Income is after-tax income and it is
measured in year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours. Source: C-NLSY
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Table 4.2: First Stage Estimates
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
∆Income ∆Hours Worked ∆Income ∆Hours Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EITC 1.026** 1.481*** 1.101** 1.488***
(0.488) (0.282) (0.482) (0.280)
LabDemShocks 1.659*** 0.322* 2.067*** 0.245
(0.395) (0.186) (0.405) (0.178)
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 13.21 14.40 21.89 20.57
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SW F (Weak id) 13.19 14.38 21.86 20.54
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KP (Weak id) 6.42 6.42 10.43 10.43
Observations 12,288 12,288 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for both our first stage models. Dependent variable: ∆Income
(columns 1 and 3), and ∆Hours worked (columns 2 and 4). Columns (1) and (2) refer to the esti-
mating sample for the analysis of child cognitive development (combined Math-Reading test score).
Columns (3) and (4) consider the estimating sample for the analysis of child behavioral development
(Behavior Problems Index, BPI). For each analysis, the two endogenous variables are: changes in
income (∆Income) and changes in maternal hours worked (∆Hours). The two instrumental variables
are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). Income and
the EITC are measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed
in hundreds. All models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a
control function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age, gender, race, and
number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and reported in parentheses. *,
**, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.3: Income, Hours Worked, and Child Test Scores
Combined Math-Reading
OLS IV
(1) (2)
∆Income 0.001* 0.044***
(0.000) (0.015)
∆Hours worked 0.000 -0.060**
(0.001) (0.024)
Observations 12,288 12,288
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis
of child cognitive development. Dependent variable:
Combined Math-Reading test score. Column (1) re-
ports the OLS estimates. Column (2) shows the IV es-
timates. The two instrumental variables are: changes
in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks
(LabDemShocks). Income is measured in $1,000 of
year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and
expressed in hundreds. All models include a third or-
der Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income
as a control function (see equation 4.7). All models
also include controls for child’s age, gender, race, and
number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at
the family level and reported in parentheses. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Income, Hours Worked, and Child Behavior
Behavior Problems Index
OLS IV
(1) (2)
∆Income 0.000 0.013
(0.000) (0.009)
∆Hours worked -0.001 -0.052**
(0.001) (0.022)
Observations 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis
of child behavioral development. Dependent variable:
Behavior Problems Index (BPI). Column (1) reports
the OLS estimates. Column (2) shows the IV esti-
mates. The two instrumental variables are: changes
in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks
(LabDemShocks). Income is measured in $1,000 of
year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and
expressed in hundreds. All models include a third or-
der Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income
as a control function (see equation 4.7). All models
also include controls for child’s age, gender, race, and
number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at
the family level and reported in parentheses. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.5: The Effect of Family Income and Hours Worked in Isolation
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
IV IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Income 0.017** 0.044*** -0.003 0.013
(0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009)
∆Hours worked -0.021* -0.060** -0.040** -0.052**
(0.011) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022)
First Stage Tests (Income/Hours):
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 19.37 29.19 13.21/14.40 27.68 29.09 21.89/20.57
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00/0.00
SW F (Weak id) 9.67 14.57 13.19/14.38 13.82 14.53 21.86/20.54
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00/0.00
KP (Weak id) 9.67 14.57 6.42 13.82 14.53 10.43
Observations 12,288 12,288 12,288 13,777 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis of child cognitive development (columns 1–3) and
child behavioral development (columns 4–6). Dependent variable: Combined Math-Reading test score
(columns 1–3), and Behavior Problems Index (BPI) (columns 4–6). Columns (1) and (4) show the impact
of family income in isolation. Columns (2) and (5) show the impact of maternal hours worked in isolation.
Columns (3) and (6) show the contemporaneous impact of family income and maternal hours worked.
All estimates are IV estimates. For comparison purposes, the coefficient for the effect of family income
estimated in Dahl and Lochner (2017) is equal to 0.041. See their work for further details. In columns (1)
to (6), the two instrumental variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks
(LabDemShocks). Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and
expressed in hundreds. All models in columns (1) to (6) include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of
predicted income as a control function (see equation 4.7). The same models also include controls for child’s
age, gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Heterogeneous Effect of EITC Changes: Mother’s Employ-
ment
Combined Behavior
Math-Reading Problems Index
IV IV
(1) (2)
∆Income 0.032*** 0.002
(0.009) (0.008)
∆Hours worked -0.039*** -0.028**
(0.011) (0.013)
First Stage Coefficients:
∆Income:
∆EITC*Employed(t−1) 1.557** 1.744***
(0.640) (0.638)
∆EITC*Non-Employed(t−1) 0.637 0.614
(0.504) (0.512)
LabDemShocks 1.613*** 2.009***
(0.395) (0.404)
∆Hours worked:
∆EITC*Employed(t−1) 0.544 0.553
(0.365) (0.355)
∆EITC*Non-Employed(t−1) 2.166*** 2.194***
(0.294) (0.298)
LabDemShocks 0.403** 0.330*
(0.189) (0.181)
First Stage Tests (Income/Hours):
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 21.47/62.24 30.61/63.37
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
SW F (Weak id) 10.71/31.07 15.28/31.64
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
KP (Weak id) 7.06 10.05
Observations 12,288 13,777
Notes: This table shows the IV estimates for our robustness analysis. Dependent
variable: Combined Math-Reading test score (column 1), and Behavior Problems
Index (BPI) (column 2). First stage estimates are obtained by interacting the EITC
instrument with the mother’s lagged employment status. Income is measured in
$1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds.
All models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income
as a control function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s
age, gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family
level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Single Test Scores
Reading Reading
Math Recognition Comprehension
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
∆Income 0.029** 0.055*** 0.030**
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013)
∆Hours worked -0.036* -0.070** -0.049**
(0.021) (0.029) (0.022)
Observations 12,288 12,288 12,288
Notes: This table shows the IV estimates for each single PIAT test
score. Dependent variable: Math test score (column 1), Reading Recog-
nition test score (column 2), and Reading Comprehension test score
(column 3). The two instrumental variables are: changes in EITC ben-
efits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). Income
is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly
hours and expressed in hundreds. All models include a third order
Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a control function
(see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age, gen-
der, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the
family level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Single Behavior Problems Index
Peer
Antisocial Anxious Headstrong Hyperactive Conflicts
IV IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Income 0.012 -0.007 0.015 0.020** 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
∆Hours worked -0.048** -0.027 -0.046** -0.036* -0.041*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
Observations 13,777 13,777 13,777 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the IV estimates for each single BPI score. Dependent
variable: Antisocial behavior (column 1), Anxious behavior (column 2), Headstrong
behavior (column 3), Hyperactive behavior (column 4), and Peer Conflicts behavior
(column 5). The two instrumental variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC)
and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). Income is measured in $1,000 of year
2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All models
include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a control
function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age, gender,
race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Income, Hours Worked, and Early Childhood Develop-
ment
Insecure Compliance and
Compliance Attachment Ins.Attach. Sociability
IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Income 0.046 0.020 0.046 0.011
(0.031) (0.022) (0.029) (0.020)
∆Hours worked -0.039 -0.044 -0.053 -0.010
(0.043) (0.034) (0.039) (0.045)
Age range 1–7 1–7 1–7 2–7
Observations 4,807 4,884 4,656 2,969
Notes: This table shows the IV estimates for our analysis of early childhood
temperament development. Dependent variable: Compliance score (column 1),
Insecure Attachment score (column 2), Combined Compliance and Insecure At-
tachment score (column 3), and Sociability score (column 4). The two instru-
mental variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand
shocks (LabDemShocks). Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars.
Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All models include a
third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a control func-
tion (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age, gender,
race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level
and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.10: Heterogeneous Effects: Mother Characteris-
tics
Combined Behavior
Math-Reading Problems Index
IV IV
(1) (2)
Panel A: Mother’s Education
∆Income*HS or less 0.031** 0.012
(0.015) (0.010)
∆Income*Some college or more 0.030** 0.013
(0.016) (0.011)
∆Hours worked*HS or less -0.058** -0.054**
(0.024) (0.021)
∆Hours worked*Some college or more 0.001 -0.049**
(0.028) (0.024)
Observations 12,288 13,777
Panel B: Mother’s AFQT
∆Income*Low AFQT 0.030** 0.016
(0.015) (0.010)
∆Income*High AFQT 0.033** 0.018*
(0.016) (0.010)
∆Hours worked*Low AFQT -0.064** -0.052**
(0.025) (0.022)
∆Hours worked*High AFQT 0.001 -0.073***
(0.028) (0.023)
Observations 11,939 13,348
Panel C: Mother’s Marital Status
∆Income*Married 0.038** 0.016
(0.016) (0.010)
∆Income*Unmarried 0.044*** 0.013
(0.017) (0.011)
∆Hours worked*Married -0.010 -0.065**
(0.030) (0.029)
∆Hours worked*Unmarried -0.069** -0.052**
(0.028) (0.022)
Observations 12,288 13,777
Notes: This table shows the IV heterogeneous effects of income
and maternal hours worked on child development. Dependent vari-
able: Combined Math-Reading test score (column 1), and Behavior
Problems Index (BPI) (column 2). We divide mothers according
to: (i) Panel A: educational attainments (high school (HS) diploma
or less vs. some college or more); (ii) Panel B: AFTQ score (below
or above the median); and (iii) Panel C: marital status (married vs.
unmarried). The two instrumental variables are: changes in EITC
benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). In-
come is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are
yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All models include a third
order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a con-
trol function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls
for child’s age, gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard
errors are obtained through a family-level clustered bootstrap pro-
cedure based on 100 repetitions and reported in parentheses. *, **,
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 4.11: Heterogeneous Effects: Child Characteristics
Combined Behavior
Math-Reading Problems Index
IV IV
(1) (2)
Panel A: Child’s Race
∆Income*Black or Hispanic 0.046** 0.014
(0.018) (0.009)
∆Income*White 0.047** 0.015
(0.019) (0.010)
∆Hours worked*Black or Hispanic -0.069** -0.050**
(0.031) (0.023)
∆Hours worked*White -0.047 -0.068***
(0.032) (0.022)
Observations 12,288 13,777
Panel B: Child’s Age
∆Income*Below 12 0.048** 0.012
(0.019) (0.009)
∆Income*Above 12 0.049** 0.015
(0.020) (0.010)
∆Hours worked*Below 12 -0.076** -0.055**
(0.031) (0.023)
∆Hours worked*Above 12 -0.053 -0.055**
(0.033) (0.022)
Observations 12,288 13,777
Notes: This table shows the IV heterogeneous effects of income and ma-
ternal hours worked on child development. Dependent variable: Com-
bined Math-Reading test score (column 1), and Behavior Problems Index
(BPI) (column 2). We divide children according to: (i) Panel A: race
(white vs. black or Hispanic); and (ii) Panel B: age (below 12 years old
vs. above 12 years old). The two instrumental variables are: changes in
EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). In-
come is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly
hours and expressed in hundreds. All models include a third order Tay-
lor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a control function (see
equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age, gender,
race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are obtained through a
family-level clustered bootstrap procedure based on 100 repetitions and
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.12: Maternal Employment Status, Investment in the Child, and Child’s Activities
(LI,E)- (HI,E)-
(LI,NE) (LI,E) (HI,NE) (HI,E) (LI,NE) p-val (HI,NE) p-val
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Parenting
Encourage hobbies 0.92 0.91 0.96 0.94 -0.01 0.64 -0.01 0.38
Phys. affection (times past week) 8.43 9.51 15.55 13.98 1.07 0.16 -1.57 0.36
Parenting class pre-birth 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.18 -0.02 0.36 -0.03 0.18
Parenting class 0.24 0.20 0.31 0.26 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.03
Never cared by others 0.57 0.24 0.45 0.15 -0.33 0.00 -0.30 0.00
Use of rules 0.58 0.51 0.54 0.50 -0.07 0.02 -0.04 0.19
Control who the child is with 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.47 0.03 0.32 -0.11 0.00
Control activities after school 0.60 0.66 0.70 0.57 0.06 0.08 -0.13 0.00
Set homework time 0.70 0.78 0.82 0.72 0.08 0.01 -0.10 0.00
Panel B: Reaction to Poor Scholastic Performance
Contact faculty (≥ 6 y.o.) 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.88 -0.02 0.47 0.07 0.01
Closer eye on activities 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.00 0.84 -0.01 0.80
Lecture a child 0.80 0.81 0.74 0.80 0.01 0.80 0.06 0.04
Tell child to work harder 0.81 0.80 0.66 0.73 -0.01 0.84 0.07 0.04
Help with schoolwork 0.80 0.82 0.75 0.76 0.02 0.39 0.01 0.78
Panel C: Family Environment Scales
Full home 17.39 18.10 19.90 20.18 0.71 0.00 0.28 0.13
Cognitive stimulation 8.67 9.24 10.04 10.13 0.57 0.00 0.09 0.44
Emotional support 8.72 8.86 9.86 10.05 0.15 0.14 0.19 0.09
Parental warmth 4.46 4.47 4.59 4.48 0.01 0.67 -0.11 0.00
Panel D: Time Diaries (in seconds per day)
School 12,161 16,323 12,745 16,743 4,162 0.00 3,998 0.00
TV 6,492 6,271 5,769 5,247 -221 0.49 -522 0.12
Electronic games 365 538 335 361 172 0.10 27 0.73
Art, sculpture 242 123 244 214 -119 0.01 -30 0.56
Books 248 238 350 337 -10 0.83 -13 0.81
Books (≥ 4 y.o.) 280 248 332 334 -32 0.59 2 0.97
Visiting others, socializing 409 526 261 288 117 0.40 28 0.76
Notes: This table shows several measures for investment in the child development process using the CDS supple-
ment of the PSID data set. All measures refer to children aged 0–12 in 1997. LI means low family income (below
$35,000), HI means high family income (above $35,000). NE means that the mother is non-employed in 1997, E
means that the mother is employed in 1997. All the variables (if not differently specified) excepted time diaries
are indicator variables. Time diaries variables (Panel D) are expressed in seconds per day and refer to weekdays
only.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 2 develops new identification concepts and associated estimators for the
process of skill development in children. One of the key empirical challenges in this
context is that the various measures of children’s skills are in general imperfect and
arbitrarily located and scaled. We introduce the concept of known location and scale
production technologies, which are the type of technologies actually estimated in
many previous papers, and show that for these technologies, standard measurement
assumptions non-parametrically identify the production technology, up to the nor-
malization of initial period skills. Importantly, we show non-parametric identification
for these cases without re-normalizing latent skills each period which can bias the
production technology. For production functions which do not have a known location
or scale, additional assumptions are necessary, and we provide empirically grounded
assumptions which are sufficient for identification of these more general technologies.
Our paper provides the first analysis of these crucial identification tradeoffs, and
hopefully will serve as a useful guide for future work.
Based on our identification results, we develop a robust method of moments es-
timator and show that it can be implemented using a sequential algorithm. Our
estimator does not require strong assumptions about the marginal distribution of
measurement errors or the latent factors. We estimate the skill production process
using data for the United States and a flexible parametric model of skill develop-
ment allowing for non-constant returns to scale, dynamics in TFP, and for parental
investment to endogenously depend on unobserved children’s skills.
Our empirical results show a pattern of rapid skill development from age 5 to 14.
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We find that as children age, not only does their mean skill level increase, but the level
of skill inequality also increases. Our parameter estimates reveal that investments
are more productive at early ages and in particular for disadvantaged children. Our
findings of a positive return to income transfers at early ages, especially for poorer
households, is largely consistent with prior evidence of a positive effect of income on
a number of child outcomes (see Dahl and Lochner, 2012a; Loken et al., 2012) using
different sources of identification. Our results suggest that family income is a better
“target” than initial children’s skills for children’s skills. Lastly, our finding that that
the estimated policy effects would be substantially smaller if one estimated a restricted
technology or ignored measurement error demonstrates the critical importance of
allowing for general technologies and correcting estimates for measurement error.
Chapter 3 studies the role of children’s social interactions in the dynamics of chil-
dren’s skills. I estimate a tractable dynamic equilibrium model of parental investment
and endogenous formation of peer groups. The model is estimated using information
about friendships, children’s test scores and parental investments in the National Lon-
gitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). I exploit within school / across
cohort variations in peers’ composition to identify the degree of complementarity be-
tween parents and peers in producing a child’s skills. I find that parents and peers
are static substitutes and dynamic complementary inputs in child development. After
validating my estimated model using findings in Chetty and Hendren (2016a) on en-
vironment exposure effects in children, I assess the importance of social interactions
in skills dynamics with various policies.
This article underlines three main points: (i) social interactions and social context
permanently shape the developmental trajectories of children; (ii) changing cohort
composition and the relative social interactions generates winners and losers and
the heterogeneous effects are due to the endogenous formation of new peers; (iii)
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neglecting the dynamic equilibrium effects of skill formation and social interactions
would lead to biased predicted effects of policies.
I want to conclude this paper by considering an extension of this work. Specifically,
one potential type of parental investment can be the choice of neighborhood where the
family lives. In this case, parents have alternative margins in response to changes in
peer composition, and to a certain extent, they can also decide to change where they
live as a response to the previously considered policy. Modeling this second channel
is challenging, because now the environment composition is also endogenous, and it
becomes part of the equilibrium solution of the model. However, understanding the
extent to which neighborhood decisions are influenced by children’s social interactions
is an important question in considering the effects of socioeconomic segregation on
intergenerational mobility. Therefore, future work is needed.
Chapter 4 unveils the contemporaneous effect family income and maternal hours
worked have in shaping child development. We combine the analysis of cognitive and
noncognitive development. We exploit children’s performance on standardized tests
to measure cognitive development. We use indicators of behavioral problems to gauge
noncognitive development.
We find that family income has a sizable and positive effect on cognitive de-
velopment, while the income effect is negligible (although positive) on behavioral
development. The effect of maternal hours worked is the same across outcomes. On
average, hours worked by the mother negatively affect both cognitive and behavioral
development.
We shed light on the mechanism behind the negative effect of maternal hours
worked on child development. Working mothers invest less time in child care. As
a consequence, the choice of alternative sources of child care becomes crucial; this
choice is likely to be affected by economic factors. We decompose the overall effect of
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maternal hours worked on child development into an income effect (higher earnings)
and a substitution effect (less maternal time). We find that the substitution effect
tends to dominate the income effect when the after-tax hourly wage is less than $13.50
per hour. With higher earnings, families are able to substitute their decreased time
investment with better and more productive alternatives. In line with this explana-
tion, we show that the average effect (on cognitive development) is mainly driven by
low-income, less-educated families and that the employment effect on investment in
the child differs according to family income.
Several policy suggestions derive from our results. The trade-off between the in-
come and substitution effect in terms of child development encourages a debate about
the effect of conditional versus unconditional cash transfers. Income subsidies that
provide monetary transfers based on work requirements might produce heterogeneous
impacts in terms of child development. Our analysis confirms that policies aimed at
fostering maternal labor supply benefit child development when considered in con-
junction with well-researched policies concerning the optimal level of family income
taxation or the optimal minimum wage. Alternatively, policies that encourage ma-
ternal employment in low-income families should also guarantee alternative sources
of child care to support child development.
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A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, we note that with Zt,m, Gt(θt, It), µt,m and λt,m known, we then identify
the distribution of the measurement error, given
ϕ ǫt,m
λt,m
(x) =
ϕZ˜t,m(x)
ϕln θt,m(x)
Given the one-to-one mapping between characteristic functions and distributions,
we identify the marginal density of ǫt,m
λt,m
. Since λt,m is known, we also identify the
marginal density of ǫt,m, Fǫt,m(ǫ).
Next, consider the following conditional expectation:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) = µt+1 + λt,mE(ln θt+1| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ)
+E(ǫt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ)
where E(ǫt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) = 0 given Assumption 1 (ǫt+1,m independent of
ln θt and ln It).
Iterating expectations and substituting for ln θt =
Zt,m−µt,m−ǫt,m
λt,m
, we have the
following:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) =
∫
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m − µt,m − ǫ
λt,m
= a, ln It = ℓ, ǫ)dFǫt,m(ǫ)
Again applying Assumption 1 (ǫt,m independent of Zt+1,m), we have
=
∫
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m − µt,m − ǫ
λt,m
= a, ln It = ℓ)dFǫt,m(ǫ)
Re-writing again, we have
=
∫
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m = λt,ma+ µt,m + ǫ, ln It = ℓ)dFǫt,m(ǫ)
=
∫
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m = b(ǫ), ln It = ℓ)dFǫt,m(ǫ)
Note that for each realization of ǫt,m = ǫ, we have Zt,m = b(ǫ), where b(ǫ) is
known given µt,m, λt,m, and a are known. We identify the conditional expectation
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m = b(ǫ), ln It = ℓ) from the observed distribution of Zt+1,m and Zt,m
measures. Because the distribution of measurement errors Fǫt,m(ǫ) is identified, we
identify E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ).
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Example 4 Consider the case where ǫt,m ∼ N(0, σ2t,m) ∀t. We identify σ2t,m from
V (Zt,m) = λ
2
t,mV (ln θt) + V (ǫt,m) since we have already identified V (ln θt) and λt,m.
The idea of the proof of Lemma 1 is that the value of the current latent skills (ln θt =
a) comes both from observable measure (Zt,m) and unobservable measurement error
(ǫt,m). Since we identify the distribution of the unobservable, we are able to integrate
out each possible realization of that unobservable random variable. Indeed, if ǫ takes
value 0, because we are fixing ln θt to be equal to a, this implies that Zt,m would equal:
Zt,m = λt,m · a+ µt,m = b(0)
where both λt,m and µt,m are known. Hence weight E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m = b(0), ln It = ℓ)
with the likelihood of the event that ǫ takes the value of zero. Because ǫt,m ∼ N(0, σ2t,m),
we have that the marginal density of the measurement error is
fǫt,m(ǫ) =
1
σt,m
√
2π
e
−
ǫ2
2σ2
t,m
and ∫
E(Zt+1,m|Zt,m = b(ǫ), ln It = ℓ) fǫt,m(ǫ)d ǫ
Because ǫt,m is a continuous random variable, we integrate over all the values to find
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ). This approach would be similar in the case where
investment is also a latent variable. In this case, we would integrate over the support
of the measurement error terms of both variables. by Fǫt,m(ǫ) = pr(ǫt,m ≤ ǫ). Define
Z˜t,m = ln θt+
ǫt,m
λt,m
and its characteristic function ϕZ˜t,m(x) = E
[
e
ix
(
Zt,m−µt,m
λt,m
)]
. Define
ϕln θt(x) = E
[
eix ln θt
]
to be the characteristic function of ln θt. Given the independence
between ǫt,m and ln θt (Assumption 1), we can rewrite the characteristic function for
ǫt,m
λt,m
to be:
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A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1
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Proof.
Given Gt(θt, It) and the measurement parameters for period t, µt,m and λt,m, are
known, we use Lemma 1 to identify E(ln θt+1| ln θt = a, ln It = ℓ) from E(Zt+1,m| ln θt =
a, ln It = ℓ) for any a ∈ R and ℓ ∈ R. We then use the following transformation:
E(Zt+1,m| ln θ = a1, ln It = ℓ1)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θ = a2, ln It = ℓ2)
E(Zt+1,m| ln θ = a3, ln It = ℓ3)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θ = a2, ln It = ℓ2) =
ln ft(e
a1 , eℓ1)− ln ft(ea2 , eℓ2)
ln ft(ea3 , eℓ3)− ln ft(ea2 , eℓ2)
Because the function ft satisfies the known location and scale definition, then
for the points (a2, ℓ2) and (a3, ℓ3) the function evaluated at those points, ft(e
a2 , eℓ2)
and ft(e
a3 , eℓ3), where ft(e
a2 , eℓ2) 6= ft(ea3 , eℓ3), is known. Call these known points,
ft(e
a2 , eℓ2) = α2 and ft(e
a3 , eℓ3) = α3.
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a1, ln It = ℓ1)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a2, ln It = ℓ2)
E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a3, ln It = ℓ3)− E(Zt+1,m| ln θt = a2, ln It = ℓ2) =
ln ft(e
a1 , eℓ1)− α2
α3 − α2
We identify the function ln ft(θt, It) over its support by varying a1 ∈ R and ℓ1 ∈ R.
We cannot of course use this transformation to identify the function at the point
(a2, ℓ2), but the function evaluated at this point ft(e
a2 , eℓ2) is already known by Def-
inition 1.
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A.1.3 Derivation of Example with CES Technology (Example 2)
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∆1 =
ln f0(a1, 0)− ln f0(1, 1)
ln f0(e1, e1)− ln f0(1, 1)
∆1 =
ln(γ0 a1)− 0
ln(e1)− 0
∆1 =
ln(γ0 a1)
1
e∆1 = γ0 a1
γ0 =
e∆1
a1
Once we have γ0, we can use the same ratio as before taking a1 6= {0, 1}, a3 6= 0,
ℓ1 = 1, a2 = a4 = ℓ2 = ℓ4=1 and taking the limit ℓ3 → 0 we have:
∆2 =
ln f0(a1, 1)− ln f0(1, 1)
ln f0(a3, 0)− ln f0(1, 1)
∆2 =
ln f0(a1, 1)− 0
ln f0(a3, 0)− 0
∆2 =
ln f0(a1, 1)
ln f0(a3, 0)
∆2 =
ln(γ0 a
φ0
1 + 1− γ0)
ln(γ0 a3)
ln(γ0 a3)∆2 = ln(γ0 a
φ0
1 + 1− γ0)
(γ0 a3)
∆2 = γ0 a
φ0
1 + 1− γ0
(a1)
φ0 =
(γ0 a3)
∆2 − 1 + γ0
γ0
φ0 ln(a1) = ln
(
(γ0 a3)
∆2 − 1 + γ0
γ0
)
φ0 =
ln
(
(γ0 a3)∆2−1+γ0
γ0
)
ln(a1)
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A.1.4 Technologies and Output Elasticities
260
One rationale for the choice of a technology specification with non-constant returns
to scale is the flexibility this specification offers with respect to the implied output
elasticity. We consider the output elasticity with respect to investment defined as
ǫI ≡ ∂ ln θt+1
∂ ln It
This elasticity is key to quantifying the effects of policy interventions.
In the general CES case, with technology given by
θt+1 =
[
γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt
]ψt
φt ,
the output elasticity is given by
ǫI =
ψt
φt
[
γθφtt + (1− γt)Iφtt
]ψt
φt
−1
φ(1− γt)Iφt−1t ·
It[
γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt
]ψt
φt
=
ψt(1− γt)Iφtt
γtθ
φt
t + (1− γt)Iφtt
∈ [0,∞)
In the special case of constant returns to scale (CRS), ψt = 1, and ǫI ∈ (0, 1). CRS
implies this elasticity is bounded from above by 1. The general, non-constant returns
to scale, case allows a larger than unit elastic response.
Similarly, the general translog technology,
ln θt+1 = α1t ln θt + α2t ln It + α3t ln θt ln It
with elasticity
ǫI = α1t + α3t ln θt
also allows general higher than unit elastic elasticities.
The main insight we want to underline is that the CES technology with constant
return to scale restricts the output elasticity to be between 0 and 1: a one percent
change in investment leads to a less than one percent change in next period skills.
This prediction is independent of data, hence it can potentially be very restrictive in
the context of child development and skills formation.
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A.2 Additional Tables and Figures
262
A.2.1 Additional Tables for Model 1 Corrected for Measurement Error
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Table A.1: Estimates for Income Process
Constant 0.377
( 0.013)
Log Family Income t-1 0.753
( 0.008)
Variance Innovation 0.579
( 0.008)
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the income process. The dependent variable
is log family income at time t. Log Family Income t − 1 is log family income two
years prior. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Elasticity of Next Period Skills with respect to Investment
by Age
Notes: This figure shows the box plot for the elasticity of next period skills with
respect to investment by different ages in the estimated Model 1 controlling for mea-
surement error. The box plot is constructed as follow: the ”central box” represents
the central 50% of the data. Its lower and upper boundary lines are at the 25th and
75th quantile of the data. The central line indicates the median of the data while
the two extreme lines (the top and the bottom ones) represents the 5th and 95th
percentiles.
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Figure A.2: Distribution of Technology Return to Scale by Age
Notes: This figure shows the box plot for the technology return to scale by different
ages in the estimated Model 1 controlling for measurement error. The box plot is
constructed as follow: the ”central box” represents the central 50% of the data. Its
lower and upper boundary lines are at the 25th and 75th quantile of the data. The
central line indicates the median of the data while the two extreme lines (the top and
the bottom ones) represents the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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A.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
267
Table A.2: Children’s Skills Measures
Measures Range Values Age Range Scoring Order
(The Peabody Individual Achievement Test):
Math 0-84 5-14 Positive
Recognition 0-84 5-14 Positive
Comprehensive 0-84 5-14 Positive
Notes: This table shows the features of children cognitive measures. The first column
indicate each type of children skills measure we use to estimate our model. The second
column shows the minimum and maximum value that each measure takes. The third
column shows the minimum and maximum children age at which each measure is
available. The last column indicates whether the measure is ordered positively (the
higher score tend to reveal higher skills) or negatively (the lower score tend to reveal
higher skills).
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Table A.3: Mothers Cognitive Skills Measures
Measures Range Values Scoring Order
Arithmetics 0-30 Positive
Word Knowledge 0-35 Positive
Paragraph Composition 0-15 Positive
Numeric Operations 0-50 Positive
Coding Speed 0-84 Positive
Math Knowledge 0-25 Positive
Notes: This table shows the features of mother cognitive measures. The first column
indicate each type of mother cognitive skills measure we use to estimate our model.
The second column shows the minimum and maximum value that each measure takes.
The last column indicates whether the measure is ordered positively (the higher score
tend to reveal higher skills) or negatively (the lower score tend to reveal higher skills).
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Table A.4: Mothers Noncognitive Skills Measures
Type of variables Range Values Label Scoring Order
Mother Noncognitive Measures
(Rosenberg indexes):
I am a person of worth
1-4
1= Strongly agree
Negative
I have a number of good qualities 2= Agree
I am able to do things as well as most other people 3=Disagree
I take a positive attitude toward myself 4=Strongly disagree
I am inclined to feel that I am a failure
1-4 Positive
I felt I do not have much to be proud of 1= Strongly agree
I wish I could have more respect for myself 2= Agree
I certainly feel useless at times 3=Disagree
At times I think I am no good at all 4=Strongly disagree
(Rotter Indexes):
Rotter 1 ( Life is in control or not) 1-4
1= In Control and closer to my opinion
Negative2= In control but slightly closer to my opinion
3= Not in control but slightly closer to my opinion
4= Not in control and closer to my opinion
Rotter 2 (Plans work vs Matter of Luck) 1-4
1= Plans work and closer to my opinion
Negative
2= Plans work but slightly closer to my opinion
3= Matter of Luck but slightly closer to my opinion
4= Matter of Luck and closer to my opinion
Rotter 3 (Luck not a factor vs Flip a coin) 1-4
1= Luck not a factor and closer to my opinion
Negative
2=Luck not a factor but slightly closer to my opinion
3= Flip a coin but slightly closer to my opinion
4= Flip a coin and closer to my opinion
Rotter 4 (Luck big role vs Luck no role) 1-4
1= Luck big role and closer to my opinion
Positive
2=Luck big role but slightly closer to my opinion
3= Luck no role but slightly closer to my opinion
4= Luck no role and closer to my opinion
Notes: This table shows the features of mother noncognitive measures. The first
column indicate each type of mother cognitive skills measure we use to estimate
our model. The second column shows the minimum and maximum value that each
measure takes. The third column shows the type of answers associated with each
measure value. The last column indicates whether the measure is ordered positively
(the higher score tend to reveal higher skills) or negatively (the lower score tend to
reveal higher skills).
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Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics about Children’s Cognitive Skills Measures
Number
of
Measures Mean Std Min Max Values
Age 5-6
PIAT Math 11.858 4.278 0.000 37.000 32.000
PIAT Recognition 12.864 5.048 0.000 57.000 35.000
PIAT Comprehensive 12.770 4.930 0.000 49.000 35.000
Age 7-8
PIAT Math 23.016 8.681 0.000 74.000 58.000
PIAT Recognition 25.748 8.774 0.000 80.000 67.000
PIAT Comprehensive 24.099 8.142 0.000 69.000 60.000
Age 9-10
PIAT Math 38.720 10.832 0.000 84.000 71.000
PIAT Recognition 40.825 11.487 0.000 84.000 76.000
PIAT Comprehensive 37.540 10.231 0.000 78.000 64.000
Age 11-12
PIAT Math 48.184 10.543 0.000 84.000 78.000
PIAT Recognition 51.079 13.278 0.000 84.000 74.000
PIAT Comprehensive 45.732 11.272 0.000 84.000 72.000
Age 13-14
PIAT Math 53.767 11.387 0.000 84.000 78.000
PIAT Recognition 58.670 14.262 0.000 84.000 74.000
PIAT Comprehensive 51.015 12.229 0.000 84.000 74.000
Notes: This table shows main sample statistics of children cognitive skills measures
by children age.
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Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics of Mother Cognitive and Noncognitive Skills Mea-
sures
Mother Cognitive Skills
Number
of
Measures Mean Std Min Max Values
Mom‘s Arithmetic Reasoning Test Score 13.946 6.603 0.000 30.000 31.000
Mom‘s Word Knowledge Test Score 21.773 8.562 0.000 35.000 36.000
Mom‘s Paragraph Composition Test Score 9.620 3.778 0.000 15.000 16.000
Mom‘s Numerical Operations Test Score 31.044 11.831 0.000 50.000 51.000
Mom‘s Coding Speed Test Score 42.953 17.468 0.000 84.000 85.000
Mom‘s Mathematical Knowledge Test Score 10.853 5.867 0.000 25.000 26.000
Mother Non Cognitive Skills
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am a person of worth” 2.461 0.549 0.000 3.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ” I have good qualities” 2.338 0.539 0.000 3.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am a failure” 3.379 0.618 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am as capable as others” 2.291 0.567 0.000 3.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I have nothing to be proud of” 3.360 0.669 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I have a positive attitude” 2.183 0.619 0.000 3.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I wish I had more self-respect” 2.796 0.817 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I feel useless at times” 2.650 0.770 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I sometimes think I am no good” 3.039 0.802 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Rotter Score:”I have no control” 2.863 1.058 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”I make no plans for the future” 2.386 1.192 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”Luck is big factor in life” 3.205 0.856 1.000 4.000 4.000
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”Luck plays big role in my life” 2.594 1.024 1.000 4.000 4.000
Notes: This table shows main sample statistics of mother cognitive skills measures.
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Figure A.3: Descriptive Statistics: Mean of PIATs over the Childhood
Notes: This figure shows the mean Piat Math, Recognition and Comprehensive test
scores by age. The x-axis shows children age. Child age of 5 is age 5-6, 7 is age 7-8,
and so on.
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A.2.3 Measurement Parameter Estimates
274
Table A.7: Measurement Parameter Estimates for Children’s Cognitive Measures
Measures µ λ Signal Noise
Age 5-6
PIAT Math 11.858 1.000 0.270 0.730
PIAT Recognition 12.864 2.238 0.972 0.028
PIAT Comprehensive 12.770 2.159 0.948 0.052
Age 7-8
PIAT Math 11.858 1.000 0.757 0.243
PIAT Recognition 15.592 0.906 0.608 0.392
PIAT Comprehensive 15.014 0.802 0.554 0.446
Age 9-10
PIAT Math 11.858 1.000 0.779 0.221
PIAT Recognition 10.297 1.136 0.894 0.106
PIAT Comprehensive 12.273 0.936 0.765 0.235
Age 11-12
PIAT Math 11.858 1.000 0.803 0.197
PIAT Recognition 2.107 1.347 0.918 0.082
PIAT Comprehensive 6.129 1.089 0.833 0.167
Age 13-14
PIAT Math 11.858 1.000 0.927 0.073
PIAT Recognition 8.556 1.195 0.845 0.155
PIAT Comprehensive 9.041 1.002 0.806 0.194
Notes: This table shows the measurement error parameters and associated statistics
for children cognitive measures. The first two columns shows the measurement pa-
rameters (µ and λ) while the last two columns shows the signal and noise variance
decomposition for the children cognitive measures.
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Table A.8: Measurement Parameter Estimates for Mother Cognitive and Noncogni-
tive Measures
Mother Cognitive Skills
Measures µ λ Signal Noise
Mom‘s Arithmetic Reasoning Test Score 13.946 1.000 0.692 0.308
Mom‘s Word Knowledge Test Score 21.773 1.345 0.745 0.255
Mom‘s Paragraph Composition Test Score 9.620 0.584 0.722 0.278
Mom‘s Numerical Operations Test Score 31.044 1.720 0.638 0.362
Mom‘s Coding Speed Test Score 42.953 2.308 0.527 0.473
Mom‘s Mathematical Knowledge Test Score 10.853 0.854 0.639 0.361
Mother Non Cognitive Skills
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am a person of worth” 2.461 1.000 0.152 0.848
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ” I have good qualities” 2.338 1.263 0.252 0.748
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am a failure” 3.379 1.612 0.311 0.689
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I am as capable as others” 2.291 1.127 0.181 0.819
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I have nothing to be proud of” 3.360 1.746 0.312 0.688
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I have a positive attitude” 2.183 1.474 0.260 0.740
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I wish I had more self-respect” 2.796 2.080 0.297 0.703
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I feel useless at times” 2.650 1.861 0.268 0.732
Mom‘s Self-Esteem: ”I sometimes think I am no good” 3.039 2.096 0.313 0.687
Mom‘s Rotter Score:”I have no control” 2.461 1.000 0.092 0.908
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”I make no plans for the future” 2.338 1.263 0.140 0.860
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”Luck is big factor in life” 3.379 1.612 0.118 0.882
Mom‘s Rotter Score: ”Luck plays big role in my life” 2.291 1.127 0.044 0.956
Notes: This table shows the measurement error parameters and associated statistics
for mother cognitive and noncognitive measures. The first two columns shows the
measurement parameters (µ and λ) while the last two columns shows the signal and
noise variance decomposition for the mother measures.
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A.2.4 Estimates and Results for Model 2 with Measurement Error Corrected
Estimator
277
Table A.9: Estimates for Investment (Model 2)
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 0.230 0.069 0.068 0.065
( 0.059) ( 0.021) ( 0.029) ( 0.030)
Log Mother Cognitive Skills 0.071 0.004 0.011 -0.005
( 0.022) ( 0.009) ( 0.014) ( 0.012)
Log Mother Noncognitive Skills 0.359 0.711 0.660 0.678
( 0.131) ( 0.059) ( 0.084) ( 0.084)
Log Family Income 0.341 0.217 0.261 0.262
( 0.076) ( 0.054) ( 0.072) ( 0.082)
Variance Shocks 1.186 0.969 0.831 1.028
( 0.232) ( 0.134) ( 0.211) ( 0.259)
Notes: This table shows the measurement error corrected estimates for the invest-
ment equation for Model 2. Each column shows the coefficients of the investment
equation at the given ages. The dependent variable is investment in period t which is
determined by the covariates at time t . For example, the first column shows the coef-
ficients at age 5-6 for parental investments and child’s skill and family income at age
5-6 as well. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
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Figure A.4: Heterogeneity in Policy Effects by Age 5 Household Income (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23)
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age 5-6
on completed months of schooling by the percentile of initial (age 5-6) family income
for the estimated Model 2, controlling for measurement error. Each income category
is defined as the people contained between nth and the n − 1th of the percentiles of
the income distribution. For example, Income category 10 in the graph means the
people who belong between the 9th and 10th percentile of the income distribution. In
the estimated income distribution for our sample, income categories 10, 50, and 90
contain families with about $14,000, $45,000, and $145,000 of annual family income.
This figure also plots the average effect over the income distribution.
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A.2.5 Estimates and Results without Measurement Error Correction (Model 1 and
Model 2)
280
Table A.10: Estimates for Investment (Model 1 and Model 2)
Model 1 Model 2(
Free Return to Scale Technology
and TFP Dynamics
) (
Restricted Return to Scale Technology
and No TFP Dynamics
)
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 0.083 0.032 0.024 0.015 0.083 0.045 0.030 0.014
( 0.023) ( 0.009) ( 0.009) ( 0.007) ( 0.023) ( 0.012) ( 0.011) ( 0.007)
Log Mother Cognitive Skills 0.082 0.010 0.010 -0.002 0.082 0.010 0.010 -0.002
( 0.019) ( 0.011) ( 0.014) ( 0.011) ( 0.019) ( 0.011) ( 0.014) ( 0.011)
Log Mother Noncognitive Skills 0.248 0.454 0.442 0.553 0.248 0.448 0.440 0.553
( 0.093) ( 0.073) ( 0.098) ( 0.074) ( 0.093) ( 0.073) ( 0.098) ( 0.074)
Log Family Income 0.587 0.504 0.524 0.434 0.587 0.498 0.521 0.435
( 0.074) ( 0.070) ( 0.095) ( 0.077) ( 0.074) ( 0.069) ( 0.095) ( 0.078)
Variance Shocks 1.635 1.522 1.537 1.535 1.635 1.504 1.529 1.537
( 0.224) ( 0.172) ( 0.364) ( 0.327) ( 0.224) ( 0.168) ( 0.360) ( 0.329)
Notes: This table shows the estimates (not corrected for measurement error) for
the investment equation for both Model 1 and Model 2. Each column shows the
coefficients of the investment equation at the given ages. The dependent variable is
investment in period t which is determined by the covariates at time t . For example,
the first column shows the coefficients at age 5-6 for parental investments and child’s
skill and family income at age 5-6 as well. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed
using a cluster bootstrap.
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Table A.11: Estimates for Skill Technology (Model 1 and Model 2)
Model 1 Model 2(
Free Return to Scale Technology
and TFP Dynamics
) (
Restricted Return to Scale Technology
and No TFP Dynamics
)
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 0.875 0.771 0.669 0.770 0.625 0.868 0.897 0.880
( 0.057) ( 0.022) ( 0.017) ( 0.018) ( 0.047) ( 0.039) ( 0.039) ( 0.052)
Log Investment 0.518 0.069 0.042 0.325 0.370 0.125 0.101 0.127
( 0.089) ( 0.066) ( 0.061) ( 0.099) ( 0.045) ( 0.038) ( 0.039) ( 0.052)
( Log Skills * 0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.006 0.005 0.008 0.002 -0.007
Log Investment ) ( 0.012) ( 0.003) ( 0.002) ( 0.002) ( 0.009) ( 0.004) ( 0.002) ( 0.003)
Return to scale 1.399 0.846 0.713 1.089 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
( 0.098) ( 0.072) ( 0.063) ( 0.096) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Variance shocks 7.490 7.673 6.716 7.382 5.354 6.155 7.211 9.092
( 0.127) ( 0.145) ( 0.192) ( 0.220) ( 0.386) ( 0.565) ( 0.769) ( 0.980)
Log TFP 12.789 18.491 18.477 14.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
( 0.215) ( 0.299) ( 0.444) ( 0.690) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Notes: This table shows the estimates (not corrected for measurement error) for the
technology of skills formation and the technology return to scale (i.e. the sum of the
share parameters for each input) for not measurement error corrected estimates of
both Model 1 and Model 2. Each column shows the coefficients of the technology of
skills formations at the given age. The dependent variable is log skills in the next
period t+1 while the covariates (inputs) are at time t. For example, the first column
shows the coefficients for the skills inputs at age 5-6 which lead to log skills at age
7-8. Standard errors in parenthesis are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
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Figure A.5: Heterogeneity in Policy Effects by Age 5 Household Income (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23, Model 1 )
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age
5-6 on completed months of schooling by the percentile of initial (age 5-6) family
income for the estimated Model 1, not controlling for measurement error. Each
income category is defined as the people contained between nth and the n − 1th of
the percentiles of the income distribution. For example, Income category 10 in the
graph means the people who belong between the 9th and 10th percentile of the income
distribution. In the estimated income distribution for our sample, income categories
10, 50, and 90 contain families with about $14,000, $45,000, and $145,000 of annual
family income. This figure also plots the average effect over the income distribution.
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Figure A.6: Heterogeneity in Policy Effects by Age 5 Household Income (Outcome:
Schooling at Age 23, Model 2 )
Notes: This figure plots the heterogeneous effect of a $1,000 income transfer at age
5-6 on completed months of schooling by the percentile of initial (age 5-6) family
income for the estimated Model 2, not controlling for measurement error. Each
income category is defined as the people contained between nth and the n − 1th of
the percentiles of the income distribution. For example, Income category 10 in the
graph means the people who belong between the 9th and 10th percentile of the income
distribution. In the estimated income distribution for our sample, income categories
10, 50, and 90 contain families with about $14,000, $45,000, and $145,000 of annual
family income. This figure also plots the average effect over the income distribution.
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A.2.6 Skills measures in CNLSY79
285
Measures for Cognitive Skills
• Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, revised edition (PPVT-R) ”measures
an individual’s receptive (hearing) vocabulary for Standard American English
and provides, at the same time, a quick estimate of verbal ability or scholastic
aptitude” (see Dunn and Dunn, 1981). The PPVT was designed for use with
individuals aged 2 to 40 years. The English language version of the PPVT-
R consists of 175 vocabulary items of generally increasing difficulty. The child
listens to a word uttered by the interviewer and then selects one of four pictures
that best describes the word’s meaning. The PPVT-R has been administered,
with some exceptions, to NLSY79 children between the ages of 3-18 years of
age until 1994, when children 15 and older moved into the Young Adult survey.
In the current survey round, the PPVT was administered to children aged 4-5
and 10-11 years of age, as well as to some children with no previous valid PPVT
score.
The first item, or starting point, is determined based on the child’s PPVT age.
Starting at an age-specific level of difficulty is intended to reduce the number
of items that are too easy or too difficult, in order to minimize boredom or
frustration. The suggested starting points for each age can be found in the
PPVT manual (see Dunn and Dunn, 1981).
Testing begins with the starting point and proceeds forward until the child
makes an incorrect response. If the child has made 8 or more correct responses
before the first error, a “basal” is established. The basal is defined as the last
item in the highest series of 8 consecutive correct answers. Once the basal is
established, testing proceeds forwards, until the child makes six errors in eight
consecutive items. If, however, the child gives an incorrect response before
8 consecutive correct answers have been made, testing proceeds backwards,
beginning at the item just before the starting point, until 8 consecutive correct
responses have been made. If a child does not make eight consecutive responses
even after administering all of the items, he or she is given a basal of one. If
a child has more than one series of 8 consecutive correct answers, the highest
basal is used to compute the raw score.
A “ceiling” is established when a child incorrectly identifies six of eight con-
secutive items. The ceiling is defined as the last item in the lowest series of
eight consecutive items with six incorrect responses. If more than one ceiling is
identified, the lowest ceiling is used to compute the raw score. The assessment
is complete once both a basal and a ceiling have been established. The ceiling
is set to 175 if the child never makes six errors in eight consecutive items.
A child’s raw score is the number of correct answers below the ceiling. Note
that all answers below the highest basal are counted as correct, even if the child
answered some of these items incorrectly. The raw score can be calculated by
subtracting the number of errors between the highest basal and lowest ceiling
from the item number of the lowest ceiling.
• The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT): Math
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The PIAT Mathematics assessment protocol used in the field is described in
the documentation for the Child Supplement (available on the Questionnaires
page). This subscale measures a child’s attainment in mathematics as taught
in mainstream education. It consists of 84 multiple-choice items of increasing
difficulty. It begins with such early skills as recognizing numerals and progresses
to measuring advanced concepts in geometry and trigonometry. The child looks
at each problem on an easel page and then chooses an answer by pointing to or
naming one of four answer options.
Administration of this assessment is relatively straightforward. Children enter
the assessment at an age-appropriate item (although this is not essential to
the scoring) and establish a ”basal” by attaining five consecutive correct re-
sponses. If no basal is achieved then a basal of ”1” is assigned (see PPVT).
A ”ceiling” is reached when five of seven items are answered incorrectly. The
non-normalized raw score is equivalent to the ceiling item minus the number of
incorrect responses between the basal and the ceiling scores.
• The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT): Reading Recog-
nition
The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) Reading Recognition sub-
test, one of five in the PIAT series, measures word recognition and pronuncia-
tion ability, essential components of reading achievement. Children read a word
silently, then say it aloud. PIAT Reading Recognition contains 84 items, each
with four options, which increase in difficulty from preschool to high school lev-
els. Skills assessed include matching letters, naming names, and reading single
words aloud.
The only difference in the implementation procedures between the PIAT Math-
ematics and PIAT Reading Recognition assessments is that the entry point into
the Reading Recognition assessment is based on the child’s score in the Mathe-
matics assessment, although entering at the correct point is not essential to the
scoring.
The scoring decisions and procedures are identical to those described for the
PIAT Mathematics assessment.
• The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT): Reading Com-
prehension
The Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) Reading Comprehension
subtest measures a child’s ability to derive meaning from sentences that are
read silently. For each of 66 items of increasing difficulty, the child silently
reads a sentence once and then selects one of four pictures that best portrays
the meaning of the sentence.
Children who score less than 19 on Reading Recognition are assigned their
Reading Recognition score as their Reading Comprehension score. If they score
at least 19 on the Reading Recognition assessment, their Reading Recognition
score determines the entry point to Reading Comprehension. Entering at the
correct location is, however, not essential to the scoring.
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Basals and ceilings on PIAT Reading Comprehension and an overall nonnormed
raw score are determined in a manner identical to the other PIAT procedures.
The only difference is that children for whom a basal could not be computed
(but who otherwise completed the comprehension assessment) are automati-
cally assigned a basal of 19. Administration instructions can be found in the
assessment section of the Child Supplement.
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A.3 Alternative Measures
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One of the characteristics of the data used to study child development is the rich
variety skill measures. The previous sections considered identification where the skill
measures are in a “raw” form: each measure is a linear function of the latent log
skill. This measurement system, while commonly assumed in the prior literature, is
in some respects a “best case.”
In this section, we consider alternative forms of measures and re-examine whether
we can identify the same types of production technologies using these alternative
measures. We consider four classes of measures which are frequently encountered
empirically: (i) age-standardized measures where the raw measures are transformed
ex post to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the sample at hand; (ii) relative
measures where the measures reflect not the level of a child’s skill but the child’s skill
relative to the population mean; (iii) ordinal measures which provide a discrete rank-
ing of children’s skills; and iv) censored measures where the measures are truncated
with a “floor” (finite minimum value) and/or a “ceiling” (finite maximum value). For
each type of measure, we discuss which of our prior identification results still hold, if
any, and what auxiliary assumptions would be sufficient to restore our identification
results.
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A.3.1 Age-Standardized Measures
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Age-standardized measures are defined as the following transformation of raw
measures Zt,m:
ZSt,m =
Zt,m − E(Zt,m)
V (Zt,m)1/2
. (A.1)
By construction, these measures are mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for all child
ages.
Our main identification result using standardized measures (Theorem 1) continues
to hold if the technology of skill formation has known scale and location functions
(KLS, Definition 1). To show this, we can re-write the standardized measures as a
linear function of the latent variable:
ZSt,m = µ
S
t,m + λ
S
t,m ln θt + ǫ
S
t,m
where the measurement parameters and measurement error are
µSt,m = −λSt,m(V (ln θt)) · E(ln θt)
λSt,m =
λt,m
V (Zt,m)1/2
=
λt,m
(λ2t,mV (ln θt) + V (ǫt))
1/2
ǫSt,m =
ǫt,m
V (Zt,m)1/2
=
ǫt,m
(λ2t,mV (ln θt) + V (ǫt))
1/2
These expressions show that the standardized measurement parameters are linear
functions of the underlying moments of the latent skill distribution. 1 The reason for
the invariance of our identification result to the use of standardized or raw measures
is that any measurement parameters are “transformed away” as shown in Lemma 1.
More generally, identification of the KLS production technologies is invariant to any
increasing linear transformation of the original raw measures, say Z ′t,m = a + bZt,m
for a ∈ R and b ∈ R+. 2
However, the use of age-standardized measures may not be cost free in the sense
that age-standardized measures, which are constructed to be age-stationary in their
1It is important to recognize that the use of standardized measures does not necessarily imply
that any particular restriction on the underlying latent variables such as E(ln θt) = 0 or V (ln θt) = 1.
The standardizations are necessarily in terms of the observed measures, not the unobserved latent
variables.
2One caveat deserves mention. Recall that because the initial conditions are normalized to a
particular measure, using standardized rather than raw measures can affect the normalized location
and scale of the latent skills, and in general affect the values of the production parameters which
are identified up to the normalized initial period measure.
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first and second moments, contain no information about skill dynamics in these mo-
ments. For example, standardizing age-invariant measures, as defined in the previous
section, so that the mean and variance of these measures is equal at all ages, would
essentially “throw away” information regarding the average skill development of chil-
dren across ages. This loss of information prevents the identification of the broader
classes of technology of skills formation discussed above, the unknown Total Factor
Productivity (TFP) functions (as in equation 14) or unknown scale functions (as in
equation 15).
To see this point, recall that the identification of TFP or scaling parameter are
based on additional information of the dynamics of measurement parameters. In
the case of raw measures, those parameters are fully free parameters. On the other
hand, when we use standardized measures, the new measurement parameters (µSt,m
and λSt,m) are no longer free parameters but functions of the moments of the latent
distribution. Hence, restricting the dynamics of the measurement parameters in this
case (imposing Assumption 2 and Assumption 3) is equivalent to restricting the dy-
namics of the latent skills, and can restrict the possible classes of technologies. While
age-standardizing measures may provide some descriptive value, in the context of
identifying dynamic production technologies, there is simply no point to transform-
ing the measures in this way and throwing away potentially important identifying
information.
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A.3.2 Relative Measures
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Some of the proxies used to measure children outcomes come from surveys where
observers (often mothers, fathers, or other caregivers) provide assessments of the
child. It can be plausible then that these observers are actually evaluating the child
with respect to their perceptions of the average in the population. We call this type
of measure a relative measures. In this case, these measures can be written as:
ZRt,m = µ
R
t,m + λ
R
t,m(ln θt − E(ln θt)) + ǫRt,m. (A.2)
where (ln θt−E(ln θt) is the latent variable being measured by ZRt,m, which we model
as the deviation of the actual level of the child’s skill ln θt relative to the mean value in
the population E(ln θt). Relative measures are not ordinal ranking measures (which
we discuss below) but a continuous measure of skills relative to the population mean.
As with the age-standardized measures, the relative measures are an increasing linear
function of the underlying latent variable, and therefore the main identification result
in Theorem 1 continues to hold as the measurement parameters are “transformed
away.”
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A.3.3 Ordinal Measures
296
We define ordinal measures the measures which are based on children rankings:
this child has higher skills than another child. Let’s assume that we observe in data
children’s skill rank. Let Zt = {1, 2, . . . , J} be the child’s human capital rank, with 1
highest level, and J lowest level. The observer (or us forming ranks from test scores)
forms rank according to this ordinal model:
ZOt,m =

J if λOt,m ln θt + ǫ
O
t,m < κJ,t,m
J − 1 if κJ,t,m < λOt,m ln θt + ǫOt,m < κJ−1,t,m
...
2 if κ3,t,m < λ
O
t,m ln θt + ǫ
O
t,m < κ2,t,m
1 if λOt,m ln θt + ǫ
O
t,m > κ2,t,m
(A.3)
where the κ2, . . . , κJ , with κ2 > κ3, . . . , κJ , are measurement parameters which pro-
vide the mapping from latent skills ln θt and measurement error ǫ
O
t,m to the observed
ordinal ranking values ZOt,m. The probability a child is ranked first (j = 1) is then
pr(ZOt,m = 1) = pr(λ
O
t,m ln θt + ǫ
O
t,m > κ2,t,m)
= Fǫ(λ
O
t,m ln θt − κ2,t,m)
where Fǫ is the distribution function for the measurement error ǫ
O
t,m.
With ordinal ranking measures the non-parametric identification result no longer
holds. There is no longer a one-to-one mapping between a child’s latent skills θt
and expected measures, as multiple values of θt are consistent with a child having a
certain rank. Without additional assumptions beyond Assumption 1 (independence
of measures), ordinal measures of skills do not allow non-parametric identification of
the continuous skill production function.
If the researcher were to assume a particular known distribution for the measure-
ment errors Fǫ, then under this assumption for an ordinal measure of t + 1 skills we
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would have:
F−1ǫ (pr(Z
O
t+1,m = 1| ln θt, ln It)) = λt+1,mft(It, θt)− κ2,t+1,m
where pr(ZOt+1,m = 1| ln θt, ln It) is the probability the child receives rank 1 at age t+1
given inputs θt, It at age t. This expression shows that with a known distribution for
measurement errors, we can then apply Theorem 1 to identify a KLS technology
ft(It, θt) up to this assumed distribution.
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A.3.4 Censored Measures
299
Censored measures are defined as
ZCt,m =

Z if Zt,m ≥ Z
Zt,m if Z < Zt,m < Z
Z if Zt,m < Z
(A.4)
where Zt,m = µt,m + λt,m ln θt + ǫt,m is the “latent” measure, and Z (“ceiling”) and
Z (“floor”), with Z > Z, are the truncation points. Censoring occurs, for example,
when a test score used as the measure has a maximum score (answering all questions
correctly) and a minimum score (say answering none of the questions correctly). In
practice, researchers can ascertain whether censoring is an important issue empirically
by investigating what proportion of the sample actually has measured skills at the
floor or ceiling points of the measure. Because censored measures do not have full
support, the non-parametric identification result of Theorem 1 appears no longer to
hold. As with the ordinal measures, auxiliary assumptions could be used to achieve
identification up these additional assumptions (for a complete analyze of the problem,
see Wang et al. 2009, Koedel and Betts, 2010)
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A.4 Monte Carlo Exercise for Model 1 and Measurement Error Correction
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We implement a Monte Carlo exercise to examine the properties of our estimator.
The true data generating process is assumed to be the estimated (measurement error
corrected) Model 1 with some additional parametric assumptions about the measure-
ment error process. In order to simulate the dataset, we use the both the estimated
measurement parameters and the joint distribution of children skills and investments.
In addition, we assume that all the measurement noises are Normally distributed. 3
We generate a simulated longitudinal dataset of 10,000 children ranging from age
5-6 to age 13-14. In particular, the Monte Carlo analysis is performed estimating the
model on 200 simulated data sets. In the following tables we show the mean estimates
over the 200 estimates of the coefficients.
We focus only on estimates of skills technology, investment process and children’s
skills measurement parameters. Tables A.12-A.14 show true and mean estimated
parameters. Overall, the estimator is able to recover the true parameters with minimal
bias.
3We assume that the standard deviation of the error terms for all the skills measures are 0.5
(children and mothers) while we fix to 0.1 the standard deviation of the error terms for all the
investment measures.
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Table A.12: Monte Carlo Estimates for Investment Process
True Parameters Monte Carlo Estimates
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 0.230 0.027 0.020 0.018 0.249 0.026 0.020 0.018
Log Mother Cognitive Skills 0.071 0.004 0.012 -0.005 0.077 0.002 0.008 -0.011
Log Mother Noncognitive Skills 0.359 0.742 0.694 0.712 0.322 0.748 0.700 0.700
Log Family Income 0.341 0.227 0.274 0.275 0.352 0.224 0.272 0.292
Variance Shocks 1.186 1.019 0.868 1.087 1.263 0.993 0.827 1.103
Notes: This table shows the both the true estimates (reported also in Table 3) and
the mean Monte Carlo estimates for the investment equation. Each column shows the
coefficients of the investment equation at the given ages. The dependent variable is
investment in period t which is determined by the covariates at time t . For example,
the first column shows the coefficients at age 5-6 for parental investments and child’s
skill and family income at age 5-6 as well.
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Table A.13: Monte Carlo Estimates for Skill Technology
True Parameters Monte Carlo Estimates
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12
Log Skills 1.966 1.086 0.897 1.065 1.955 1.091 0.897 1.071
Log Investment 0.799 0.695 0.713 0.252 0.759 0.700 0.839 0.502
( Log Skills * -0.105 -0.005 -0.003 0.003 -0.092 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002
Log Investment )
Return to scale 2.660 1.776 1.606 1.320 2.623 1.786 1.731 1.571
Variance shocks 5.612 4.519 3.585 4.019 5.613 4.520 3.586 4.018
Log TFP 13.067 14.747 11.881 2.927 13.060 14.689 11.801 2.594
Notes: This table shows the both the true estimates (reported also in Table 4) and
the mean Monte Carlo estimates for the technology of skills formation. Each column
shows the coefficients of the technology of skills formations at the given age. The
dependent variable is log skills in the next period t+1 while the covariates (inputs)
are at time t. For example, the first column shows the coefficients for the skills inputs
at age 5-6 which lead to log skills at age 7-8.
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Table A.14: Monte Carlo Estimates for Measurement Parameters
True Constant (µ) Monte Carlo Constant (µ) Estimates
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 13-14 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 13-14
PIAT Math 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858 11.858
PIAT Recognition 12.864 15.592 10.297 2.107 8.556 12.864 15.592 10.298 2.110 8.555
PIAT Comprehensive 12.770 15.014 12.273 6.129 9.041 12.770 15.013 12.270 6.132 9.040
True Factor Loadings (λ) Monte Carlo Factor Loadings (λ) Estimates
Parameter Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 13-14 Age 5-6 Age 7-8 Age 9-10 Age 11-12 Age 13-14
PIAT Math 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
PIAT Recognition 2.238 0.906 1.136 1.347 1.195 2.238 0.905 1.136 1.347 1.196
PIAT Comprehensive 2.159 0.802 0.936 1.089 1.002 2.159 0.802 0.936 1.089 1.002
Notes: This table shows the both the true estimates (reported also in Table A.7) and
the mean Monte Carlo estimates for the measurement parameters of children skills
measures equation. Each column shows the parameters at the given ages for each
test score.
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Chapter B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2
306
B.1 Data Appendix
The Add Health database was designed to study the impact of the social envi-
ronment (i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school) on adolescents’ behavior in
the United States of America. Add Health’s original sample comprises students of
132 representative schools in the United States. There are 90,118 students, rang-
ing between grades 7 and 12 in the 1994–1995 school year (Wave I). A subsample
of students (20,745) was selected for an additional home interview (in-home). The
home interview includes new questions for the children and a questionnaire for one
of their parents. Information related to school quality and area of residence makes
the data set attractive. Those surveyed were interviewed again in 1995–96 (Wave
II), 2001–2002 (Wave III), and 2007–2008 (Wave IV). The data set includes specific
information on family background, students’ school grades and their scores in the
Add Health Picture Vocabulary Test (AHPVT – a revised version of the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test [PPVT]), as well as information about children’s peers.
A main source of information which makes the Add Health data set particularly
attractive for achieving the objective of this project is the friendship nomination.
During the first two waves, children were asked, both during the in-home and in-
school interviews, to nominate their best five male and best five female friends. This
detailed information helped me to reconstruct the structure of friendship for every
child in the sample by simply matching their identifier.
307
B.1.1 Measures for Children’s Skills and Parental Investments
308
The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) was developed in 1959 as a test
of receptive vocabulary and is oriented to give an estimation of verbal ability and
school aptitude. More generally, it intends to provide a measure of intelligence. The
test is age standardized, and performance does not depend on the reading ability of
the test-taker. The test-giver reads a word, and the test-taker selects the image she
thinks best fits the meaning of the word from among four simple illustrations.
In the Add Health dataset, a computerized and shorter version of the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test, the AHPVT, has been implemented. The AHPVT includes
half of the questions of the original PPVT (every other item in the original sequence
was selected for use). Add Health provides two versions of the AHPVT: raw and
standardized test scores. The standardized version has a mean of 100 and a standard
deviation of 15 and is standardized by age (for further technical details about the
AHPVT, see Halpern, 2000).
Add Health provides information about the AHPVT test scores for Waves I, III
and IV. During Wave I, respondents are between 11 and 21 years old. I consider this
piece of information as one of the measures of children’s latent skills. Additionally, I
consider children’s grades at school for both Wave I and Wave II. Analyzing all these
multiple measurements, I am able to combine both the cross-sectional as well as the
longitudinal information about child development.
During the in-home interview in Wave I and Wave II, children provided infor-
mation about activities they had engaged in with their parents during the previous
four weeks. These activities include: going shopping, sport activities, going to a
movie/museum/concert or sport event, talking about personal problems or school, or
working on a project for school. There are a total of nine activities each child can
do with their parents. These types of activities provide information about the level
of parental engagement with their child. During Wave I, a parent, preferably the
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resident mother, of each adolescent respondent was interviewed (in-home interview).
The parent questionnaire included a question about the achieved level of education for
the respondent, which is considered as one proxy for the mother’s skills. During the
same survey, the respondent provided information about total family income during
the previous calendar year.
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B.2 Additional Figures and Tables
311
Figure B.1: Probability of the Friendships and School’s Size
Notes: This figure shows the probability, for each school, that a child becomes friend
with another child as function of school’s size.
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Figure B.2: Mean of Children Skills by Race (Low-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the mean of children’s skills for low-quality (low-income) neighborhood by
race.
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Figure B.3: Mean of Children Skills by Race (Medium-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the mean of children’s skills for medium-quality (medium-income) neighborhood
by race.
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Figure B.4: Mean of Children Skills by Race (High-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the mean of children’s skills for high-quality (high-income) neighborhood by
race.
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Figure B.5: Standard Deviation of Children Skills by Race (Low-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the standard deviation of children’s skills for low-quality (low-income) neigh-
borhood by race.
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Figure B.6: Standard Deviation of Children Skills by Race (Medium-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the standard deviation of children’s skills for medium-quality (medium-income)
neighborhood by race.
317
Figure B.7: Standard Deviation of Children Skills by Race (High-Income Neighborhood)
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the standard deviation of children’s skills for high-quality (high-income)
neighborhood by race.
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Figure B.8: Index for Skills Homophily by Neighborhoods
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the homophily index for skills by by neighborhood-quality type (low-median-
high income).
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Figure B.9: Index for Race Homophily by Neighborhoods
Notes: This figure shows the sample fit for the homophily index for race by by neighborhood-quality type (low-median-high
income).
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Table B.1: Sample Statistics by Neighborhood Types
Neighborhood’s Type (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Fraction of Families by Race
Fraction Black (%) 31.74 14.00 5.36
Fraction Hispanic (%) 26.77 14.50 10.86
Fraction White (%) 41.50 71.50 83.78
Panel B: Family Income (in 1994 $)
Mean Family Income
Family Income 29,637 43,458 57,512
Mean Family Income by Race
Black Family 26,917 41,778 46,592
Hispanic Family 26,167 33,749 49,940
White Family 34,046 45,632 59,224
Panel C: Children PPVT Achievements
Mean PPVT by Race
Black Children 57.02 62.37 64.39
Hispanic Children 58.06 60.33 64.51
White Children 63.87 66.46 69.98
PPVT Gaps between Neighborhoods
Black Children 66 (% SD) 18 (% SD) -
Hispanic Children 58 (% SD) 37 (% SD) -
White Children 55 (% SD) 32 (% SD) -
PPVT Gaps within Neighborhoods
Black Children 61 (% SD) 37 (% SD) 50(% SD)
Hispanic Children 52 (% SD) 55 (% SD) 49(% SD)
White Children - - -
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics by by neighborhood-
quality type (low-medium-high income).
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Table B.2: Sample Fit for Auxiliary Coefficients (Investments)
Dependent Variable
Fraction (%) of Invested Parental Time
Measurement Error Adjusted Measurement Error Adjusted Measurement Error Adjusted Measurement Error Adjusted
and and
Instrumental Variables (IV) Instrumental Variables (IV)
Data Model
Child Skills (Log) 2.660 2.120 2.152 3.124
(0.316) (0.668)
[2.041,3.280] [0.810,3.430]
Peers’ Skills (Log) -1.441 0.720 -1.272 0.895
(0.650) (0.354)
[-2.715,-0.167] [0.026,1.414]
First Stage First Stage
Z1,i,t (Minorities Children) -0.104 -0.127
(0.052)
[-0.206,-0.002]
Z2,i,t (White Children) 0.082 0.105
(0.037)
[0.009,0.155]
Notes: This table shows the sample fit for auxiliary regression coefficients for models in (3.2). Columns 1 and 2 shows the same estimated coefficients as in Table 3.2.
Both standard errors in parenthesis and the 95% confidence interval in square brackets are computed using a cluster bootstrap.
Data source: National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health).
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Table B.3: Sample Fit for Auxiliary Coeffi-
cients (Dynamics of Skills)
Data Model
Investments (Log) 0.408 0.343
(0.197)
[0.021,0.794]
Child‘s Skills (Log) 0.750 0.760
(0.238)
[0.283,1.216]
Peer‘s Skills (Log) 0.366 0.167
(0.167)
[0.038,0.693]
Notes: This table shows the sample fit for auxiliary
regression coefficients of the auxiliary model for the
dynamics of children’s skills. The dependent variable
is the next period (t+1) child’s log-skills. The covari-
ates in the table are: log-investments, current child’s
log-skills, current peers’ log-skills. The regression also
include as controls: age fixed effects, race, last period
family’s income, mother’s skills, school’s fixed effects.
Both standard errors in parenthesis and the 95% con-
fidence interval in square brackets are computed using
a cluster bootstrap.
Data source: National Longitudinal Survey of Ado-
lescent Health (Add Health).
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Table B.4: Counterfactual Effects on Receiving Children by Race (moved children are 5% of the receiving cohort)
Panel A: Effects on Children‘s Log-Skills (Mean)
Black Hispanic White
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (Equilibrium)
Age 13 -0.30 -0.30 Age 13 -0.34 -0.34 Age 13 0.22 0.22
Age 14 0.28 0.23 Age 14 0.45 0.41 Age 14 0.97 0.96
Age 15 0.96 0.87 Age 15 1.08 1.03 Age 15 1.66 1.64
Age 16 1.49 1.39 Age 16 1.59 1.53 Age 16 2.24 2.21
Panel B: Effects on Parent‘s Investment Decision (Mean)
Black Hispanic White
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
(Equilibrium) (Equilibrium) (Equilibrium)
Age 13 20.09 19.01 Age 13 21.97 20.71 Age 13 27.92 27.67
Age 14 18.85 17.94 Age 14 20.67 20.25 Age 14 28.02 27.85
Age 15 16.32 16.36 Age 15 16.69 16.63 Age 15 24.29 24.37
Notes: This table shows the counterfactual policy effects for receiving children (by race) when a fraction of moved children (5% of the
receiving population) are moved into a high-income environment. For each subgroup, I compare the baseline results in skills and parental
investments (Panel B) with the equilibrium counterfactual predictions.
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B.3 The Latent Factor Models
325
I consider the following latent factor model for either the child’s skills (hi,t) or the
mother’s skills (mi):
Zhi,t,k = µ
h
t,k + λ
h
t,k · lnhi,t + ǫhi,t,k
Zmi,k = µ
m
t,k + λ
m
k · lnmi + ǫmi,k (B.1)
where µs and λs are, respectively, the location and scale (or loading factor) parameters
for each considered measure k at any age t for each child i. The distribution of the
latent factors is identified by exploiting multiple measures in the data. One commonly
used condition for identification is the independence of the joint distribution of latent
variables and measurement errors.
Assumption 4 Measurement model assumptions:
(i) ǫhi,t,k ⊥ ǫhi,t,k′ and ǫmi,k ⊥ ǫmi,k′ for all t and k 6= k′
(ii) ǫhi,t,k ⊥ ǫhi,t′,k′ and ǫmi,k ⊥ ǫmi,k′ for all t 6= t′ and all k and k′
(iii) ǫhi,t,k ⊥ hi,t′ and ǫmi,k ⊥ mi for all t and t′ and all k
(iv) ǫhi,t,k ⊥ ǫhj,t,k and ǫmi,k ⊥ ǫmj,k for all k and for any family j different from family
i
(v) ǫhi,t,k , ǫ
m
i,k ⊥ Xi, for all t and all k
Assumption 4 (i) is that measurement errors are independent contemporaneously
across measures. Assumption 4 (ii) is that measurement errors are independent over
time. Assumption 4 (iii) is that measurement errors in any period are independent
of the latent variables in any period. Assumption 4 (iv) that measurement errors
are independent between observations. Finally, assumption 4 (v) assures that errors
in measuring skills are independent of the observable characteristics of children and
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mothers. While these assumptions are strong, they are common in the current liter-
ature (see Cunha et al., 2010; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016a). Assumptions (i)–(v),
together with the specification in (B.1), guarantee the non-parametric identification
of the latent distribution. However, in this work, I consider a parametric model of skill
formation, hence each of the conditions in (i)–(v) can be relaxed to statements about
the zero correlation between the considered variables, instead of the full independence
conditions.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
328
In this proof, I consider the two-period case. The four-period case follows by
the induction hypothesis. The proof is based on backward induction. The goal is
to show that for each period t, I can compute the policy functions for both parents
and children that solve the fixed point associated to the equilibrium conditions in
(3.4.5). For the purpose of exposition, I employ only the endogenous state variables
of the problem (h, H) and define the technology of skill formation in (3.4) as f(·).
1 Finally, the proof is executed for the case of log utility (γ3 = γ5 = 1) and perfect
substitution between parents and peers (α4 = 1). This parametric case is the harder
case to prove an existence of a fixed point through Tarski’s fixed point theorem, and
this is because of the non-trivial preservation of monotonicity and supermodularity
in the value function. Any other case where either utility function is more convex or
the technology provides higher complementarity between endogenous inputs follows
by construction. Hence, by proving that this case admits a fixed point, I prove that
a fixed point exists for any other admissible parameterization of the model .
• Last period case (t = T ):
During the last period, children decide their own peer-solving problem (3.6)
based on their current level of skills. Parents observe the realization of their
child’s network formation and then make their last investment decision. No
equilibrium conditions here are necessary, since during the next period, no chil-
dren’s network is formed. In other words, during the last period, the equilibrium
policy functions to solve the two (parent’s and child’s) decision problems. The
associated last period value function for parent i is:
1For clarity and without loss of generality, I ignore all the exogenous variables which are irrelevant
for the equilibrium analysis, such as the mother’s skills and the family’s characteristics.
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V PT (hi,T , H i,T ) =
((
τ − I∗T (hi,T , H i,T )
) · wi,T + yi,T )γ1 + (γ2 + α1) log(hi,T )
+ β γ4log
(
α3I
∗
T (hi,T , H i,T ) + (1− α3)H i,T
)
(B.2)
Lemma 2 The value function V PT (hi,T , H i,T ) is monotone, increasing in both
arguments and supermodular.
Proof: It is easy to show that the policy function is monotone in both dimen-
sions (monotone increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second
argument). Hence, the value function clearly has monotone increasing in the
first argument. Additionally, because of the homothetic preferences, the overall
peer effects H on children’s skills is positive, e.g., the change (decrease) of the
policy function due to higher H does not dominate the initial change in H. 2
Hence, the value function is also increasing with the peer effects. To show that
the value is supermodular, consider the derivative of V PT with respect to hi,T :
∂V PT (hi,T , H i,T )
∂hi,T
≡ γ2 + α1
hi,T
(B.3)
where equation (B.3) is derived applying the principle of optimality. Given equa-
tion (B.3) is independent of Hi,T , it follows trivially that V
P
T is supermodular
in (hi,T , H i,T ).
• First period case (t = T − 1):
In order to solve the parent’s problem and child’s problem differently (remember
that parents take a child’s decision regarding the next period’s network forma-
tion as a given), let us define h˜i,t+1 as the skills that children care about once
2This can be proved through the comparative statics of the problem, using the concavity of utility
over consumption and children’s skills.
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they decide upon their friends in the next period. Parents take h˜i,t+1 as a given
– that is, they think the process of the formation of peer groups is independent
of their investment decisions. In this case, the parent’s problem is:
V PT−1(hi,T−1, H i,T−1 ; h˜i,T ) =
max
Ii,T−1∈[0 , τ ]
((τ − Ii,T−1) · wi,T−1 + yi,T−1)γ1 + γ2 hi,T−1+
β E
[
V PT
(
hi,T (Ii,T−1) , H i,T (h˜i,T )
) ∣∣∣∣h˜i,T] (B.4)
where H i,T (h˜i,T ) is the stochastic mapping about the next period’s peer effects
H i,T given h˜i,T . Given the empirical evidence on children’s social interactions,
I consider the case when this mapping is stochastically ordered in h˜i,T ,
E
[
H i,T (h˜i,T )
∣∣∣∣h˜i,T] ≤ E [H i,T (h˜i,T ’)∣∣∣∣h˜i,T ’] if h˜i,T < h˜i,T ’,
which means that the higher the child’s skills, the higher the probability of
becoming friends with higher-skilled children. The fix-point problem here comes
from the equilibrium consistency conditions, which require that the endogenous
network formation is consistent with the parental decisions about the child’s
development. In other words, in the equilibrium path, I am imposing that the
optimal level of children’s skills decided by the parents are the same level of
skills governing the network-formation decision
h˜i,T = h
∗
i,T .
To show that this fix point has a solution, I am applying standard results in
the dynamic lattice programming literature.
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Lemma 3 Under Lemma 2, there exists a policy function IT−1(·) which solves
the equilibrium fix-point problem in (B.4).
Proof: This result follows directly from Tarski’s fixed point theorem. The con-
tinuation value is both increasing and supermodular in the two endogenous vari-
ables (individual endogenous children’s skills and peers’ skills). The stochastic
process governing the network formation stochastically ascends with respect to
the children’s skills, and the choice set is a complete lattice.
The Markovian equilibrium of the model is defined as the sequence of the policy
functions solves each of the two periods’ equilibrium problems.
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B.5 Indirect Inference
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Part of the selected moments in the estimation procedure includes coefficients of
auxiliary regressions. In particular, I consider separate auxiliary models to analyze the
parental investments and the dynamics of skills. The first set of coefficients consider
parental investments as the dependent variable in the following linear regression
Ii,s,t = β0 + β1 lnhi,s,t + β2 lnH i,s,t +X
′
iβ3 + βs + ui,s,t , (B.5)
where Ii,s,t is the parental investment (as fraction of time) for parent of child i, in
school s when she is t years old, which is recovered through a latent factor model
(see Section 3.5.1) using data on parental engagement described in previous section.
The child’s skills are defined as hi,s,t , while H i,s,t is the mean of her peers’ skills. Xi
is a vector of child and parents’ exogenous characteristics, which includes race, age
fixed-effects, lagged family income and mother’s skills. Finally, βs is the school fixed
effects. The coefficients of interests are related to how parental investments respond
to changes in child skills (β1) and peers’ skills (β2). In the estimation procedure, I
include as targeted moments the parameters in (B.5), for both the school fixed-effects
estimator, as well as for the IV estimator explained in Section 3.3.4.
Additionally, I consider an auxiliary model of skill dynamics, where the next period
skills are the dependent variable of the following regression
lnhi,s,t+1 = β
h
0 + β
h
1 lnhi,s,t + β
h
2 lnH i,s,t + β
h
3 ln Ii,s,t +X
′
iβ
h
4 + β
h
s + u
h
i,s,t , (B.6)
where (βh0 , β
h
1 , β
h
2 , β
h
3 ) are the specific auxiliary parameters I selected as targeting
moments for estimation. They represent respectively the elasticity of the next period
skills with respect to the stock of current skills, the peers’ skills and the parental
investments. Xi is a vector of child and parents’ exogenous characteristics, which
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includes race, age fixed-effects, lagged family income and mother’s skills. Finally, βs
is the school fixed effects. The estimated distribution of school fixed-effects are used
in the estimation as the school quality distributions in the model.
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Chapter C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3
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C.1 Additional Tables
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Table C.1: First Stage Estimates – Full Set of Individual Controls
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
∆Income ∆Hours Worked ∆Income ∆Hours Worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆EITC 1.026** 1.481*** 1.101** 1.488***
(0.488) (0.282) (0.482) (0.280)
LabDemShocks 1.659*** 0.322* 2.067*** 0.245
(0.395) (0.186) (0.405) (0.178)
Male 0.185 -0.006 0.134 -0.012
(0.279) (0.119) (0.288) (0.110)
Age -0.155** -0.007 -0.109** -0.020
(0.064) (0.028) (0.052) (0.024)
No siblings 0.053 0.024 -0.181 0.045
(0.533) (0.240) (0.481) (0.212)
Two or more sibling 0.079 -0.070 0.128 0.021
(0.397) (0.163) (0.406) (0.152)
Black -2.728*** -0.441** -2.624*** -0.393**
(0.447) (0.180) (0.417) (0.171)
Hispanic -2.087*** -0.342* -1.782*** -0.312*
(0.525) (0.205) (0.522) (0.189)
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 13.21 14.40 21.89 20.57
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SW F (Weak id) 13.19 14.38 21.86 20.54
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
KP (Weak id) 6.42 6.42 10.43 10.43
Observations 12,288 12,288 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for both our first stage models. Dependent variable: ∆
Income (columns 1 and 3), and ∆Hours worked (columns 2 and 4). Columns (1) and (2) refer to the
estimating sample used for the analysis of child cognitive development (combined Math-Reading test
score). Columns (3) and (4) consider the estimating sample used for the analysis of child behavioral
development (Behavior Problems Index, BPI). For each analysis, the two endogenous variables are:
changes in income (∆Income) and changes in maternal hours worked (∆Hours). The two instrumental
variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). Income
and the EITC are measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed
in hundreds. All models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a
control function (see equation 4.7). One sibling is the reference category for child’s number of siblings.
White is the reference category for child’s race. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table C.2: Changes in EITC Schedule, Labor Demand Shocks, and Spouse Labor
Supply
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
∆Hours Worked Spouse ∆Hours Worked Spouse
(1) (2)
∆EITC 0.402 0.788
(0.661) (0.644)
LabDemShocks 0.166 0.098
(0.204) (0.192)
Observations 7,726 8,845
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis of changes in spouse labor
supply. Dependent variable: ∆Hours worked by the spouse. Column (1) refers to
the estimating sample used for the analysis of child cognitive development (combined
Math-Reading test score). Column (2) considers the estimating sample used for the
analysis of child behavioral development (Behavior Problems Index, BPI). The two
instrumental variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor demand
shocks (LabDemShocks). Income and the EITC are measured in $1,000 of year 2000
dollars. Hours worked by the spouse are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All
models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted income as a
control function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age,
gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level
and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.3: Income, Hours Worked, and Child Test
Scores – Full Set of Individual Controls
Combined Math-Reading
OLS IV
(1) (2)
∆Income 0.001* 0.044***
(0.000) (0.015)
∆Hours worked 0.000 -0.060**
(0.001) (0.024)
Male 0.024** 0.017
(0.010) (0.017)
Age 0.001 0.008*
(0.003) (0.005)
No siblings -0.001 -0.006
(0.020) (0.032)
Two or more sibling -0.026** -0.028
(0.012) (0.022)
Black -0.156*** -0.057
(0.014) (0.041)
Hispanic -0.076*** -0.009
(0.016) (0.035)
Observations 12,288 12,288
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis of
child cognitive development. Dependent variable: Com-
bined Math-Reading test score. Column (1) reports the
OLS estimates. Column (2) shows the IV estimates. The
two instrumental variables are: changes in EITC benefits
(∆EITC) and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). In-
come is measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours
worked are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All
models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion
of predicted income as a control function (see equation 4.7).
One sibling is the reference category for child’s number of
siblings. White is the reference category for child’s race.
Standard errors are clustered at the family level and re-
ported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.4: Income, Hours Worked, and Child Be-
havior – Full Set of Individual Controls
Behavior Problems Index
OLS IV
(1) (2)
∆Income 0.000 0.013
(0.000) (0.009)
∆Hours worked -0.001 -0.052**
(0.001) (0.022)
Male -0.016 -0.018
(0.011) (0.013)
Age 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003)
No siblings 0.026 0.027
(0.020) (0.023)
Two or more sibling 0.002 0.005
(0.013) (0.015)
Black -0.008 0.010
(0.015) (0.028)
Hispanic 0.023 0.031
(0.016) (0.022)
Observations 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for our analysis of
child behavioral development. Dependent variable: Behav-
ior Problems Index (BPI). Column (1) reports the OLS esti-
mates. Column (2) shows the IV estimates. The two instru-
mental variables are: changes in EITC benefits (∆EITC)
and labor demand shocks (LabDemShocks). Income is
measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are
yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. All models include
a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted in-
come as a control function (see equation 4.7). One sibling is
the reference category for child’s number of siblings. White
is the reference category for child’s race. Standard errors
are clustered at the family level and reported in parenthe-
ses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.5: Baseline Estimates with State Trends
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Income 0.001* 0.041*** 0.000 0.008
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.006)
∆Hours worked 0.000 -0.056** -0.001 -0.049**
(0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.020)
First Stage Tests (Income/Hours):
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 23.54/19.32 40.98/25.72
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
SW F (Weak id) 23.41/19.21 40.77/25.60
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
KP (Weak id) 10.30 15.38
Observations 12,288 12,288 13,777 13,777
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the analysis of cognitive and behavioral development
with a state fixed effects specification. Dependent variable: Combined Math-Reading test
score (columns 1–2), and Behavior Problems Index (BPI) (columns 3–4). Income and EITC
are measured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in
hundreds. All models include state fixed effects and a third order Taylor polynomial expansion
of predicted income as a control function (see equation 4.7). All models also include state fixed
effects, as well as controls for child’s age, gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors
are clustered at the family level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.6: Baseline Estimates with Controls for School Financial and Economic
Resources
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Income 0.001* 0.042*** 0.000 0.012
(0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.009)
∆Hours worked 0.000 -0.057** -0.001 -0.051**
(0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.022)
∆Total revenues (per pupil) 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.006
(0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.015)
∆Total public expenditure (per pupil) 0.012 -0.016 0.021 -0.006
(0.022) (0.044) (0.023) (0.032)
First Stage Tests (Income/Hours):
SW Chi-sq. (Under id) 14.58/15.60 23.45/21.03
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
SW F (Weak id) 14.56/15.58 23.41/21.00
P-value 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00
KP (Weak id) 7.08 11.05
Observations 12,255 12,255 13,735 13,735
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the analysis of cognitive and behavioral development
when we control for per-pupil school resources by state. Dependent variable: Combined Math-
Reading test score (columns 1–2), and Behavior Problems Index (BPI) (columns 3–4). Family
income, the EITC, the total revenues per pupil, and the total expenditure per pupil are measured
in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in hundreds. The
total revenues per pupil are the total revenues from all sources divided by the fall membership
as reported in the state finance file. The total current expenditure per pupil is the total current
expenditure for public elementary and secondary education divided by the fall membership as
reported in the state financial file. Data about revenues and expenditures are from the CDD Na-
tional Public Education Financial Survey. All models also include controls for child’s age, gender,
race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the family level and reported in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.7: Common Pre-trends between La-
bor Demand Shocks and Child Development
Combined Behavior
Math-Reading Problems Index
(1) (2)
LabDemShocks (t+ 1)
F-stat. 6.11 0.12
P-value 0.01 0.73
LabDemShocks (t+ 2)
F-stat. 0.70 0.38
P-value 0.40 0.54
LabDemShocks (t+ 3)
F-stat. 1.35 0.61
P-value 0.25 0.43
LabDemShocks (t+ 1),(t+ 2)
F-stat. 0.47 0.23
P-value 0.63 0.80
LabDemShocks (t+ 1),(t+ 2),(t+ 3)
F-stat. 0.81 1.50
P-value 0.49 0.21
Notes: This table is based on the analysis of the
effect of future labor demand shocks on current
cognitive and behavioral development. The table
shows the F-statistic and the relative significance of
the coefficients for future labor demand shocks. In
cases with multiple variables for future labor demand
shocks, we jointly test the significance of labor de-
mand shocks. Dependent variable: Combined Math-
Reading test score (column 1), and Behavior Prob-
lems Index (BPI) (column 3). Each specification con-
tains controls for EITC benefits (∆EITC) and labor
demand shocks (LabDemShocks). In addition, each
model also contains variables for future labor demand
shocks as explained in each panel header. All models
include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of
predicted income as a control function (see equation
4.7). All models also include controls for child’s age,
gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the family level and reported
in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.8: Baseline Estimates Excluding Movers Across States
Combined Math-Reading Behavior Problems Index
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Income 0.001** 0.052*** 0.000 0.010
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.010)
∆Hours worked 0.000 -0.069** -0.000 -0.053**
(0.001) (0.030) (0.001) (0.024)
Observations 11,707 11,707 13,087 13,087
Notes: This table shows the estimates for the analysis of cognitive and behavioral
development once we exclude observations with changes in state of residence in two
consecutive periods. Dependent variable: Combined Math-Reading test score (columns
1–2), and Behavior Problems Index (BPI) (columns 3–4). Income and EITC are mea-
sured in $1,000 of year 2000 dollars. Hours worked are yearly hours and expressed in
hundreds. All models include a third order Taylor polynomial expansion of predicted
income as a control function (see equation 4.7). All models also include controls for
child’s age, gender, race, and number of siblings. Standard errors are clustered at the
family level and reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.9: Time Allocation to Child Care, Mother’s Hours Worked, and Family
Income
Physical Help with Read & Other Total
Child Care Homework Play Child Care Child Care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Hours worked (per week) -0.007** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.028*** -0.060***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 3,183 3,183 3,183 3,183 3,183
Notes: This table shows the OLS estimates for the analysis of parental time investment in the child using
data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the American Heritage Time Use Survey (AHTUS).
Dependent variable: Physical Child Care (column 1), Help with Homework (column 2), Read and Play
(column 3), Other Child Care (column 4), and Total Child Care (column 5). Time investment is measured in
hours per week. Income is measured in $1,000 of year 2003 dollars. Hours worked are weekly hours worked.
All models include controls for single-head household, mother’s age, child’s age, mother’s education, number
of siblings. All models also include year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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C.2 The Child Development Supplement
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In Table C.10 we show the variables construction process used to analyze the
Child Development Supplement (CDS). We focus on the first wave of the CDS, the
so-called CDS-I, collected in 1997.
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Table C.10: CDS – Variables Construction
Original Variable
Original Definition Answers Definition
(1) (2) (3)
Encourage hobbies Family encourages hobbies Yes, No Yes=1
Physical affection Shown physical affection 1-350 1-350
(times past week)
Parenting class pre-birth Take parenting classes Yes, No Yes=1
before child’s birth
Parenting class Never take parenting Yes, No No=1
classes
Never cared by others Child’s age when 0-10 Never=1
first cared by others
Use of rules Family with lots of rules Lots, Not many Lots=1
or not very many rules
How often...
Control who the child is with Control which children your N, S, SM, O, VO O, VO=1
child spend time with
Control activities after school Control how child spends N, S, SM, O, VO O, VO=1
time after school
Set homework time Set a time for homework N, S, SM, O, VO O, VO=1
Reaction to grades lower than expected:
Contact faculty Contact teacher/principal U, SU, NS, SL, L SL, L=1
Closer eye on activities Closer eye on child’s U, SU, NS, SL, L L=1
activities
Lecture a child Lecture the child U, SU, NS, SL, L SL, L=1
Tell child to work harder Tell the child to spend U, SU, NS, SL, L L=1
more time on homework
Help with schoolwork Increase time helping U, SU, NS, SL, L L=1
the child with schoolwork
Full home Full home scale 7-27 7-27
Cognitive stimulation Cognitive stimulation 2-14 2-14
subscale
Emotional support Emotional support 2-14 2-14
subscale
Parental warmth Parental warmth 1-5 1-5
subscale
Time diaries (in seconds)
School Student, attending classes 0-86,400 0-86,400
TV TV use 0-86,400 0-86,400
Electronic games Electronic video games use 0-86,400 0-86,400
Art, sculpture Art, arts and crafts, 0-86,400 0-86,400
Books Reading or looking at books 0-86,400 0-86,400
Visiting others, socializing Socializing with people 0-86,400 0-86,400
outside own household
Note: This table shows variable definitions from the CDS-I data set used in Section 4.5.4. In the table the
following abbreviations are used: (i) N: Never, S: Seldom, SM: Sometimes, O: Often, VO: Very often; (ii)
U: Not at all likely, SU: Somewhat unlikely, NS: Not sure how likely, SL: Somewhat likely, L: likely. Refer
to the text and the CDS-I User Guide Supplement for further details about the original and the constructed
variables.
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